The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

Open to allIsvara Krishna; comm. Gaudapada273 segments · 92 pp

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The translator’s English as printed (H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.

‘3. The notion of the Kanabhakshas, Akshacharanas, and others, that that which is not may proceed from that which is, excludes the comprehension of effect in cause, as that which is and that which is not cannot have community: consequently the existence of nature is not proved ; and in order to establish its existence, the existence of effect in it must first be determined *."

Of the doctrines here alluded to, the first is said to be that of some of the Buddhists, who deny the existence of prakriti, or any universal cause, or of any thing which they cannot verify by perception. The second is that of the Véd4ntis, who maintain that all that exists is but the vivarttas, literally the ‘ revolutions’'—the emanations from, or manifestations of, one only universal spirit. It might be said that the Sankhya seems to teach a similar doctrine, in as far as it refers all that exists, exclusive of spirit, to one common source, and makes all else identical with prakriti, It differs however in this, that it regards the substances evolved from the radical prakriti as substantial existences, as effects or products of a cause which exists no longer except in its effects. The VédAntis, on the other hand, maintain that it is cause which is eternal, and that effects are

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only its present operations. The popular form of Véd4ntism asserts, indeed, that nothing exists but cause, and that its effects, or all that appears to exist, are unrealities, illusions, the phantoms of a dream: but the commentator on the Sdnkhya Pravachana declares, that the doctrine of mdyd, or ‘illusion,’ is modern, and is contrary to the Védas, and that those who advocate it are nothing but disguised Bauddhas: ‘ The cause of the bondage of soul asserted by those concealed Bauddhas, the modern advocates of mdyd, is here refuted*.’ In the third case we have the authors specified as Kanabhakshas, ‘ Feeders upon little,’ or upon atoms, perhaps; and Adshacharanas, ‘ Followers of controversy ;') contemptuous terms for the Vaiséshikas, who maintain the origin of all things from primeval atoms, or monads; and who may therefore be said to deduce what is not—the insubstantial forms of things—from actual corpuscular substance.

The fourth or ancient doctrine, that that which is comes from that which is, ens from ens, 76 dv from 76 éy, is the converse of the celebrated dogma of antiquity, ex nihilo, nihil fit; and although in this place it is especially restricted to the relation of certain effects to a certain cause, yet it comes to the same thing as regards the world in general, the things of which cannot be derived from no primary existent thing; agreeably to the Sftra of Kapita; ‘The production of a thing cannot be from nothing ;) Oceer ryiverac é rod wy Syros: not only according to Democritus and Epicurus, but according to all the ancient philosophers, who, Aristotle states, agreed universally in the physical doctrine, that it was impossible for any thing to be produced from nothing: Tovrwy & 76 pév ée Mn Svrer vyiverOa adivatoy’ rept yap Tatras Suoryrwuovovas Tis ddtns Gravres of epi pices. Phys. I. 4.

t araeqat aepfete: 1

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IX.

Errect subsists (antecedently to the operation of cause); for what _ exists not, can by no operation of cause be brought into existence. | Materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose: every thing is not by every means possible: what is capable, does that to which it is competent ; and like is produced from like.

BHASHYA.

From there being no instrumental cause of what exists not—non-existent, what is not—there is no making what is not: therefore effect is. In this world there is no making of what is not; as, the production of oil from sand: therefore the instrumental cause produces what is, from its having been formerly implanted. Hence perceptible principles, which are effects, exist in nature.

Further, from selection of materials.—Upddéna is ‘ (material) cause,’ from the selection of it: thus, in life, a man who desires a thing, selects that by which it may be produced; as he who wishes for curds, takes milk, not water (for their material cause). Thence effect is.

Again, every thing is not by every means possible. The universal possibility of every thing is not; as of gold in silver, &c. or in grass, dust, or sand. Therefore, from the non-universality of every thing in every thing, effect is. *

Again, what is capable does that to which it is competent ; as, a potter is the capable agent; the implements, the lump of clay, the wheel, rag, rope, water, &c. (are capable), by which he makes the jar, which is capable of being so made from earth. Thence effect is.

Commentary
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