The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

The explanation given by Gaurapapa of the three kinds of inference is not exactly conformable to the definitions of the logicians, although the same technical terms are employed. Thus in the Nydya Siitra Vritti, in the comment on the Sitra of Gautama‘, we have the following: ‘ Threefold inference. Prior, that is, cause; characterized by, or having, that (cause); as inference of rain from the gathering of clouds. Posterior, effect ; characterized by it, as inference of rain from the swelling of a river. Analogous (or generic); characterized as distinct from both effect and cause, as the inference of any thing being a substance from its being earthy **.’ Here then we have inference a priori, or of effect from cause ;

* afafaranaaara:—faed aft Tar 1 erarrarnt qfearenrd art tenradtan fasiasta =f af ae fe argaereaaatate wéttisorrarnsaaarn warts aA | wa aferaea qeranste afcarte AAA: | YET FETT Aquat waa 1 Wisd afersaftareqefen anfafaen srarmrenarargqareartra wart | ‘ fafanrqar ara wa arated wi fafeufafs ot acd wen whe TS ae Airfare gerard | Fe: wet where Hera awa adtgen gear i aan ce astarcufrataTs an gfadiea crane |

2Q4 inference a posteriori, or of cause from effect ; and inference from analogy, or community of sensible properties; for samdnyato drishtam is ‘that which is recognised from generic properties, its own specific properties being unnoticed *.’ The S. Chandrika gives a similar, or logical, explanation of the three kinds of inference.

The definition of inference in general is the subject of the first member of the second hemistich. The expressions linga{ and lingt{ are analogous to ‘ predicate and subject,’ or the mark, sign, or accident by which any thing is characterized, and the thing having such characteristic mark and sign. Thus /inga is explained by logicians by the term rydpya}, and ling by vydpaka§; as in the proposition, There is fire, because there is smoke, the latter is the /inga, vydpya, ‘ major or predicate ;’ and fire the /ingé or vydpuka, the ‘minor or subject,’ or thing of which the presence is denoted by its characteristic. Inference, then, is a conclusion derived from previous determination of predicate and subject; or it is knowledge of the points of an argument depending on the relation between subject and predicate; that is, ‘Unless it were previously known that smoke indicated fire, the presence of the latter could not be inferred from the appearance of the former.’ This is what the logicians term paramersha, ‘observation or experience.’ Apta*®, according to Gaurapdpa, means acharya; and dpta srutitt implies ‘holy teachers and holy writ.’ NArAyana expounds it in a similar mannerff, and adds, that dpta means /swara, or ‘god,’ according to the theistical Scnkhya |. VAcuespazt explains the terms similarly, though more obscurely. Apta is equivalent with him to prépta, ‘obtained,’ and yukta,

‘ proper, right ;’ and dpéa sruti is ‘ both that which is right and traditional, holy knowledge §§;' for sruti is defined to be ‘knowledge of ie purwai amagtenqarafargarannrd afer | “STH 1 ssrreegift t Yo arambtracarantarararare: | I Se wah iat wae) emer afr Sergi:

* eee eras Targa | + fabri ees. Iara fare * wera

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port of texts derived from holy writ; which knowledge is of itself proof, as obtained from the Védas, which are not of human origin, and fit to exempt from all fear of error®.’ The first term, vdkya, is explained to signify, ‘the Véda is the teacher of religion t;' and the expression vékydrtha is equivalent to dherma, ‘religion or virtue.’ ‘ Religion is heard by it; as, “ Let one desirous of heaven perform the jyotishtoma sacrifice :” such is a text (of scripture) {.’ The texts of the Védas and of other inspired works are authority, as having been handed down through successive births by the same teachers as Jaicisnavya says, ‘ By me living repeatedly in ten different great creations |.’ So ‘the Véda was remembered by Kapiza from a former state of being §.’ The Miémdnsakas distinguish between dpta vdhya and réda vdékya: the former is human; the latter inspired, authority.

VI.

SensiBxe objects become known by perception; but it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained: and a truth which is neither to be directly perceived, nor to be inferred from reasoning, is deduced from revelation.

BHASHYA.

By inference from analogy ; of things beyond the senses—the ascertainment of existing things which transcend the senses. Nature and soul are | waserenraaryaye waists om fea Sptenh aNafa are | lewa erat fauftatarea aati |S anrfefageerafterer Feet weararenitera frercreara:

vt H