The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

there can be no abstract mastership (or possession) *.. The same authority gives also a different reading of the first expression, ndsmi, explaining it x@ asmi, ‘I am male; or purusha, ‘ unproductive of progeny,’ of actst. The S. Prav. Bh., commenting on this verse of the Kerikd, has, ‘ Neither I am, denies the agency of soul; nor (is aught mine), denies its attachment (to any objects); nor do I exist, denies its appropriation (of faculties)}.’ The Sitra is to the same effect: ‘ From relinquishment (consequent on) study of principles; this is not, this is not {j:’ that is, of all the objects proceeding from prakriti, not one is soul. The phraseology is ascribed to the Védas, and a similar passage is thence cited: ‘ Hence comes the conclusion, it is not, it is not (soul), it is uot (soul is not), from it: such is not so; it is different, it is supreme, it is that very thing (that itis). It is not, it is not, (means) soul. Such is (the phrase), It is not §,” &c. And the Chandrika explains the terms similarly: ‘ J am not means I am not agent; therefore I am distinct from the principle of intelligence. Not mine is pain: exemption from being the seat of pain and the rest is thence determined. Nor do J exist: by this, difference from egotism is expressed.’ Rama Kaisuna repeats the words of the

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Chandrikd. By these expressions therefore, however quaint or questionable, we are not to understand negation of soul. This would be a direct contradiction to its specification as one of the categories of the system, one of the twenty-five essential and existent principles. It is merely intended as a negation of the soul’s having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings. Lam, I do, I suffer, mean that material nature, or some of her products, (substantially,) is, does, or suffers ; and not soul, which is unalterable and indifferent, susceptible of neither pleasure nor pain, and only reflecting them, as it were, or seemingly sharing them, from the proximity of nature, by whom they are really experienced *: for soul, according to the Védas, is absolutely existent, eternal, wise, true, free, unaffected by passion, universal +. This verse, therefore, does not amount, as M. Cousin has supposed, to “ le nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme.”

LXV.
Possessev of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure

and at ease nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven forms.

BHASHYA.

By that pure (absolute), single knowledge soul beholds nature, like a spectator, at leisure and composed ; a8 a spectator seated at a play beholds an actress. Composed: who stays (or is involved) in self; or staying or abiding in one’s own place. How is Prakriti; debarred from prolific change? Not producing intellect, egotism, and the other effects. Consequently precluded from those seven forms: desisting from the seven forms

* ufafarety qeasha Gage wl 1 amare fare: RE ET Ger ie eG

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or modes by which she binds herself, or virtue, vice, and the rest, and which are no longer required for the use of soul, both whose objects (fruition and liberation) are effected.

COMMENT.

Soul, possessed of the knowledge described in the preceding stanza, or divested of all individuality, becomes indifferent to, and independent of, nature, which therefore ceases to act.

Soul contemplates nature, like a spectator, prékshaka, one who beholds a dancer or actress; at leisure, avasthita, or without action, nishkriya ; aud at ease, sustha. This is also read strastha, ‘calm, collected in self * or nirdkula, ‘ unagitated.’ Nature consequently has nothing more to do. The objects of soul, fruition and liberation, having been effected, by knowledge, the other faculties of intellect are needless.

LXVI.
He desists, because he has seen her; she does so, because she has

been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.

BHASHYA.

One present at a play, as a spectator, (ceases to behold ;) so one, single, pure soul desists. One (nature), knowing I have been seen by him, stops, ceases. Nature is the one, chief cause of the three worlds ; there is no second. Although form have terminated, yet from specific difference there is, even in the cessation of (the cooperation of) nature and soul, union, as a generic characteristic. For, if there be not union, whence is creation! There being union of these two; that is, of nature and soul; there being union from their universal diffusion: yet there es

* ere: exfera frrefer |