The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

tion of the Sétra, “ Upon the detection of her faults, there is no further approach of nature (to soul); like a woman of family {:° that is, ‘When nature finds that soul has discovered it is to her that the distress, &c. of migration are owing, she is put to shame by the detection, and ventures no more near soul; as a woman of family keeps aloof from a husband by whoin she knows her faults to have been found out. And this is considered as an additional reason for the discontinuance of the activity of nature |. This is my opinion§ refers to what has preceded, there is nothing more gentle, as is shewn by the term it#; also by the Bhdshya of GavrarApa. It is clear, therefore, that the expression refers to the author; such is his opinion; that is, he does not here dogmatise, and say that nature is actually more timid or soft than any thing else—for the phrase is merely a figure of speech, a metaphorical illustration—but that it seems so to him; the words having the force of ‘ methinks, it seems :’ ‘ Nature,

* aren fe goraycirrerenrea warehetforaferea WT VESTA UCYRTY AAT AMT NIA BAAR TIA TE wrrafa a ormetfa | wat opiate gorayiisafire ger fe Wea a qadern eer) tog fe: cca Geta at ara weet eet at dteraaren Foreiad yaad aah) |b are asia arrata maT! FerTyAA | | gee wga: aft uiaagermennecetarchis faa: WEA: YaTEd Wy ward gsoayay TM Sifaat BAe ee IAMUTTa ofa Fs tae ie taal faqet eeoacfata | 5 ee a enp. 175 it seems to me, or methinks, is the most soft, timid, retiring, of all things, and cannot bear to be stared at rudely: once seen, therefore, as she is, she takes care, like a truly modest matron, to be seen no more.” Such is the obvious purport of the text, which is merely a further illustration of the idea conveyed in ver. 59. Gauravapa has gone out of his way rather to discuss the character of a first cause; giving to sukwmdratara a peculiar import, that of ‘ enjoyable, perceptible ;) which nature eminently is, and is therefore, according to him, the most appropriate source of all perceptible objects, or, in other words, of creation.

LXIIL. |

Verity not any soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates; but 2nature alone, in relation to various beings, is bound, is released, and migrates. , BHASHYA.

Therefore, from that cause, soul is not bound, nor indeed is loosed, nor migrates ; for, because, nature, in relation to various beings—in relation (or connection) with celestial, human, or brute forms, in the character of intellect, egotism, the rudiments, senses, and gross elements—is bound, is liberated, or migrates. For soul is of its own nature loosed, and goes every where, and how therefore should it migrate? migration being for the purpose of obtaining something not previously obtained. The phrases, therefore, Soul is bound, Soul is loosed or migrates, originate in ignorance of the nature of migration. From knowledge, the end of soul and existence, the real nature of soul is attained. That being manifest, soul is single, pure, free, fixed in its own nature. Consequently if there is no bondage there can be no liberation of soul. It is therefore said (see next verse), “ Nature binds and liberates herself ;” for where subtile body, composed of the rudiments, and having a triple cause, exists, such body is bound with triple bonds ; as it is said, “‘ He who is bound by the bonds of nature,” of nature’s products or of works, “cannot by any other bep. 176 loosed” (see Comment, ver. 45). Such a subtile body is affected by virtue, vice, &c. Nature is bound, is loosed, and migrates. How is next described.

The subjection of nature, not of soul, to the accidents of bondage, liberation, and migration is asserted in this verse.

The doctrine here laid down seems at variance with what has preceded, and with the usual purport of the notions that attach the accidents of bondage and liberation to soul. Apparently, however, the difference is one of words only.