The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

There is nothing in the world more soft (gentle, timid) than nature, in my opinion: for which reason (nature’s) opinion consults another's advantage. Wherefore nature says to herself, “1 have been beheld by that soul,” and does not again present herself to the view of that soul ; that is, she disappears from the presence of soul. That indicates what the text means by gentle,

It (the text?) declares /swara (God) to be the cause of the world : thus; “ Let this ignorant, brute, godless (soul), for its own pleasure or pain, go to heaven or hell, sent (thither) by Iswara.” Others say, spontaneity is cause: “ By what (or whom) the swan is created white, the peacock of many colours ;” that is, they are so naturally (or spontaneously). Here, therefore, the Sankhya teachers have said, How can beings endowed with qualities proceed from Iswara, who is devoid of qualities? or how from soul, equally devoid of qualities! Therefore (the causality) of nature is rendered probable. Thus; from white threads white cloth is fabricated ; from black threads black cloth: and in the same manner, from nature, endowed with the three qualities, the three worlds, endowed with the three qualities also, are produced. This is determined. Iswara is without qualities: the origin of the three worlds endowed with qualities, from

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him, would therefore be an inconsistency. By this (same reason) soul also cannot be cause. According to some, time is cause: “ Time is the five elements; time destroys the world; time watches, when all things sleep; time is not to be surpassed.” There are but three categories, the discrete principle, the undiscrete principle, and soul ; and by one of them time must be comprehended. Time, then, is a discrete principle ; for nature, from its universal creative power, is the cause of time; spontaneity merges into it (nature): and time, therefore, is not cause; neither is spontancity. Nature alone, therefore, is cause; and there is no cause of nature. She does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul. Therefore it is my opinion that there is no cause more gentle, more enjoyable, than nature, such as Tswara and the rest.

It is said familiarly in the stanzas of the text, “Soul is liberated ; soul migrates :” on this it is observed—

COMMENT.

Nature being once properly understood by soul ceases to act.

Nature being once fully seen—that is, known or understood—by soul :

disappears, goes no more into its sight; it ceases to be, with respect to that individual soul. Why is this? Because it is the most soft, the most gentle or timid, sukumdratara, of all things. The term kumdra, properly implying ‘soft’ or ‘young,’ is explained by the Scholiasts to signify ‘ bashful, modest, unable to bear the gaze of soul*.’ VAcnespati. Sukumédratara salajja }, NAnAvana and Rama Krisuxa. In the S. Bhadshya it is rendered by subhogyatara |,‘ more fit to be enjoyed; but this refers less to the metaphorical illustration, than to the doctrine, of the text, and might be rendered, ‘more plastic;' there being nothing so suitable as nature (matter) for the cause or origin of sensible objects. The 8. Tatwa Kaumudi amplifies and explains the illustration : ‘ Nature is like a woman of virtue and family: such a one, of retired habits and modest looks, may be, by

. ce fart t fi ' t 2 wast | lpivaatp. 174 some inadvertence, surprised in disabille by a strange man, but she takes good care that another shall not behold her off her guard. Nature being once fully seen by discrimination, has too much matronly decorum to allow herself to be looked at a second time®.’ The 8. Chandrika has a similar exposition ¢. The 8. Pravachana Bh. cites this verse in explana-