The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

Srvce the assemblage of sensible objects is for another’s use; since the converse of that which has the three qualities, with other properties (before mentioned), must exist; since there must be superintendence ; since there must be one to enjoy; since there is a tendency to abstraction; therefore, soul is.

afanfrqerrafater) 6 | eeeparare a frre eam} ayearareerd | a

p. 66

BHASHYA.

As it is said, “ Liberation is obtained by discriminative knowledge of discrete and undiscrete principles ;" and whereas the undiscrete has been shewn to be distinct from the discrete by five arguments (ver. 9), so soul being, like the undiscrete principle, subtile (not cognizable by the senses), its existence is now established by inference. Soud is—Why ? Because the assemblage of objects is for another's use—The assemblage of intellect and the rest is for the use of soul: this is inferred from the irrationality (of nature and its effects), like a bed. In like manner as a bed, which is an assemblage of bedding, props, cords, cotton, coverlid, and pillows, is for another's use, not for its own; and its several component parts render no mutual service; thence it is concluded that there is a man who sleeps upon the bed, and for whose use it was made: so this body, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for another's use ; or, there is soul, for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body, consisting of un aggregate of intellect and the rest, has been produced. ~

Aguin, soul is, because the reverse of that which has the three qualities has been declared: as it was stated in a former verse (11), ‘A discrete principle has the three qualities, is indiscriminative, objective, &c.;" and it is added, “ Soul is in these respects the reverse.”

Aguin, soul is, because there must be superintendence-—As a charioteer guides a chariot drawn by horses able to curvet, to prance, to gallop, so the suul guides the body: as it is said in the Shashihi Tantra, “ Nature, directed by soul, proceeds.”

Soul is, because there must be an enjoyer—Iu like manner as there must be sume one to partake of food flavoured with swect, sour, salt, pungent, bitter, and astringent flavours, so, as there is no capability of fruition in intellect and the other products of nature, there must be soul, by which this body is to be enjoyed.

Again, soul is, because there is a tendency to abstraction.— Kaivalya is the abstract noun, derived from kerala, ‘sole, only’—for, on account of, that (abstraction); the practice of it: from the exercise of (or tendency to) abstraction (for the sake of its own separation or detachment) it isp. 67 inferred that soul is. That is, Every one, whether wise or unwise, equally desires imperishable release from succession of worldly existence.

It is next to be determined whether this soul be but one superintendent over all bodies, like the string that supports all the gems of a necklace ; or whether there be many souls presiding severally over individual bodies.

COMMENT.

Arguments for the existence of soul as a distinct principle are here adduced.

The existence of soul is established by inference: a bed implies a sleeper; nature, made up of its effects, is for the production of pain, pleasure, and insensibility, of which soul alone is conscious*. But admitting that the assemblage is for the benefit of another, why should that other be soul? because soul is not a similar aggregate ; it is not made up of qualities and the like, but is the reverse of nature in these respects, as was explained in verse 11: or, as the commentator on the Sitra, Sanhata pardrthatwat}, observes, because the property of pain or pleasure, which is identical with body, must be different from that which enjoys the one, or suffers the other. Because there must be an enjoyer.—The existence of an enjoyer implies the existence of both pleasure and pain; election between which cannot be made by intellect and the rest, which are inseparable from them, and it must be the act of something else, which is soul. ‘Intellect and the rest are the things to be used (hogya) or perceived (drigya), and consequently imply one who perceives {.’ S. Tata Kaumudi.

The term kaivalya, rendered ‘ abstraction,’ signifies ‘detachment from the world ;° or, as it is explained, ‘ absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must therefore be something different from intellect and thep. 68 rest, which are the same thing as pain, and cannot effect a separation from their own essence ®.) S. Tateea Kanmudi. So Visxina Buixsuu explains katvalya, ‘ absolute extirpation of pain t.’

* qageenrara wee: ai dara) t demand aq! brat ee qeneat & CET era TAT Rat wemrefea wet eTqerafafce: a wTefa |