The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

The version proposed by Professor Lassen rests upon his notion of the grammatical force of the expression chénna or chét, ‘if, na, ‘not:’ the former he would refer to the prior member of the sentence, the latter to the subsequent expressions. But this division of the compound is not that which is most usual in argumentative writings. The phrase is an elliptical negation of a preceding assertion, chét referring to what has been said, implying, ‘if you assert or believe this ;° and na meeting it with a negatur, ‘it is not so:’ then follows the reason or argument of the denial. Thus in the Muktdvali: ‘ But why should not Darkness be c

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called a tenth thing, for it is apprehended by perception? If this be said, it is not so (iti chén-na) ; for it is the consequence of the non-existence of absolute light, and it would be illogical to enumerate it amongst things®.’ So in the Nydya Sitra Vritti: ‘If by a disturbance in the assembly there be no subsequent speech, and through the want of a reply there be defeat ; if this be urged, it is not so (ii chén-na), because there has been no opportunity for an answer.’ Again in the Sdénkhya Pravachana Bhashya. Stra :—' If it be said that Prakriti is the cause of bondage, it is not so, from its dependent statej.’ Comment :—‘ But bondage may be occasioned by Prakriti. If this be asserted, it is not so. Why? Because in the relation of bondage, Prakriti is dependent upon conjunction, as will be explained in the following precept||.’ Also in the Veddnta Sdra Vivriti: ‘If in consequence of such texts of the Védas as “ let sacrifice be performed as long as life endures” their performance is indispensable, and constant and occasional rites must be celebrated by those engaged in the attainment of true knowledge ; and if, on the other hand, the attainment of true knowledge is distinct from the observance of ceremonies ; then a double duty is incumbent on those wishing to eschew the world. If this be asserted, it is not so (#té chén-na), from the compatibility of severalty with union, as in the case of articles of khayar or other wood §:’ that is, where there are several obligations, that which is most essential

THRAMSTAA ATT CATACH STATA | Tt aTeRt fen Faas Teche Sens Ta Tecra aa ( fb agfafraanea ren afer) 6 laggy fafafrnen vafafa ta uawen why saree dato AaTyy TATA | {aq aardat aasitd aretara Tratena wera fafafearae franfadae: masta afe a fafafenta wgrequiaantata am dare facqere anfefres erfecican eaqeeTTe: |

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may be selected from the rest. In the same work we have an analogous form used affirmatively ; as,‘ But how by the efficacy of knowledge, after the dissipation of ignorance, in regard to the object (of philosophy), can the true nature of the essentially happy (being) be attained? for as he is eternally existent, knowledge is not necessary to establish his existence. If this be asserted, it is true (iti chét; satyam). Brahme, one essentially with felicity, is admitted to be eternal, but in a state of ignorance he is not obtained ; like a piece of gold which is forgotten (and sought for), whilst it is hanging round the neck*.’ Here it would be impossible to refer satyam to the succeeding member of the sentence, as the apodosis being separated from it, not only by the sense, but by the particle api. Passages of this description might be indefinitely multiplied, but these are sufficient to shew that the construction in the sense adopted by Mr. Colebrooke is common and correct.