The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
The translator’s English as printed (H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
from which he starts, and the existence of which he deduces from its effects: the mutual and correlative existence of which, with their cause, he endeavours to establish by arguments, which, as regarding a curious and not uninteresting part of the Sénkhya philosophy, it may be allowable to recapitulate a little more in detail.
1. Asadakarandt ; ‘Because efficient or instrumental cause cannot make or produce that which is not.’ Professor Lassen renders this, ‘ E nulla nonentis efficacitate, nonens nil efficit. Asaé in this passage, however, is the object, not the agent; and karana is employed technically to denote the efficient or operative cause, the energy of which would be exerted in vain, unless applied to materials that existed : that which does not exist cannot be brought into existence by any agent. It would be useless to grind the sesamum for oil, unless the oil existed in it: the same force applied to sand or sugar-cane would not express oil. The appearance or manifestation of the oil is a proof that it was contained in the sesamum, and consequently is a proof of the existence of the source whence it is derived. This dogma, in its most comprehensive application, is of course the same with that of the Greeks, that nothing can come from nothing, and makes the creation of the universe dependent upon preexisting materials. Here, however, the application is limited and specific, and as Sir Graves Haughton, in his vindication of Mr. Colebrooke’s exposition of the Védanta philosophy, has justly observed, it means no more than that things proceed from their respective sources, and from those sources alone; or that certain sequents follow certain antecedents, and indicate consequently their existence.
2. Updddna grahandt; ‘From taking an adequate material cause: a fit material cause must be selected for any given effect or product.’ There is no difference of opinion as to the purport of updddna; ‘Such as the substance evolved, such is that from which it is evolved ;’ or as illustrated by Gaurapdpa, ‘He who wishes to make curds will employ milk, not water:' but this being the case, the effects which we behold, or infer, must proceed from something similar to themselves, and consequently prove the existence of that substance. ‘The relation between cause and effect is the generation of effect ; but there can be no relation
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(between cause and) a non-existent effect, and therefore effect is*,” and consequently so is cause.
3. ‘From the unfitness of all causes for every effect ;’ sarva sambhavdbhdvdt, There must be an identity of character between the sequent and its antecedent, and the existence of one indicates that of the other: a jar is made with clay, cloth with yarn; the latter material could not be used to fabricate a water-pot, nor clay to weave a garment. If this was not the case, all things would be equally fit for all purposes,
+ ex omnibus rebus une genus nasci possit. It is not, however, here intended to assert, that “ idonea causa non est ulla quam sad, 76 év," but that the effect must have a determinate existence in that cause, and can be the only effect which it can produce ; as in the commentary on this expression in the S. Pravachana Bhashya: ‘If effect prior to production do not exist in cause, there would be no reason why cause should not produce one non-existent effect, and not another t.’
4. Saktasya sakydkarandt; ‘ From the execution of that which the agent is able to do.’ Active or efficient causes can do only that to which they are competent: the potter and his implements fabricate a water-jar, not a piece of cloth; they are not competent to the latter, they are capable of the former. If effect did not pre-exist, if it were not inseparable from cause, power, or the exertions of an agent, and the employment of means, might derive from any antecedent one consequence us well as another.
5, Kdranabhévat ; ‘ From the nature of cause ;’ that is, from its being of the same nature or character with effect, and consequently produciug its like; or, according to VAcnespatt, ‘from the identity of cause with effect {:’ ‘Cloth is not different from the threads of which it is woven, eae Rare afa weamafefa! =f Sra: OTR AID Sreirerarat fz a Hs fa farasfee ta faced aaaaacfafa | | qrckeq It UTA |
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