The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
The translator’s English as printed (H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
p. 87
by Gavrapiva; where, in the simple conclusion after consideration, “ this object is a jar; that, is a piece of cloth,” no wish, or will, is indicated ; no act follows. It is clear also that he considers adhyavasdya merely as the functions of intellect in exercise: they are in intellect, and part of it, as the germ is in the seed, until brought into activity. Intellect is only an instrument ; that which, having received the ideas or images conveyed through the organs of sense, and the mind, constructs them into a conclusive idea, which it presents to soul. Its function in exercise, therefore, is ascertainment or certainty, as described in the S. Pravachana Bhéshya, which explains adhyavasdya, ‘ the synonyme, as well as buddhi, of the great principle (mahat), and its specific function denominated ascertainment *.’
The other synonymes of this principle are, buddhi, derived from budh, ‘to know,” ‘ knowing, intellect.’ Mahat, ‘great, the great principle ;’ ‘ The first and most important of the products of nature, and presiding over and pervading the wholet.’ Asuré }: this is a very unusual and questionable denomination. It occurs only in the S. Bhdshya, and may be an error, perhaps for semushi, one of the synonymes of buddhi in the Amera kosha. It cannot be connected with asura, ‘a demon,’ as if the faculty were incompetent to convey divine knowledge; for one of its properties, in connexion with the quality of goodness, is jnydna, ‘ true knowledge.’ There is no good reason why it should be derived from Asuri, the pupil of Kapiza, unless allusion is made to some personification of intellect, as the bride of the sage. No explanation of the word is given in the Bhdshya, and I must confess my inability to suggest one entitled to any confidence. Afati means ‘ understanding ;:’ manyalé anayd, that by which any thing is understood. Khydti properly signifies ‘fame,’ but here means ‘ notoriety, notion, familiar knowledge ;’ as in the Smriti,
“Ree wait qfefteeaemre frearenraranncet
afefora: | te Sree GTAPHeRirE
Aas | tergd |
p. 88
‘The great one it is, whence the familiar notions of the universe are always produced *.’ Jaydna is usually the term for ‘true or divine knowledge; knowledge of matter and spirit leading to liberation; but it is here employed in its generic purport, ‘that by which things are known.’ The same may be said of prajnd, which is also commonly used in the sense of ‘true wisdom,’ but here implies merely, ‘that by which knowledge is obtained,’ prajudyaté anayd, a8 RAMAsRama expounds it. Several of these terms, in their technical, as well as literal application, bear an analogy to the voir of Aristotle, and the gporncs of Plato. M. Cousin considers the category to be ‘ une sorte d’ame du monde.’ It is, however, the instrument most proximate to soul, by which the latter perceives, wills, and acts.
Intellect is of two kinds, or bas two sets of properties, as it is influenced or affected by the opposite qualities, goodness and darkness. The former are, ‘ virtue,’ dherma; ‘knowledge,’ jaydna; ‘ dispassion,’ vairdgya; and ‘ power,’ aiswaryya. The latter are their negatives, ‘ vice,’ adherma ; * ignorance,’ ajuydna ; * passion,’ avairdgya; and ‘ weakness,’ anaiswaryya. These again comprehend specific varieties.