The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

tainty, light. It is of two kinds, external and internal. The former is (knowledge of) the Védas and their six subordinate branches, recitation, ritual, grammar, glossary, prosody, and astronomy ; also (of) the purdnas, and of logic, theology, and law. Internal knowledge is that of nature and soul, or (the discrimination that) this is nature, the equipoised condition of goodness, foulness, and darkness: this is soul, perfect, devoid of qualities, pervading, and sentient. By external knowledge worldly distinction or admiration is acquired; by internal knowledge, liberation. Dispassion is also of two kinds, external and internal. The former is the indifference of one who contemns sensible objects from observing their defects, or the trouble of acquiring and preserving them; the inconvenience of attachment to them ; their liability to decay; and the injustice they cause. The latter is the indifference of one who is desirous of liberation, and looks upon nature as if it was a piece of witchcraft or a dream. Power is the abstract property of a superior (or divine) being: it is eightfold, (the capacity of) minuteness, magnitude, heaviness, lightness, reach, gratification of will, dominion, subjugation, and irresistible purpose. Atomic existence is meant by ‘ minuteness;’ so that a person becoming atomically subtile or minute may traverse the world: ‘ magnitude’ is said of one who may make himself a giant: ‘lightness’ is having limbs like the fibres of the lotus stalk, or like cotton, so as to be able to stand upon the tops of the filaments of a flower: ‘reach’ is attainment of a desired object by going to the place where it is situated, wherever that may be: ‘ gratification of will’ is obtaining or effecting whatever is desired: ‘dominion’ is governing the three worlds, as a king: + subjugation’ is having all things subject : ‘irresistible purpose’ is compelling the site, rest, and motion of all things, from Bralimé to a block, agreeably to the will of the person endowed with this faculty. These are the four properties of intellect which soul obtains when the qualities of foulness and darkness are overcome by that of goodness.

But those partaking of darkness are the reverse —When intellect is influeuced by the quality of darkness, then its four properties are the reverse of the above; they are, vice. ignorance, passion, and weakness. In this manner intellect having eight members, as it is affected by goodness orp. 85 foulness, is produced from the undiscrete principle having the three qualities. Intellect has thus been explained. Egotism is next described.

COMMENT.

The first product of nature, or intellect, is here described by its properties.

Intellect (6uddhi) is adhyavasdya*. It is not easy to offer a satisfactory equivalent for this word, nor to understand precisely what is meant by it. In the Amera Kosha it occurs as a synonyme of uésdhat, ‘effort, strenuous and continued effort, perseverance ;) according to RAmAsRama, ‘ possessing great power }.’ He derives it from sho antakarmmani |i, ‘ finishing, making end of,’ with adhi§, ‘over,’ and ava‘, ‘ off; that is, entirely or absolutely ending or effecting; as in the Hitopadésa: ‘The precepts of knowledge confer not the least benefit on one who is afraid of exertion : of what use is a lamp to a blind man, though it be within his reach **.’ In the Mitdkshara, utséha is explained, ‘ Effort (or perseverance) in the performance of acts accomplishing the objects of man tt.’ In the Bhatti Kdvya we have the word used in the sense of ‘ wish, purpose, determination :’ ‘The bird said to the monkeys, You have not studied the law, if at such a season you wish (or resolve) to die ff.”

In a preceding passage (ver. 5) the phrase prati vishaya adhyavasdya \\, ‘ ascertainment of several objects,’ was given as the definition of drishita,

‘aera | ot gered anfierfeerre: | at sear werfys Saft ‘wai “a eeraueraariia: wofa faarafafinga fe | sare fe ceosfentists cerry fae mdi) t qeantereranireitsorrera: | tt sere ara weft atari api: | gd aged gem wesferra aera) lll afefrrareraera:

p. 86

‘perception ;’ and the explanation of the Scholiast, buddhivydpdra jndnam®, ‘knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty,’ was cited (p. 23). The same commentator, VAcuespati, here defines it, ‘ the specific function of intellect, not differing from intellect itself; or, to quote the passage at length, ‘Ascertainment is intellect, from the identity of the act and the agent, as will be explained. Every one who engages in any matter first observes, or considers; he next reflects, it is I who am concerned in this; and then determines, this is to be done by me; thence he proceeds to act : this is familiar to every one. Thence this ascertainment that such act is to be done is the determination of intellect, which is as it were endowed with reason, from the proximity of the sentient principle. This is the specific function of intellect, not differing from intellect itself; and the definition of intellect is ascertainment, as that comprehends both its generic and specific distinctions +.’

The explanation of the S. Chandrikd is to the same effect: ‘ Adhyavasdya is a sort of modified condition of intellect, as flame is of a lamp ; it is certainty in this form, such an act is to be done by me |.”

These explanations, however, would rather seem to intimate intention, or volition, or, at least, the determination to act after reflection; but the determination or conclusion that such an act should be done, does not necessarily signify that it shall be done: it is only the conclusion or ascertainment of its fitness. This function of the intellect, also, is not indispensably connected with the notion of will; as in the example given a) i etaeath ati Teen Gian cacddaterer endo datsee hes raat arena sha otafee | re Tisd arafafa fafawafafeafeurarcraerara Fe: Mewar Fecannt warmer qfe: aw yeu saranda wT! laargannt aad weafarrenteat defies qfeafcurarrenfaze: |