The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

In the first inember of this sentence, the translation of abhighdta by ‘ impetus’ is irreconcilable with the context. The sense required by the doctrine laid down is ‘impediment, embarrassment, the prevention of liberation by worldly cares and sufferings.’ So the same word abhighdtaka is immediately used to mean ‘ preventing, removing, ‘ depellens.’ Professor Lassen's text, it is true, reads apaghdtaka, but this is not the reading followed by Mr. Colebrooke, nor that of the citation of the text given in the S. Bhashya or S. Kaumudi; it is that of the S. Zatwa Kaumudi and S. Chandrikd, and although in itself unobjectionable, yet is not a necessary nor preferable variation. At any rate there can be no question that the word abhighdta may be used in the sense of ‘depellere,’ and that sense therefore equally attaches to it in the prior member of the hemistich. So in the Bhdshya of Gavrardpa we have ddhibhautikasya rakshddina abhighdtah ; ‘The prevention of extrinsic pain is by protection andp. 4 the like.’ It would not be possible here to render abhighata by ‘impetus.’ By VaAcnespati the term abhighdta is defined ‘the confinement of the sentient faculty (explained to mean here ‘ life’), through the impediment opposed by threefold distress abiding in spirit®.’ NArAyana interprets it more concisely asahya sambandha {, ‘intolerable restraint.’ ‘ Embarrassment’ therefore sufficiently well expresses the purport of these definitions, or the obstructions offered by worldly sufferings to the spirit anxious to be free.

This variation, however, is of no great consequence: the more important difference is in the second portion of the stanza ; and as Professor Lassen has deviated advisedly from Mr. Colebrooke, it is necessary to 2examine the passage more in detail. The following are his reasons for the version he has made:

“ Hee posterioris versus (driskié etc.) interpretatio, sicuti scholiastarum suffragiis probatur, a grammatica postulatur. Quod ideo moneo, ne leviter rationem, a Colebrookio, V. summo, in hoc versu enarrando initam deseruisse censear. Is enim: ‘nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious means of alleviation exist: for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.’ Sed vereor, ne vir summus constructionem particule chét sententiam claudentis et a negatione excepte male intellexerit. De qua re dixi ad Hitop. proem. d. 28. Ex interpret. Colebrook. construendum esset: drishié sc. sati (i. e. yadyapi drishiam vidya té) sé (jijndsd) apdrthd na ékint—abhdvdt{. Sed ut omittam, particule chét nullum omnino relinqui locum in sententia, xa inopportuno versus loco collocatum esse, non potes quin concedas. Male omnino se habet tota sententia et claudicat. Equidem construo: drishié sd ( jijndsd) apdrtha (bhavati) chét (tathdpi) na (apdrthd bhavati) ékdnta—abhdvat|. Prorsus similiter dicitur ndbhdvdt infr. v., 8. Ablativum igitur ekdntyatyantoh

7 garsamia-arectin wfrgerrat aqanrigrieiasirsta ure! + weedaari «| ee aft (aafa ed fred) on (freer)

want a water! | ee at (fataren) ara (staf) BH (wensfa) a (erardt wafa) warA—aTaTA |p. 5 abhdvdt, non ad drishéé refero cum Colebrookio, sed ad negationem, que cum supplementis suis apodosin constituit. Nam que post chénna sequuntur verba, ad apodosin pertinere semper observavi. Quam gram3matica postulare videtur, patitur preterea loci tenor enarrationem, imo melior evadit sententia. Ad drishié enim relatis istis verbis, id tantum dicitur, rerum visibilium cognitione non attingi posse philosophic finem, liberationem absolutam et perpetuam a doloribus; mea posita enarratione non id tantum docetur, sed additur etiam hoc: finem istum posse attingi, licet alio cognitionis genere. Tres omnino positiones altero hemistichii versu continentur: philosophie (id enim valet gigndsd, i. e. cognitionis desiderium) finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam et omne tempus transgredientem; deinde ad eum non perveniri ea via que primum initur, quia obvia quasi sit, i. e. remediorum a sensibilibus rebus petitorum ope; denique ea remedia cognoscendi desiderium posse expleri. Sed aliter atque Colebrookius hasce sententias inter se conjungit noster, et per conditionem effert, quod ille per negationem enuntiat.”

In this view of the meaning of the verse, there is a refinement that does not belong to it, and which is not Indian: arguments are often elliptically and obscurely stated in Sanscrit dialectics, but one position at a time is usually sufficient for even Brahmanical subtlety. The only position here advanced is, that the cure of worldly evil is not to be effected by such remedies as are of obvious and ordinary application, as they can only afford temporary relief. Death itself is no exemption from calamity, if it involves the obligation of being born again.