The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

The term chétand, from chit, ‘to reflect,’ means in general ‘ reason, intelligence ;° but it is here applied to the possession or exercise of every faculty proper to a sentient and thinking being. It is the attribute of soul only, as will be more distinctly made clear when the functions of the senses, of consciousness, and intellect are explained, and they are shewnp. 15 to be merely the vehicles or instruments through which ideas and notions are conveyed. They seem, however, to act independently, but this is merely from their uzion with, or, more correctly, proximity to, soul ; samyoga being explained by the commentators to mean here merely sannidhdna, ‘approximation.’ In like manner, soul, which is contemplative, not active, mover, though itself unmoved, appears to be active through a similar contiguity. ‘I am sentient; wishing to do, I do: here a common origin or subject of action and reflection is apprehended*.’ S. Tatwa Kaumudi. But this is an error, as the site or subject of action and reflection is distinct}. The term dinga in the first line is explained to denote mahat and the subtile products of pradhina, Udésina, ‘ indifferent,’ is said also to mean ‘inert {.”

But it appears that there are passages in the Védas and in the lawbooks which attribute agency to soul, and knowledge to duddAi ||: and to meet this is supposed to be the purpose of the aphorism, ‘Agency from affection, intelligence from propinquity §;° that is, ‘The apparent agency of soul is from the affection (or operation) of buddhi; the apparent intelligence of buddhi (understanding) is from the proximity of soul; neither is actual. Their mutual transfer of properties is like that of fire and iron in a heated bar, or of the sun and water, in the reflected rays of the former from the latter®.’ S. Prav. S. In like manner the 8. Chandrika exemplifies the doctrine by reference to buddhi, the organ of the understanding; and furnishes also an example of the sense in which chétand,

* Saatsd fasta atria gira: ararenireceny wafre | t aaatrerage firerfirectr afenm: fae wenrgtfar fefa! tatenfaage | ger age gece Sai o aft wear) «=| § sacra wan ferme) | * GETS

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‘intelligence,’ is to be understood: ‘ Thence the effect (of pradhdna), the category buddhi, which is unintelligent, is as it were intelligent, (seems to be that which says) I know, becomes as it were endowed with knowledge *:' that is, it is not the understanding, but soul, that knows. This, however, applies equally to all the other products of nature, as far as to the subtile rudiments, whether individually considered, or as composing subtile body ¢. They are all uon-sentient, or irrational and inert. Their activity depends ou combination with the qualitics ; their sentient power on proximity to soul: and the conjoint presence of these two properties leads to the erroneous belief that soul is agent, as well as sentient.

XXI.
For the soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction,

the union of both takes place, as of the halt and blind. By that union a creation is framed.

BHASHYA.

The union of soul with nature is for its contemplation (of nature) ; that is, soul contemplates nature (in the state of) intellect and the other effects to the gross elements inclusive. For that object is the union of nature with soul; and the same union, which is also for the abstraction (of the latter), is dike the association of the halt and blind. As, a lame man and a blind man, deserted by their fellow-travellers, who in making their way with difficulty through a forest had been dispersed by robbers, happening to encounter each other, and entering into conversation so as to inspire mutual confidence, agreed to divide between them the duties of walking and of seeing; accordingly the lame man was mounted on the aft) | fora wearfe queria |p. 17 blind man’s shoulders, and was thus carried on his journey, whilst the blind man was enabled to pursue his route by the directions of his companion. In the same manner the faculty of seeing is in soul, not that of moving ; it is like the lame man : the faculty of moving, but not of seeing, is in nature; which resembles, therefore, the blind man. Further, as a separation takes place between the lame man and the blind man, when their mutual object is accomplished, and they have reached their journey’s end, 8o nature, having effected the liberation of soul, ceases to act; and soul, having contemplated nature, obtains abstractedness ; and consequently, their respective purposes being effected, the connexion between them is dissolved.

Again, By that, by that union, a creation is framed.—As the birth of a child proceeds from the union of male and female, so the production of creation results from the connection of nature and soul.

The text next describes the particulars of all the products of nature.

COMMENT.