The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

which constitutes a triple principal class: they are respectively distinguished as objects, and the means of effecting those objects.’ 8. Tata Kaumudi. Reasoning, according to Vacneseati, is ‘ investigation of scriptural authority by dialectics which are not contrary to the scriptures: and investigation is defined, ‘refutation of dubious doctrine, and establishment of positive conclusions ®.’ ‘ Hearieg is oral instruction, or rather the knowledge thence derived, or knowledge derived either from hearing another person read, or from expounding a work ¢.. S. Pr. Bh Intercourse of friends { is explained in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi to signify ‘dissatisfaction with solitary inquiry, and discussion with a teacher, a pupil, or a fellow-student jj.’ Viasaxa Banxsnv defines it, ‘ acquirement of knowledge from a benevolent visitor, who comes to give instruction j.” Vacnaspati and Narayana agree in rendering ddéaa*—which Gavrapava explains by * gift, liberality,’ particularly to religious characters —hby suddhi**, ‘purity ;) meaning the purity of discriminative knowledge; deriving it from the root daiptt, ‘to purify ;’ and not from dat}, ‘to give.” The former cites the authority of Patasxsati for this sense of one kind of perfectness: * Undisturbedness of discriminative knowledge, that is, purity; which is not attained except through long repeated and uninterrupted practice of veneration. That is also comprehended in discrimination by the term ddna||. He also observes that others interpret it ‘gift, by which a sage, being propitiated, imparts

5 Prt gated | wierd = denice TRA | t serdaisaret aaa ara areen asad wren wfefe) ||} qari: | gret oye freemeifcat waren of) |) erquenTa yerray woTarefuararasrt: | “adi nfa tt Sa, wrwat |r, eras Perereararcfarera: | arfara: ofa: —w wy afametondtditaersafaanaraaftarerxadtfa a aa faawearat aria aifa dapeta:

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knowledge *.’ The S. Prav. Bh. gives this interpretation only t. The term for ‘curb,’ ankusa}, is the gond or iron hook used to guide an elephant: it is here explained by xivdrana, ‘hindering ;’ and ‘as obstruction, disability, and acquiescence hinder perfectness, they are to be shunned ||.”

LIT.

Wituovt dispositions there would be no subtile person: without person there would be no pause of dispositions: wherefore a twofold creation is presented, one termed personal, the other intellectual.

BHASHYA.

Without dispositions, without intellectual creations, there would be no subtile person, no rudimental creation; from the non-assumption of repeated successive bodily forms, without the necessary influence of anterior conditions (or dispositions). Without person, without rudimental creation, there would be no pause of dispositions ; from the indispensability of virtue or vice for the attainment of either subtile or gross body, and from the non-priority of either creation, they being mutually initiative, like the seed and the germ. There is no fault in this, for (the relation) is that of species, it does not imply the mutual relation of individuals. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, one termed conditional (or intellectual), the other rudimental (or personal). Further—

COMMENT.

It is here explained that a double condition of existence, a twofold creation, necessarily prevails ; one proceeding from the intellectual facul-

* gaithanercfint enh qotmeetr!, tent eet wafer ufonfrrraront efi oberg! fafa ufcafornfaadtarnfaqeat Fat Te: |p. 160 ties, the other from the rudimental elements ; each being indispensable to the other.

It was stated (ver. 40) that subtile body migrates, invested with dispositions; and it was then explained (ver. 43, et seq.) what those dispositions or conditions were, viz. the conditions of the intellect (described in ver. 23), or virtue, vice, knowledge, ignorance, passion, dispassion, power, and debility. These were said (v. 46) to constitute an intellectual creation, or a series of conditions originating in affections of buddhi, or the intellectual principle. But the effects of these dispositions, the consequences of virtue or vice and the rest, can only be manifested in a bodily state, and therefore require necessarily a creation of a different character, personal or rudimental creation, such as subtile body, investing the imperceptible products of nature ; intellect and its faculties included. Nor is such a creation indispensable for the existence or exercise of the intellectual conditions or sentiments alone, but it is equally necessary for their occasional cessation : thus virtue, vice, and the rest necessarily imply and occasion bodily condition ; bodily condition is productive of acts of vice and virtue; vice and virtue, again, occasion bodily condition; and so on: like the seed and the tree, each mutually generative of the other; the tree bears the seed; from the seed springs the tree, again to put forth seed; and so on for ever; neither being initiative, neither being final. But one result of bodily condition is knowledge ; knowledge is liberation, when soul is disengaged: subtile body then resolves into its rudiments, and the dispositions or conditions of the intellect terminate. In this way there are two creations, the bhdrdkhya*, that termed ‘conditional’ or ‘intellectual ;’ and the dingdékhya +, that called ‘ rudimental’ or ‘ personal.’ Both these seem to be considered by the text, as well as by Gavrapapa aud VAcnEspaTi, as varieties of one species of the Pratyaya sarga, or ‘intellectual creation... The commentator on the §. Pravachana so far agrees with them, but he seems to restrict the two kinds more closely to a creation of intellect, regarding the finga as buddhi itself, and the bhéva

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