Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller

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The translator’s English as printed (F. Max Müller). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.

The understanding therefore limits the sensibility without enlarging thereby its own field, and by warning the latter that it can never apply to things by themselves, but to phenomena only, it forms the thought of an object by itself, but as transcendental only, which is the cause of phenomena, and therefore never itself a phenomenon : which cannot be thought as quantity, nor as reality, nor as substance (because these concepts require sensuous forms in which to determine an object), and of which therefore it must always remain unknown, whether it is to be found within us only, or also without us ; and whether, if sensibility were removed, it would vanish or remain. If we like to call this object noumenon, because the representation of it is not sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But as we

Transcendental Analytic 235

cannot apply to it any of the concepts of our understanding, such a representation remains to us empty, serving no purpose but that of indicating the limits of our sensuous knowledge, and leaving at the same time an [p. 289] empty space which we cannot fill either by possible experience, or by the pure understanding.

The critique of the pure understanding does not therefore allow us to create a new sphere of objects beyond those which can come before it as phenomena, or to stray into intelligible worlds, or even into the concept of such. The mistake which leads to this in the most plausible manner, and which, though excusable, can never be justified, consists in making the use of the understanding, contrary to its very intention, transcendental, so that objects, that is, possible intuitions, are made to conform to concepts, not concepts to possible intuitions, on which alone their objective validity can rest. The cause of this is again, that apperception, and with it thought, precedes every possible determinate arrangement of representations. We are thinking something in general, and determine it on one side sensuously, but distinguish at the same time the general object, represented in abstraction, from this particular mode of sensuous intuition. Thus there remains to us a mode of determining the object by thought only, which, though it is a mere logical form without any contents, seems to us nevertheless a mode in which the object by itself exists {notimenon), without regard to the intuition which is restricted to our senses. [p. 290]

Before leaving this transcendental Analytic, we have to add something which, though in itself of no particular

236 Transcendental Analytic importance, may yet seem to be requisite for the completeness of the system. The highest concept of which all transcendental philosophy generally begins, is the division into the possible and the impossible. But, as all division presupposes a divisible concept, a higher concept is required, and this is the concept of an object in general, taken as problematical, it being left uncertain whether it be something or nothing. As the categories are the only concepts which apply to objects in general, the distinction whether an object is something or nothing must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories.

I. Opposed to the concepts of all, many, and one, is the concept which annihilates everything, that is, none ; and thus the object of a concept, to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is = o, that is, a concept without an object, like the noumena, which cannot be counted as possibilities, though not as impossibilities either {ens natio7iis) ; or like certain fundamental forces, [p. 291] which have been newly invented, and have been conceived without contradiction, but at the same time without any example from experience, and must not therefore be counted among possibilities.

II. Reality is sometJiing, negation is nothijig ; that is, it is the concept of the absence of an object, as shadow or cold {iiiJiil privativiim),

III. The mere form of intuition (without substance) is in itself no object, but the merely formal condition of it (as a phenomenon), as pure space and pure time {ens imaginarium) , which, though they are something, as forms of intuition, are not themselves objects of intuition.

IV. The object of a concept which contradicts itself, is nothing, because the concept is nothing ; it is simply

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