Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller
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The translator’s English as printed (F. Max Müller). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
such investigations, either on the ground of their uncertainty, nr.fram any feeh'np^ of irnji^^r^nrp Of ^^rt^mpl;^^ Now it might seem natural that, after we have left the soIid^gToimd of experience, we should not at once proceed to erect an edjfir-p Axzjt^^^^ftewl^ge^ja^hich we possess without knowing whence it came, and trust to principles the origin of which is unknown, without having made sure of the safety of the foundations by means of careful examination.
It would seem natural, I say, that philosophers should first of all have asked the question how the mere understanding could arrive at all this knowledge a p7ij2zir'^nd what extent, whaL-_truth, and what value it could possess. If we take natural [p. 4] to mean whatis ju^ and reasonable, then indeed nothing could be more natural.
But if we understand by natural what takes place ordinarily, then, on the contrary, nothing is more natural and more intelligible than that this examination should have been neglected for so long a time. For one part of this knowledge, namely .the mathematical, has always been in possession of perfect trustworthiness; and thus produces a favourable presumption with regard to other parts also, although these may be of a totally different nature.
Besides, once beyond the precincts of experience, and /we are certain that experience can never contradict us\ while the charm of enlarging our knowledge is so great that nothing will stop our progress until we encounter a^ clear contra dirti on. This can be
1 The Second Edition adds here : ' These inevitable problems of pure reason itself are, God, Freedom, and Immortality. The science which with all its apparatus is really intended for the solution of these problems, is called Metaphysic. Its procedure is at first dogmatic, i.e. unchecked by a previous examination of what reason can and cannot do, before it engages confidently in so arduous an undertaking.'
4 Introduction avoided if only we are cautious in our imaginations, which nevertheless remain what they are, imaginations only. How far we can advance independent of all- experience in a priori knowledge is shown by the brilliant example of mathematics. It is true they deal with objects and knowledge so far only as they can be represented in intuition.
But this is easily overlooked, because that intuition itself may be given a priori, and be difficult to distinguish from a pure concept.
Thus inspirited- [p. 5] by a splendid proof of the power of reason, the desire of enlarging our knowledge sees no limits.\ The light dove, piercing in her easy flight the air and perceiving its resistance, imagines that flight would be easier still in empty space. ] It was thus that Plato IstL-the world of sense, as opposing so many hindrances to our understanding, and ventured beyond on the wings of his id^asinto the empty spacejiLj^re understanding.
He did not perceive that he was making no progress by these endeavours, because he had no resistance as a fulcrum on which to rest or to apply his powers, in order to cause the understanding to advance. It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its .j^eculatiye edifice as soon as possible, and then only to enquire whether the foundation be sure.
Then all sorts of excuses are made in order to assure us as to it2_.solidity, or to decline altogether such a late and dangerous enquiry. The reason why during- the time of_Jiuilding we feel free from all ajixiety and suspicion and believe in the apparent solidity of our foundation, is this: — A great, perhaps the greatest portion of what our reason finds to do consists in the analy^is__jif__oiii^_concepts of objects. This 'gives us a
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