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1XX Preface ledge. It is, at the same time, a powerful appeal to re^soa to undertake anew the most difficult of its duties, namely,- self-knowledge, and to institute a court oF appeal which should protect the just rights of_reason. but dismiss all groundless claims, and should do this not by means of irresponsible decrees, but according to the- eternal and unalterable laws of reason. This court of appeal is no other than the Critique of P lire Reason. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, touching that whole class of knowledge which it may strive after, unassisted by experience. This must decide the question of the possibility or impossibility of metaphysic in general, and the determination of its sources, its extent, and its limits — and all this according^ to fixed jmnciples. This, the only way that was left, I have followed, and I flatter myself that I have thus removecLalLjthose errors which have hitherto brought reason, whenever it was unassisted by experience, into conflict with itself. I have not evaded its questions by pleadmg the insufficienc^y of human reason, but I have classified them according to principles, and, after showing the point where_reason .begins to misunderstand itself, solved them satisfactorily. It is true that the answer of those questions is not such as a dogma-enamoured curiosity might wish for, for such curiosity could not have been satisfied except by juggling tricks in which I am no adept. But this 3Las_ilot__the intention of the natural destiny of our j^^ason, and it became the duty of philosophy to remove the__deception which arose from a false interpretation, even though many a vaunted and cherished dream should vanish at the same time. In this work I have chiefly aimed at
2Preface xxi completeness, and I venture to maintain that there ought not to be one single metaphysical problem that has not been solved here, or to the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied. In fact Pure Reason is so p&rject-a unity-that, if its principle should prove insufficient to answer any one of the many questions started by its very nature, one might throw it away altogether, as insufficient to answer the other questions with perfect certainty. While I am saying this I fancy I observe in the face of my readers an expression of indignation, mixed with j^nntPTTipt^ at pretensions apparently so self-glorious and extravagant ; and yet they are in reality far more moderate than those made by the writer of the commonest essay professing to prove the simple nature of the soul or the necessity of a first beginning of the world. For, while he pretends to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of all possible_experience, I confess most humbly that this is entirely beyond my power. I mean only to treat of reason 7\x\A its pure thinking, a knowledge of which is not very far to seek, considering that it is to be found within myself. Common loo-ic gives an instance how all the simple acts DfjTjSaSmi can be ^rmmpr^l-prl romplf^tf^jy pprj systematically. Only between the common logic and my work there is this difference, that my question is, — what can we hope to achieve with reason, when all the material and assistance of experience is taken away .'* So much with regard to the completeness in our laying hold of^yer^^single object, and the thoroughness in our laying hold of all objects, as the material of our critical enquiries — a completeness and thoroughness determined, not by a casual idea, but by the nature of our knowledge itself. xxii P7'eface
3Besides this, certainty and clearness with regard to form are two essential demands that may very properly be addressed to an author who ventures on so slippery an undertaking. First, with regard to certainty, I have pronounced judgment against myself by saying that in this kind of enquiries it is in no way permissible to propound mere opinions, and that everything looking like a hypothesis is counterband, that must not be offered for sale at however low a price, but must, as soon as it has been discovered, be confiscated. For every kind of knowledge which professes to be certain a priori^ proclaims itself that it means to be taken for absolutely necessary. And this applies, therefore, still more to a definition oi-all pure knowledge a prioi'i, which is to be the measure, and therefore also an example, of all apodicti£__phiIj:^sophical-~c£iLainty. Whether I have fulfilled what I have here undertaken to do, must be left to the judgment of the reader ; for it only behoves the author to propound his arguments, and not to determine beforehand the effect which they ought to produce on his judges. But, in order to prevent any unnecessary weakening of those arguments, he may be allowed to point out himself certain passages which, though they refer to collateral objects only, might occasion some mistrust, and thus to counteract in time the influence which the least hesitation of the reader in respect to these minor points might exercise with regard to the principal object. I know of no enquiries which are more important for determining that faculty which we call understanding (Verstand), and for fixing its rules and its limits, than those in the Second Chapter of my Transcendental Analytic, under the title of ' Deduction of the Pure Concepts Preface xxiii
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1XX Preface ledge. It is, at the same time, a powerful appeal to re^soa to undertake anew the most difficult of its duties, namely,- self-knowledge, and to institute a court oF appeal which should protect the just rights of_reason. but dismiss all groundless claims, and should do this not by means of irresponsible decrees, but according to the- eternal and unalterable laws of reason. This court of appeal is no other than the Critique of P lire Reason. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, touching that whole class of knowledge which it may strive after, unassisted by experience. This must decide the question of the possibility or impossibility of metaphysic in general, and the determination of its sources, its extent, and its limits — and all this according^ to fixed jmnciples. This, the only way that was left, I have followed, and I flatter myself that I have thus removecLalLjthose errors which have hitherto brought reason, whenever it was unassisted by experience, into conflict with itself. I have not evaded its questions by pleadmg the insufficienc^y of human reason, but I have classified them according to principles, and, after showing the point where_reason .begins to misunderstand itself, solved them satisfactorily. It is true that the answer of those questions is not such as a dogma-enamoured curiosity might wish for, for such curiosity could not have been satisfied except by juggling tricks in which I am no adept. But this 3Las_ilot__the intention of the natural destiny of our j^^ason, and it became the duty of philosophy to remove the__deception which arose from a false interpretation, even though many a vaunted and cherished dream should vanish at the same time. In this work I have chiefly aimed at
2Preface xxi completeness, and I venture to maintain that there ought not to be one single metaphysical problem that has not been solved here, or to the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied. In fact Pure Reason is so p&rject-a unity-that, if its principle should prove insufficient to answer any one of the many questions started by its very nature, one might throw it away altogether, as insufficient to answer the other questions with perfect certainty. While I am saying this I fancy I observe in the face of my readers an expression of indignation, mixed with j^nntPTTipt^ at pretensions apparently so self-glorious and extravagant ; and yet they are in reality far more moderate than those made by the writer of the commonest essay professing to prove the simple nature of the soul or the necessity of a first beginning of the world. For, while he pretends to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of all possible_experience, I confess most humbly that this is entirely beyond my power. I mean only to treat of reason 7\x\A its pure thinking, a knowledge of which is not very far to seek, considering that it is to be found within myself. Common loo-ic gives an instance how all the simple acts DfjTjSaSmi can be ^rmmpr^l-prl romplf^tf^jy pprj systematically. Only between the common logic and my work there is this difference, that my question is, — what can we hope to achieve with reason, when all the material and assistance of experience is taken away .'* So much with regard to the completeness in our laying hold of^yer^^single object, and the thoroughness in our laying hold of all objects, as the material of our critical enquiries — a completeness and thoroughness determined, not by a casual idea, but by the nature of our knowledge itself. xxii P7'eface
3Besides this, certainty and clearness with regard to form are two essential demands that may very properly be addressed to an author who ventures on so slippery an undertaking. First, with regard to certainty, I have pronounced judgment against myself by saying that in this kind of enquiries it is in no way permissible to propound mere opinions, and that everything looking like a hypothesis is counterband, that must not be offered for sale at however low a price, but must, as soon as it has been discovered, be confiscated. For every kind of knowledge which professes to be certain a priori^ proclaims itself that it means to be taken for absolutely necessary. And this applies, therefore, still more to a definition oi-all pure knowledge a prioi'i, which is to be the measure, and therefore also an example, of all apodicti£__phiIj:^sophical-~c£iLainty. Whether I have fulfilled what I have here undertaken to do, must be left to the judgment of the reader ; for it only behoves the author to propound his arguments, and not to determine beforehand the effect which they ought to produce on his judges. But, in order to prevent any unnecessary weakening of those arguments, he may be allowed to point out himself certain passages which, though they refer to collateral objects only, might occasion some mistrust, and thus to counteract in time the influence which the least hesitation of the reader in respect to these minor points might exercise with regard to the principal object. I know of no enquiries which are more important for determining that faculty which we call understanding (Verstand), and for fixing its rules and its limits, than those in the Second Chapter of my Transcendental Analytic, under the title of ' Deduction of the Pure Concepts Preface xxiii
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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