Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller

implies by itself the necessity of a permanent unity of them in one and the same apperception. In that unity of a possible consciousness consists also the form of all knowledge of objects, by which the manifold is thought as belonging to one object. The manner therefore in which the manifold of sensuous representation (intuition) belongs to our consciousness, precedes all knowledge of an object, as its intellectual form, and constitutes a kind of formal a priori knowledge of all objects in general, if they are to be thought (categories). Their syn- [p. 130] thesis by means of pure imagination, and the unity of all representations with reference to the original apperception, precede all empirical knowledge. Pure concepts of the understanding are therefore a priori possible, nay, with regard to experience, necessary, for this simple reason, because our knowledge has to deal with nothing but phenomena, the possibility of which depends on ourselves, and the connection and unity of which (in the representation of an object) can be found in ourselves only, as antecedent to all experience, nay, as first rendering all experience possible, so far as its form is concerned. On this ground, as the only possible one, our deduction of the categories has been carried out.}

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

BOOK II

ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES

General logic is built up on a plan that coincides accurately with the division of the higher faculties of knowledge. These are, Understanding, yndgment, and Reason. Logic therefore treats in its analytical portion of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms corresponding with the functions and the order of the above-named faculties [p. 131] of the mind, which are generally comprehended under the vague name of the understanding.

As formal logic takes no account of the contents of our knowledge (pure or empirical), but treats of the form of thought only (discursive knowledge), it may well contain in its analytical portion the canon of reason also, reason being, according to its form, subject to definite rules which, without reference to the particular nature of the knowledge to which they are applied, can be found out a priori by a mere analysis of the acts of reasoning into their component parts.

Transcendental logic, being limited to a certain content, namely, to pure knowledge a priori, cannot follow general logic in this division ; for it'is clear that the transcendental tiS£.JifjX^LSon_cdi\\not be objectively valid, and cannot therefore belong to the Jpgic ^f truth, that is, to Analytic, but must be allowed to form a separate part of our scholasticp. 107 lo8 Transcendental Analytic system, as a Jogic of illusion^ under the name of transcendental Dialectic.

Understanding and judgment have therefore a canon of their objectively valid, and therefore true use in transcendental logic, and belong to its analytical portion. But reason, in its attempts to determine anything a priori with reference to objects, and to extend knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience, is altogether dialectical, and its illusory assertions have no place in a canon [p. 132] such as Analytic demands.

Our Analytic of principles therefore will be merely a canon of the faculty of judgment, teaching it how to apply to phenomena the concepts of the understanding, which contain the condition of rules a priori. For this reason, and in order to indicate my purpose more clearly, I shall use the name of doctrine of the faculty of judgment , while treating of the real principles of the understanding.

INTRODUCTION

OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FACULTY OF JUDGMENT IN

GENERAL

If the understanding is explained as jhe iaculty of rules, the faculty of judgment consists in performing the sub^umption. under these rules, that is, in determining whether anything falls under a given rule {casus dates legis) or not. General logic contains no precepts for the faculty of judgment and cannot contain them. For as it takes no account of the contents of our knowledge, it has only to explain analytically the mere form of knowledge in concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, and thus [p. 133] to establish formal rules for the proper employment of the

Transceiide7ital Analytic 109