Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller

How is metaphysic possible, as a natural disposition ? that is, how does the nature of universal human reason give rise to questions which pure reason proposes to itself, and which it is urged on by its own need to answer as well as it can?

As, however, all attempts which have hitherto been made at answering these natural questions (for instance, whether the world has a beginning, or exists from all eternity) have always led to inevitable contradictions, we cannot rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition to metaphysic, that is, with the pure faculty of reason itself, from which some kind of metaphysic (whatever it may be) always arises ; but it must be possible to arrive with it at some certainty as to our either knowing or not knowing its objects ; that is, we must either decide that we can judge of the objects of these questions, or of the power or want of power of reason, in deciding anything upon them, — therefore that we can either enlarge our pure reason with certainty, or that we have to impose on it fixed and firm hmits. This last question, which arises out of the former more general problem, would properly assume this form,

How is metaphysic possible, as a science?

The critique of reason leads, therefore, necessarily, to true science, while its dogmatical use, without criticism, lands us in groundless assertions, to which others, equally specious, can always be opposed, that is, in scepticism.

Nor need this science be very formidable by its great prolixity, for it has not to deal with the objects of reason, the variety of which is infinite, but with reason only, and with problems, suggested by reason and placed before it, not by the nature of things, which are different from it, but by its own nature ; so that, if reason has only first completely understood its own power, with reference to objects given to it in experience, it will have no difficulty in determining completely and safely the extent and limits of its attempted apphcation beyond the limits of all experience.

We may and must therefore regard all attempts which have hitherto been made at building up a metaphysic dogmatically, as non-avenu. For the mere analysis of the concepts that dwell in our reason a priori, which has been attempted in one or other

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Supplement VI

of those metaphysical systems, is by no means the aim, but only a preparation for true metaphysic, namely, the answer to the question, how we can enlarge our knowledge a priori synthetically ; nay, it is utterly useless for that purpose, because it only shows what is contained in those concepts, but not by what process a priori we arrive at them, in order thus to determine the validity of their employment with reference to all objects of knowledge in general. Nor does it require much self-denial to give up these pretensions, considering that the undeniable and, in the dogmatic procedure, inevitable contradictions of reason with itself, have long deprived every system of metaphysic of all authority. More firmness will be required in order not to be deterred by difficulties from within and resistance from without, from trying to advance a science, indispensable to human reason (a science of which we may lop off every branch, but will never be able to destroy the root), by a treatment entirely opposed to all former treatments, which promises, at last, to ensure the successful and fruitful growth of metaphysical science.

SUPPLEMENT VII

[See vol. ii. p. ii]

Still less ought we to except here a criticism on the books and systems treating of pure reason, but only on the faculty of pure reason itself It is only if we are in possession of this, that we possess a safe criterion for estimating the philosophical value of old and new works on this subject. Otherwise, an unquahfied historian and judge does nothing but criticise the groundless assertions of others by means of his own, which are equally groundless.

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SUPPLEMENT VIII

[See vol. ii. p. 23]