Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller
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The translator’s English as printed (F. Max Müller). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
Whatever the process and the means may be by which knowledge reaches its objects, there is one that reaches them directly, and forms the ultimate material of all thought, viz. intuition (Anschauung). This is possible only when the object is given, and the object can be given only (to human beings at least) through a certain affection of the mind (Gemiith).
This faculty (receptivity) of receiving representations (Vorstellungen), according to the manner in which we are affected by objects, is calledjsgnsibility (Sinnlichkeit).
Objects therefore- are given to us through our sensibility. Sensibility alone supplies us with intuitions (Anschauungen)r^These intuitions become thought through the understanding (Verstand), and hence arise conceptions (Begriffe). All thought therefore must, directly or indirectly, go back to^jntuitions (Anschauungen), i.e. to our sensibility, because in no other way can objects be given to us.
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1 6 Transcendental y^stJietic
The effect produced by an object upon the faculty of representation (Vorstellungsfahigkeit), so far as we [p. 20] are affected by it, is called^,r^sation (Empfindung). An intuition (Anschauung)_of an obiect. by means of sensation, is called empirical. The undefined object of such an empirical intuition is called phenomenon (Erscheinung).
In a phenomenon I call that which corresponds to the sensation its inatte7'; but that which causes the manifold
. — f matter of the phenomenon to be perceived as arranged in a certain order, I call, its formNow it is clear that it cannot be sensation again through which sensations are arranged and placed in certain forms. The matter only of all phenomena is given us a posteriori ; but their form must be ready for them in the mind (Gemiith) a priori, and must therefore be capable of being considered as separate from all sensations.
I call all representations in which there is nothing that belongs to sensation, pure {m. a transcendental sense). The_puie_form therefore of all sensuous intuitions, that form in which the manifold elements of the phenomena are seen in a certain order, must be found in the mind ^priori. And this pure form of sensibility may be called the pure intuition (Anschauung).
Thus, if we deduct from the representation (Vorstellung) of a body what belongs to the thinking of the understanding, viz. substance, force, divisibility, etc., and likewise what belongs to sensation, viz. impermeability, hardness, colour, etc., there still remains some- [p. 21] thing of that en^HjdcaHntuition (Anschauung), viz. extension and form. These belong to pure_mtuition, which a priori y and even without a real object of the senses or of
Transcendental Esthetic 17
sensation, exists in the mind as a mere form of sensibility.
The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori I call Tianscendejital ^st/i^lui} There must be such a science, forming the first part of the ^Elements^ of Tranc;rpnr1pntah's>Tn, as opposcd to that which treats of the principles of pure thought, and which should be called Transcendental Logic.
In Transcendental Esthetic therefore we shall [p. 22] first isniai-p Qpnc;^bih't3A^ by Separating everything which the understanding adds by means of its_xoncepts, so that nothing remains Irut empirical intuition (Anschauung).
Secondly, we shall separate from this all that belongs to sensation (Empfindung), so that nothing remains -but^ure intuition^ (reine Anschauung) or the mere form of the phenomena, which is the only thing which sensibility a priori can supply. In the course of this investigation it will appear that there are, as principles of a priori knowledge, two^pure forms of sensuous intuitioji_(Anschauung\ namely, S^^^Jie-2i\i^_Tiim.,^ We now proceed to consider these more in detail.
^ The Germans are the only people who at present (1781) use the word cESthetic for what others call criticism of taste. There is implied in that name a false hope, first conceived by the excellent analytical philosopher, Baumgarten, of bringing the critical judgment of the beautiful under rational principles, and to raise its rules to the rank of a science. But such endeavours are vain. For such rules or criteria are, according to their principal sources, empirical only, and can never serve as definite a priori rules for our judgment in matters of taste; on the contrary, our judgment is the real test of the truth of such rules. It would be advisable therefore to drop the name in that sense, and to apply it to a doctrine which is a real science, thus approaching more nearly to the language and meaning of the ancients with whom the division into aladrjTa /cat vorjrd was very famous (or to share that name in common with speculative philosophy, and thus to use aesthetic sometimes in a transcendental, sometimes in a psychological sense). c i8 Of Space
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