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1of the Understanding.' They have given me the greatest but, I hope, not altogether useless trouble. This enquiry, which rests on a deep foundation, has two sides. The one refers to the obj.£Qts_of the pure understanding, and is' intended to show and explain the objective value of its concepts jT^^r/^r/^ It is, therefore, of essential importance for my purposes. The other is intended to enquire into the pure understanding itself, its possibility, and the powers of knowledge on which it rests, therefore its subjective character ; a subject which, though important for my principal object, yet forms no essential part of it, because my principal problem is and remains, What and how much may understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft) know without all experience } and not. How is the faculty of thought possible t The latter would be an enquiry into a cause of a given effect ; it would, therefore, be of the nature of an hypothesis (though, as I shall show elsewhere, this is not quite so) ; and it might seem as if I had here allowed myself to propound a mere opinion, leaving the reader free to hold another opinion also. I therefore warn the reader, in case my subjective deduction should not produce that complete conviction which I expect, that the objective deduction, in which I am here chiefly concerned, must still retain its full strength. For this, what has been said on pp. 82, 83 (92, 93) may possibly by itself be sufficient. Secondly, as to clearness, the reader has a right to demand not only what may be called Inpnral or rlisnirsive cl^rness, which is based on^jiou^epts, but also what may be called_^^etic_^QlJlituitiveclearness produced byJntuL tions^ i.e. by examples and concrete illustrations. With regard to the former I have made ample provision. That xxiv Preface
2arose from the very nature of my purpose, but it became at the same time the reason why I could not fully satisfy the latter, if not absolute, yet very just claim. Nearly through the whole of my work I have felt doubtful what to do. Examples and illustrations seemed always to be necessary, and therefore found their way into the first sketch of my work. But I soon perceived the magnitude of my task and the number of objects I should have to treat ; and, when I saw that even in their driest scholastic form they would considerably swell my book, I did not consider it expedient to extend it still further through examples and illustrations required for popular purposes only. This work can never satisfy the popular taste, and the few who know, do not require that help which, though it is always welcome, yet might here have defeated its very purpose. The Abbe Terrasson ^ writes indeed ^^fefeat,Jl_we n^eaaured the greatness of.^a book, not by the number of its pages, but^-by-t^i^-^ime we reqiure for mastering-. it, many a book might be said to be much shorter, if it were not so short. But, on the other hand, if we ask how a complicated^_j^t_iiu.pdfi€4ple coherentwhole of speculative thoughLcan best be rend£j:edjntelligible, we might be equally justified in saying that many a book would have been more intelligible, if it had not tried to be so very intelligible. For the helps to clearness, though they may ^e missed^ with regard to details, often distract with regard to the whole. The reader does not arrive quickly enough at a survey of the whole, because the bright col- ^ Terrasson, Philosophic nach ihrem allgemeinen Einflusse auf alle Gegenstande des Geistes und der Sitten, Berlin, 1762, p. 117. 2 Rosenkranz and 'Others change fehlen into helfen, without necessity, I think.
3Preface xxv ours of illustrations hide and distort the articulation and concatenation of the wl:iole^_system, which, after all, if we want to judge of its unity and sufficiency, are more important than anything else. Surely it should be an attraction to the reader if he is asked to join his own efforts with those of the author in order to carry out a great and important work, according to the plan here proposed, in a complete and lasting manner. Metaph_ysic, according to the definitions here given, is the only one.of _a]Lscknces^whJch, through a small but united effort, may count on such completeness in a short time, so that nothing will remain for posterity but to arrange everything according to its own views for didactic purposes, without being able to add anything to the subject itself. For it is in reality nothing but ^an_inventorv of all our possessions acquired- through Pure Reason, systematically_arranged. Nothing can escape us, because whatever reason produces entirely out of itself, cannot hide itself, but is brought to light by reason itself, so soon as the common principle has been discovered. This absolute completeness is rendered not only possible, but necessary, through the perfect unity of this kind of knowledge, all derived from pureconcepts, without any influence from experience, or from special intuitions leading to a definite kind of experience, that might serve to enlarge and increase it. Teciifn habita et noris qumn sit tibi cnrta supel- /^.r (Persius, Sat. iv. 52).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
1of the Understanding.' They have given me the greatest but, I hope, not altogether useless trouble. This enquiry, which rests on a deep foundation, has two sides. The one refers to the obj.£Qts_of the pure understanding, and is' intended to show and explain the objective value of its concepts jT^^r/^r/^ It is, therefore, of essential importance for my purposes. The other is intended to enquire into the pure understanding itself, its possibility, and the powers of knowledge on which it rests, therefore its subjective character ; a subject which, though important for my principal object, yet forms no essential part of it, because my principal problem is and remains, What and how much may understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft) know without all experience } and not. How is the faculty of thought possible t The latter would be an enquiry into a cause of a given effect ; it would, therefore, be of the nature of an hypothesis (though, as I shall show elsewhere, this is not quite so) ; and it might seem as if I had here allowed myself to propound a mere opinion, leaving the reader free to hold another opinion also. I therefore warn the reader, in case my subjective deduction should not produce that complete conviction which I expect, that the objective deduction, in which I am here chiefly concerned, must still retain its full strength. For this, what has been said on pp. 82, 83 (92, 93) may possibly by itself be sufficient. Secondly, as to clearness, the reader has a right to demand not only what may be called Inpnral or rlisnirsive cl^rness, which is based on^jiou^epts, but also what may be called_^^etic_^QlJlituitiveclearness produced byJntuL tions^ i.e. by examples and concrete illustrations. With regard to the former I have made ample provision. That xxiv Preface
2arose from the very nature of my purpose, but it became at the same time the reason why I could not fully satisfy the latter, if not absolute, yet very just claim. Nearly through the whole of my work I have felt doubtful what to do. Examples and illustrations seemed always to be necessary, and therefore found their way into the first sketch of my work. But I soon perceived the magnitude of my task and the number of objects I should have to treat ; and, when I saw that even in their driest scholastic form they would considerably swell my book, I did not consider it expedient to extend it still further through examples and illustrations required for popular purposes only. This work can never satisfy the popular taste, and the few who know, do not require that help which, though it is always welcome, yet might here have defeated its very purpose. The Abbe Terrasson ^ writes indeed ^^fefeat,Jl_we n^eaaured the greatness of.^a book, not by the number of its pages, but^-by-t^i^-^ime we reqiure for mastering-. it, many a book might be said to be much shorter, if it were not so short. But, on the other hand, if we ask how a complicated^_j^t_iiu.pdfi€4ple coherentwhole of speculative thoughLcan best be rend£j:edjntelligible, we might be equally justified in saying that many a book would have been more intelligible, if it had not tried to be so very intelligible. For the helps to clearness, though they may ^e missed^ with regard to details, often distract with regard to the whole. The reader does not arrive quickly enough at a survey of the whole, because the bright col- ^ Terrasson, Philosophic nach ihrem allgemeinen Einflusse auf alle Gegenstande des Geistes und der Sitten, Berlin, 1762, p. 117. 2 Rosenkranz and 'Others change fehlen into helfen, without necessity, I think.
3Preface xxv ours of illustrations hide and distort the articulation and concatenation of the wl:iole^_system, which, after all, if we want to judge of its unity and sufficiency, are more important than anything else. Surely it should be an attraction to the reader if he is asked to join his own efforts with those of the author in order to carry out a great and important work, according to the plan here proposed, in a complete and lasting manner. Metaph_ysic, according to the definitions here given, is the only one.of _a]Lscknces^whJch, through a small but united effort, may count on such completeness in a short time, so that nothing will remain for posterity but to arrange everything according to its own views for didactic purposes, without being able to add anything to the subject itself. For it is in reality nothing but ^an_inventorv of all our possessions acquired- through Pure Reason, systematically_arranged. Nothing can escape us, because whatever reason produces entirely out of itself, cannot hide itself, but is brought to light by reason itself, so soon as the common principle has been discovered. This absolute completeness is rendered not only possible, but necessary, through the perfect unity of this kind of knowledge, all derived from pureconcepts, without any influence from experience, or from special intuitions leading to a definite kind of experience, that might serve to enlarge and increase it. Teciifn habita et noris qumn sit tibi cnrta supel- /^.r (Persius, Sat. iv. 52).
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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