Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller

of pure reason. The former treats only of understanding and reason themselves, in a system of all concepts and principles which have reference to objects in general, without taking account of objects that may be given {ontologia) : the latter treats of nature, that is, the sum of given objects (whether given to the senses, or, if you like, to some other kind of intuition) and is therefore physiology, although rationalis only. The employment of reason in this rational study of nature is either physical or hyperphysical, or, more accurately speaking, immanent or transcendent. The former refers to nature, in so far as its knowledge can take place in experience {in concrete) ; the latter to that connection of objects of experience which transcends all experience. This transcendent physiology has for its object either an [p. 846] inter7tal or an external connection, both transcending every possible experience ; the former is the physiology of nature as a whole, or transcendental knowledge of the worlds the latter refers to the connection of the whole of nature with a Being above nature, and is therefore transcendental knozvledge of God.

Immanent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature as the sum total of all objects of the senses, such, therefore, as it is given us, but only according to conditions a priori, under which alone it can be given us. It has two kinds of objects only ; first, those of the external senses, which constitute together corporeal nature ; secondly, the object of the internal sense, the soul, and what, according to its fundamental principles in general, may be called thinking nattire. The metaphysic of corporeal nature is called physic, or, because it must contain the principles of an a pidori knowledge of nature only,

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rational physic. Metaphysic of the thinking nature is called psychology, and for the same reason, is here to be understood as the rational knowledge only of that nature.

Thus the whole system of metaphysic consists of four principal parts. i. Ontology , 2. Rational Physiology^ 3. Rational Cosmology^ 4. Rational Theology. The second part, the physiology of pure reason, contains two divisions, namely, physica rationalist and phychologia [p. 847] rationalis.

The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason prescribes itself this division. It is therefore architectonicaly adequate to its essential aims, and not technical only, contrived according to any observed similarities, and, as it were, at haphazard. For that very reason such a division is unchangeable and of legislative authority. There are, however, a few points which might cause misgivings, and weaken our conviction of its legitimate character.

First of all, how can I expect knowledge a priori, that is metaphysic, of objects so far as they are given to our senses, that is a posteriori? and how is it possible to know the nature of things according to principles a priori, and thus to arrive at a rational physiology } Our [p. 848] answer is, that we take nothing from experience beyond what is necessary to give us an object, either of the exter-

^ It must not be supposed that I mean by this what is commonly called physica generalis, and which is rather mathematics, than a philosophy of nature. For the metaphysic of nature is entirely separate from mathematics, and does not enlarge our knowledge as much as mathematics; but it is, nevertheless, very important, as supplying a criticism of the pure knowledge of the understanding that should be applied to nature. For want of its guidance, even mathematicians, given to certain common concepts which in reality are metaphysical, have unconsciously encumbered physical science with hypotheses which vanish under a criticism of those principles, without however causing the least detriment to the necessary employment of mathematics in this field.

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nal or of the internal sense. The former is done by the mere concept of matter (impermeable, lifeless extension), the latter through the concept of a thinking being (in the empirical internal representation, I think). For the rest, we ought in the whole metaphysical treatment of these objects to abstain from all empirical principles, which to the concept of matter might add any kind of experience for the purpose of forming any judgments on these objects.