Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller

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page 30

The translator’s English as printed (F. Max Müller). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.

sequel I shall dissect these concepts so far as is [p. 83] sufficient for the purpose of the method which I am preparing. In a complete system of pure reason they might be justly demanded, but at present they would only make us lose sight of the principal object of our investigation, by rousing doubts and objections which, without injury to our essential object, may well be relegated to another time. The little I have said ought to be sufficient to show clearly that a complete dictionary of these concepts with all requisite explanations is not only possible, but easy. The compartments exist ; they have only to be filled, and with a systematic topic like the present the proper place to which each concept belongs cannot easily be missed, nor compartments be passed over which are still empty. ^

^ Here follows in the Second Edition, Supplement XII.

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

[p. 84]

CHAPTER II

OF THE DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING

Section I

Of the Principles of a Ti^anscendental Deduction in

General

Jurists, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in every lawsuit the question of right {quid juris') from the question of fact {quid facti\ and in demanding proof of both they call the former, which is to show the right or, it may be, the claim, the deduction. We, not being jurists, make use of a number of empirical concepts, without opposition from anybody, and consider ourselves justified, without any deduction, in attaching to them a sense or imaginary meaning, because we can always appeal to experience to prove their objective reality. There exist however illegitimate concepts also, such as, for instance, chance, or fate, which through an almost general indulgence are allowed to be current, but are yet from time to time challenged by the question quid juris. In that case we are greatly embarrassed in looking for their deduction, there being no clear legal title, whether

p. 70

Transcendental Analytic 71

from experience or from reason, on which their [p. 85] claim to employment could be clearly established.

Among the many concepts, however, which enter into the complicated code of human knowledge, there are some which are destined for pure use a priori, independent of all experience, and such a claim requires at all times a deduction,^ because proofs from experience would not be sufficient to establish the legitimacy of such a use, though it is necessary to know how much concepts can refer to objects which they do not find in experience. I call the explanation of the manner how such concepts can a priori refer to objects their transcendental deduction, and distinguish it from- the empirical deduction which shows the manner how a concept may be gained by experience and by reflection on experience ; this does not touch the legitimacy, but only the fact whence the possession of the concept arose.

We have already become acquainted with two totally distinct classes of concepts, which nevertheless agree in this, that they both refer a prioid to objects, namely, the concepts of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the categories as concepts of the understanding. It would be labour lost to attempt an empirical deduction of them, because their distinguishing characteristic is that they refer to objects without having borrowed anything from experience for their representation, [p. '^6'\ If therefore a deduction of them is necessary, it can only be transcendental.

It is possible, however, with regard to these concepts, as with regard to all knowledge, to try to discover in

1 That is a transcendental deduction.

'J 2 Tra7iscendental Analytic

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