Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller

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human reason. In that sense it would be very boastful to call oneself a philosopher, and to pretend to have equalled the type which exists in the idea only.

The mathematician, the student of nature, and the logician, however far the two former may have advanced in rational, and the last, particularly, in philosophical knowledge, are merely artists of reason. There is besides, an ideal teacher, who controls them all, and uses them as instruments for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. Him alone we ought to call philosopher : but as he exists nowhere, while the idea of his legislation exists everywhere in the reason of every human being, we shall keep entirely to that idea, and determine more accurately what kind of systematical unity philosophy, in this cosmical concept,^ demands from the standpoint of its aims. [p. 840]

Essential ends are not as yet the highest ends ; in fact, there can be but one highest end, if the perfect systematical unity of reason has been reached. We must distinguish, therefore, between the ultimate end and subordinate ends, which necessarily belong, as means, to the former. The former is nothing but the whole destination of man, and the philosophy which relates to it is called moral philosophy. On account of this excellence which distinguishes moral philosophy from all other operations of reason, the ancients always understood under the name of philosopher the moralist principally : and even at present the external appearance of self-control by means of reason

^ Cosmical concept is meant here for a concept relating to what must be of interest to everybody : while I determine the character of a science, according to scholastic concepts^ if I look upon it only as one of many crafts intended for certain objects.

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6/4 Architectonic of Pitre Reason leads us, through a certain analogy, to call a man a philosopher, however limited his knowledge may be. The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects only, nature and freedom, and contains therefore both the law of nature and the law of morals, at first in two separate systems, but combined, at last, in one great system of philosophy. The philosophy of nature relates to all that is ; that of morals to that only that ought to be.

All philosophy is either knowledge derived from pure reason, or knowledge of reason derived from empirical principles. The former is called pure, the latter empirical philosophy.

The philosophy of pure reason is either pro- [p. 841] paedeutic (preparation), enquiring into the faculties of reason, with regard to all pure knowledge a priori^ and called critic, or, secondly, the system of pure reason (science), comprehending in systematical connection the whole (both true and illusory) of philosophical knowledge, derived from pure reason, and Q,?^^di nietaphysic, — although this name of metaphysic may be given also to the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of the critic, in order thus to comprehend both the investigation of all that can ever be known a priori and the representation of all that constitutes a system of pure philosophical knowledge of that kind, excluding all that belongs to the empirical and the mathematical employment of reason.

Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical use of pure reason, and is, therefore, either metaphysic of nature or metaphysic of morals. The former contains all the pure principles of reason, derived from concepts only (excluding therefore mathematics), of the theoretical knowledge of all things, the latter, the prinArchitectonic of Pure Reason 675 ciples which determine a priori and necessitate all doing and not doing. Morality is the only legality of actions that can be derived from principles entirely a priori. Hence the metaphysic of morals is really pure moral philosophy, in which no account is taken of anthropology or any empirical conditions. Metaphysic of specu- [p. 842] lative reason has commonly been called metaphysic^ in the more limited sense ; as however pure moral philosophy belongs likewise to this branch of human and philosophical knowledge, derived from pure reason, we shall allow it to retain that name, although we leave it aside for the present as not belonging to our immediate object.