Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller

Concluding remarks on the solution of the transcendental mathematical ideas, and preliminary remarks for the solution of the transcendental dynamical ideas . • 55^ III. Solution of the cosmological ideas of the totality of the derivation of cosmical events from their causes . . . . .560 Possibility of causality through freedom . 566 Explanation of the cosmological idea of freedom in connection with the general necessity of nature . . . . -570 IV. Solution of the cosmological idea of the totality of the dependence of phenomena with regard to their existence in general 587

Stipplement III 713

PAGE

Concluding remarks on the whole antinomy of pure reason . . . . . -593

Third Chapter. The ideal of pure reason . . . 595

First Section. Of the ideal in general . . . 595

Second Section. Of the transcendental ideal . . 599

Third Section. Of the arguments of speculative reason in proof of the existence of a Supreme

Being . . . . . . . . .611

Fourth Section. Of the impossibility of an ontological proof of the existence of God . . . 620 Fifth Section Of the impossibility of a cosmological proof of the existence of God . . .631 Discovery and explanation of the dialectical illusion in all transcendental proofs of the existence of a necessary Being ....... 642

Sixth Section. Of the impossibility of the physicotheological proof. ...... 648

Seventh Section. Criticism of all theology based on speculative principles of reason .... 659

Appendix to the transcendental Dialectic . . 670 Of the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason ........ 670

Of the ultimate aim of the natural Dialectic of human reason ...... 697

II. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD 733-884 Introduction . . . . . . . . -735

First Chapter. The discipline of pure reason . 736-823 First Section. The discipline of pure reason in its dogmatical use ....... 740

Second Section. The discipline of pure reason in its polemical use ....... 766

Of the impossibility of a sceptical satisfaction of pure reason in conflict with itself .... 786

Third Section. The discipline of pure reason with regard to the hypotheses ..... 797

Fourth Section. The discipline of pure reason with regard to its proofs 810

Second Chapter. The canon of pure reason . 823-884 First Section. Of the ultimate aim of the pure use of our reason 825

714 Siipplenient III

Second Section. Of the ideal of the Simwium Bonum, as determining the ultimate aim of Pure

Reason . 832

Third Section. Of trowing, knowing, and believing ........ 848

Third Chapter. The architectonic of pure reason . 860 Fourth Chapter. The history of pure reason . . 880

SUPPLEMENT IV

[See vol. ii. p. i]

INTRODUCTION

Of the Difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how should the faculty of knowledge be called into activity, if not by objects which affect our senses, and which either produce representations by themselves, or rouse the activity of our understanding to compare, to connect, or to separate them ; and thus to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which we call experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge within us is antecedent to experience, but all knowledge begins with it.

But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience. For it is quite possible that even our empirical experience is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and of that which our own faculty of knowledge (incited only by sensuous impressions), supplies from itself, a supplement which we do not distinguish from that raw material, until long practice has roused our attention and rendered us capable of separating one from the other.

It is therefore a question which deserves at least closer investigation, and cannot be disposed of at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge independent of experience, and even of all impressions of the senses? Such knowledge is called a priori, and distinguished from empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.

p. 715

7i6 Supplement IV

This term a priori^ however, is not yet definite enough to indicate the full meaning of our question. For people are wont to say, even with regard to knowledge derived from experience, that we have it, or might have it, a priori, because we derive it from experience, not immediately, but from a general rule, which, however, has itself been derived from experience. Thus one would say of a person who undermines the foundations of his house, that he might have known a priori that it would tumble down, that is, that he need not wait for the experience of its really tumbling down. But still he could not know this entirely a priori, because he had first to learn from experience that bodies are heavy, and will fall when their supports are taken away.