Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller
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at the same time restrict them, that is, limit them by conditions foreign to the understanding and belonging to sensibility. Hence the schema is really the phenomenon, or the sensuous concept of an object in agreement with the category (numerus est qtimititas phaenomenon, sensatio realitas phaenofnenon^ constans et perdurabile rerum substantia phaeno77tenon — aeternitas necessitas phaenoine7ion, etc.). If we omit a restrictive condition, it would seem that we amplify a formerly limited concept, and that therefore the categories in their pure meaning, [p. 147] free £rom all conditions of sensibility, should be valid of things in general, as they are, while their schemata represent them only as they appear, so that these categories might claim a far more extended power, independent of all schemata. And in truth we must allow to these pure concepts of the understanding, apart from all sensuous conditions, a certain significance, though a logical one only, with regard to the mere unity of representations produced by them, although these representations have no object and therefore no meaning that could give us a concept of an object. Thus substance, if we leave out the sensuous condition of permanence, would mean nothing but a something that may be conceived as a subject, without being the predicate of anything else. Of such a representation we can make nothing, because it does not teach us how that thing is determined which is thus to be considered as the first subject. Categories, therefore, without schemata are functions only of the understanding necessary for concepts, but do not themselves represent any object. This character is given to them by sensibility only, which realises the understanding by, at the same time, restricting it.
THE
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE
[p. 148]
OF THE
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT
OR
ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES CHAPTER II
SYSTEM OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING
We have in the preceding chapter considered the transcendental faculty of judgment with reference to those general conditions only under which it is justified in using the pure concepts of the understanding for synthetical judgments. It now becomes our duty to represent systematically those judgments which, under that critical provision, the understanding, can really produce a priori. For this purpose our table of categories will be without doubt our natural and best guide. For it is the relation of the categories to all possible experience which must constitute all pure a priori knowledge of the understanding ; and their relation to sensibility in general will therefore exhibit completely and systematically all
p. 121
122 Transcendental Analytic the transcendental principles of the use of the understanding.^
Principles a priori are so called, not only because they contain the grounds for other judgments, but also because they themselves are not founded on higher and more general kinds of knowledge. This peculiarity, however, does not enable them to dispense with every kind of proof ; for although this could not be given objectively, as [p. 149] all knowledge of any object really rests on it, this does not prevent us from attempting to produce a proof drawn from the subjective sources of the possibility of a knowledge of the object in general ; nay, it may be necessary to do so, because, without it, our assertion might be suspected of being purely gratuitous.
We shall treat, however, of those principles only which relate to the categories. We shall have nothing to do with the principles of transcendental aesthetic, according to which space and time are the conditions of the possibility of all things as phenomena, nor with the limitation of those principles, prohibiting their application to things by themselves. Mathematical principles also do not belong to this part of our discussion, because they are derived from intuition, and not from the pure concept of the understanding. As they are, however, synthetical judgments a piHori, their possibility will have to be discussed, not in order to prove their correctness and apodictic certainty, which would be unnecessary, but in order to make the possibility of such self-evident knowledge a priori conceivable and intelligible.
We shall also have to speak of the principle of analyti1 The insertion of man^ as suggested by Rosenkranz, is impossible.
Transcendental Analytic 123
cal as opposed to synthetical judgments, the [p. 150] latter being the proper subject of our enquiries, because this very opposition frees the theory of the latter from all misunderstandings, and places them clearly before us in their own peculiar character.
SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING
• Section I
Of the Highest Principle of all Analytical yiidgnients
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