Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason — trans. F. Max Müller
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great deal of knowledge which, though it consists in no
Introduction 5
more than in simplifications and explanations of [p. 6] what is comprehended in our concepts (though in a confused manner), is yet considered as equal, at least in form, to newjmowledge. It only separates_and arranges our concepts, it does not enlarge them in matter or contents. As by this process we gain a kind of real knowledge a prio?i, which ^progresses safely and usefully, it happens that j)ur reason, without being aware of it, appropriates under that pretence propositions of a totally different character, adding to given concepts new and strange ones a_ priori, without knowing whence they come, nay without even thinking of such a question. I shall therefore at the very outset treat of the distinction bxt^gen these two kinds of knowledge.
Of the Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical
Judgments
In all judgments in which there is a relation between subject and predicate (I speak of affirmative judgments only, the application to negative ones being easy), that relation can be of_two kinds. Either the predicate B belongs to the_subiect A as something contained (though covertly) in the concept A ; or B lies outside the sphere of the concept A, though somehow connected with it. In the former case I call the^ judgment analytical, in the latter syntheticaL Analytical judgments (af^rmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the [p. 7] predicate with the subject is conceived through Jdentitv, while others in which that coniiectixin is conceived without identity ,.jii ay be called synthetical. The former might be called jjju strati ng, the latter ex£andm^_jildgiaan^&r-because in the former nothing is added by the predicate to the
6 Introductio7i concept of the subject, but the concept is only divided into its constituent concepts which were always conceived as existing within it, though confusedly ; while the latter add to the concept of the subject a predicate not conceived as existing within it, and not to be extracted from it by any process of mere analysis. If I say, for instance. All bodies are extended, this is an analytical judgment. I need not go beyond the eoncepJL connect^d-with the name of body, in order to find thaj^ py1-pnc;mn ic; rnnnprtpH with it.
I have only ta_analyse-^tet-cuTrc^pt and become conscious of the manifold elements always contained in it, in order to find that-^iredicate. This is therefore an analytical judgment. But if I say,,,^l]JiQdies are-heavy, the^ii^dicate is something quite different from what I think as the mere concept of body. The addition of such a predicate gives us a synthetical judgment.
[It becomes clear from this,^
[i. That our knowledge is in no way extended by aijalyticaljudgments, but that all they effect is [p. 8] to put the concepts which we possess into better order and render them more intelligible, f '2. That in synthetical judo^rP'"^^'^ I must have besides the concept of the nubjert. snmethinr e]r^(^(r)^m which the^iiudei^staftding relies^in_order to know tha^L a^pjredicate, jiot contained in the concept, nevertheless belongs to it.
Tn^rnpirifal jnrlgmpnt.<; this causcs no difficulty, bccausc this X is here simply the complete experience of an object which I conceive by the concept A, that concept forming one part only of my experience. For though I do not include the predicate of gravity in the general concept of
^ These two paragraphs to * In synthetical judgments a priori, however,' are left out in the Second Edition, and replaced by Supplement V.
Introductio7i 7
body, that concept nevertheless indicates^ the co.mplete experience through one of its parts, so that I may add other parts also of the same experience, all belonging to that concept. I may first, by an analytical process, realise the concept of body through the predicates of extension, impermeability, form, etc., all of which are contained in it. Afterwards I expand my knowledge, and looking back to the experience from which my concept of body was abstracted, I find gravity always connected with the beforementioned predicates. Experience therefore is the x which lies beyond the concept A, and on which rests the possibility of a synthesis of the predicate of gravity B with the concept A.] .
In synthetical judgments a priori^ however, that [p. 9] help is entirely wanting. If I want to go beyond the concggtAJn order to find another concept_B^connected with it, where is there anything on which I may rest and through which a synthesis might become possible, considering that I cannot have the advantage of looking about in the field of experience } Take the proposition that all which happens has its cause. In the concept of something that happens I no doubt conceive of something existing preceded by time, and from this certain analytical judgments may be deduced. But the concept of cause is entirely outside that concept, and indicates something different from that which happens, and is by no means contained in that representation. How can I venture then , to pr^HiVatp of that which happens something totally different from it, and to represent_ the concept of cause, though not contained in it, as belonging to it, and belonging to it by necessity } What is here Jthe unknown x, on which the understanding may rest in order to find beyond
8 Introduction /
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