Charaka-Samhita — trans. Kaviraj Avinash Chandra Kaviratna

‘ Jatismara ’ implies one who remembers the acts and incidents of previous lives. The Rishi’s explanation of the cause of one’s being a Jatismara is union with a Pure Manas. In consequence of such union, remembered knowledge, that is, knowledge of the acts and incidents of a previous life, comes in. Whether there are Jatismaras or not, it is extremely difficult to decide. But the belief is common among Hindus that yogins are more or less Jatismaras. In the Yoga-sutras of Patanjali, elaborate instructions are laid down for observance or practice by persons desirous of becoming Jatismaras. One should, it is said, recollect, when one retires to bed, all the acts and incidents of the day from the moment of awaking to the moment of going to bed. When one goes on in this way, day by day, for a certain number of years, at the end one will, it is said, find one’s memory sufficiently strengthened to bring back the acts and incidents of one’s past life. There can be no doubt that the memory is capable of being greatly strengthened by this sort of exercise or practice. But whether it can be so strengthened as to go back to a former state of existence, cannot, accord¬ ing to those who believe in yoga-sutras, be denied by any sort of a priori reasoning, their own experience having been otherwise. — T,

CHARAKA SAMIHTA

p. 729

(Notwithstanding the fact of the diversity of the Mind), it is said to be of only one kind, following the predominent trait.*23

Thus, Conception results from the totality of all those causal conditions of diverse kinds.24

As a house is the result of various kinds of articles, as a car is made up of various limbs, after the same manner we have said that this Conception is born of mother, of father, of Self, of assimilated food and drink, and of the juices. There is, again, the Mind, which unites the others together.

Thus said the illustrious son of Atri.f25

Bharadwaja said, — If this Conception results from a totality of these causal conditions of diverse kinds, how is it that those conditions combine together for forming the foetus ?

If for any reason these combine together, how is it that the foetus, which is born of a totality of those conditions, takes a human form ? Why is it said that man has man for his progenitor ?

If it be granted that since man has man for his progenitor, therefore the foetus takes the form of man, even as a cow is born of a cow, a horse of a horse, etc., then that which has been said before, viz., that Conception or the foetus results from all the conditions, must be ill-founded.

* What is meant by there being different kinds of mind is that there are minds of different characteristics*. Taking the attributes of Sattwa, Rajas, and Tamas, we say that such a one has a ‘ Sattwika,’ a ‘ Rajasika,’ or a ‘ Tamasika ’ mind. It cannot, however, be true that one having a Sattwika mind is possessed of the attribute of Sattwa alone ; or, in other words, that he has no grain or admixture of Rajas and Tamas. Nor can it be true that a Tamasika mind has Tamas alone for its characteristic to the total exclusion of the two other attributes in any measure. When, however, we say that one has a Sattwika mind, all that we intend by it is that the attribute of Sattwa predominates in his mind. — T.

f ‘ Kuta 1 is any kind of house, particularly, one built of bamboos and seeds and grass and earth. By ‘ Kuta,’ or rather ‘ Kutagaram,’ Gangadhara understands 1 a Jen taka shed,’ that is a close house made of earth and wood, and used for the vapour bath called Jentaka. ( Vide p. 153, Sutrasthana, ante).

p. 730

CHARAKA SAMHITA.

If, again, man be taken as born of man, why then do not the offspring of idiots; of those that are blind, or hump¬ backed, or dumb, of dwarfs,, of those that speak with a nasal twang, of those that are deformed, of those that are insane, of those that are lepers, and of those that suffer from the disease called Kilasa, resemble their progenitors ?

Again, if for meeting this argument it be held that this Self knows forms by his own eyes, sounds by his own ears, scents by his own nose, tastes by his own tongue, sensation of touch by his own organ of touch, and all ideas apprehensible by the understanding by means of his own understanding, and, there¬ fore, children born of idiots and the others do not resemble their progenitors, then, even in this there would be an abandonment of the original poroposition. Since, by holding this, the Self becomes Knower only when there are organs of knowledge. In such a case, where both become possible, viz., power of know¬ ing and powerlessness of knowing, the Self becomes a modifi¬ cation and of the nature of Prakriti, whereas the Self is truly unmodified and unmodifiable, and Knower too.

If, again, it be said that the Self knows objects by the organs of vision and' the rest, then, the Self who is truly divested of the organs of sense, becomes powerless to know owing to the absence of the organs of sense.

In consequence of his powerlessness to know (or ignorance) he ceases to be the Cause.