Charaka-Samhita — trans. Kaviraj Avinash Chandra Kaviratna
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
The translator’s English as printed (Avinash Chandra Kaviratna). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
The fact is, chicane as regards words consists in taking a word in a sense different from that in which it is employed. It is a sort of punning. — T.
p. 578
charaka-samhitA.
The first one may then say, — Is this your meaning, vie., that disease is an existent thing, and medicine is also an existent thing? If an existent thing allays an existent thing, then bron¬ chitis being an existent tiling, and phthisis also being an existent thing, in consequence of botli being existent things, bronchitis allays phthisis. This is an illustration of chicane of the undistri¬ buted middle.*61
As to fallacy of reasoning ( Ahetu ) : Fallacy is (of three kinds) viz., i. Prakarana.sama (Begging the question), 2. Samgayasama (fallacy of assumption), and 3. Varnya-sama.
Prakarana-sama (Begging the question) is as follows :
One says, — The soul, which is distinct from the body, is eternal.
The other answers, — Since the soul is distinct from the body, therefore is it eternal, the body being not eternal. The soul’s being different from the body is the reason of its being eternal. This is a begging of the question. That which is to be proved cannot constitute a reason.f65
Sampayasama (or fallacy of assumption based on doubt), verily, is where that which is a cause of doubt is regarded as dispelling (or settling the doubt).
It is as follows :
This one has shown acquaintance with only a portion of the scriptures bearing on the Science of Life. A doubt, therefore, arises as to whether this one is, or is not, a physician.
He who hears this, says, —
This one has shown an acquaintance with a portion of the scriptures bearing on the Science of Life. Hence, he is a physician.
* A better example of this kind of chicane is as follows : Apes eat ; horses eat ; hence, (as both eat) Apes are horses. The fact is, by Cchala-Samanya is meant the fallacy of the undistributed middle. — T.
+ Here there is clearly a begging of the question. Whether the soul is, or is not, distinct from the body, is to be proved. Instead of being proved, it is assumed, and as the body is not eternal, the distinctness of the soul from it is taken as the reason of its being eternal. — T.
CHA RA KA -SA M HI TA .
p. 579
The reason of the doubt is not specified here. (It is ignored).
This also is an illustration of fallacy That which is the reason of a doubt should not be regarded as dispelling the doubt.*66
As to Varnyasama (or the fallacy of assumption based on similarity).
This fallacy lies where the reason is not different from what is to be predicated of the subject.
Example : Some one says, — The Intellect (Buddhi) is not eternal, because not tangible, like sound.
Here the predicate of sound should be proved, so, the predi¬ cate of Intellect also should be proved.
In the proposition, however, there is similarity as regards bolh the terms {viz., the subject and the example or reason). Hence, it is an instance of Varnyasama fallacy.t67
As to Atitakalam (impropriety of time) : Impropriety of time arises where that which should be stated first is stated afterwards.
In consequence of the time having passed of such a statement, the person making it becomes capable of being discomfited in disputation. J68
As to Upalambba (attribution of fault or censure): Upalambha, verily, is the attribution of fault to the reason adduced (of a proposition).
The faults (of reasoning) have been explained above under the f This form of fallacy is, of course, a fallacy of assumption. Stated fully, in the syllogistic form, the argument stands thus :
* This is another form of begging the question. That which is to be proved is assumed as proved and regarded as the reason of an assertion. — T.
(a) All that is not tangible is not eternal, (b) Sound is not tangible, (c) Therefore, sound is not eternal, (d) Intellect is intangible (as sound). Taking it with (a), Intellect is not eternal. The predicate of Intellect and that of sound are similar ; that of sound is assumed. Like it, that of Intellect is also assumed, the major proposition lying in the back ground, viz., things intangible are not eternal. — T.
+ No example of this kind of impropriety of speech is given. — T.
p. 580
CHA RA KA-SAMHITA.
heading of Ahetu (or fallacy) which always assumes the aspect ot Hetu (or reason).*69
As to Parihara (avoidance or correction of fault) : Parihara is the avoidance or correction of a fault (that is pointed out). Example : When the soul resides in the body, the signs of life are always noticeable. When the soul leaves the body, those signs are no longer noticeable. Hence the soul is distinct from the body, and is eternal (the body being not eternal).!70
As to Pratijna-hani (rejection of proposition) :
Pratijna-hani, verily, is where one, upon being refuted, rejects the poposition first adopted (or advanced) by him.
Example : The proposition first advanced is — Purusha is eternal.
Refuted by a disputant, he rejects the proposition and says,— Purusha is not eternal.71
As to Abhyanujna (acceptance) :
Abhyanujna, verily, is acceptance by one of what is attributed to him by the other side, whether agreeable or disagreeable. J72
No commentary for this page under the selected tracks.
There is commentary on page 1.