Phaedrus — Plato
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p. 268in children^and women, bond and free, artisan, ruler, subject, is not the one which conduces most to the excellence of the State, — this quality, I mean, of everyone doing his own work, and not being a busybody, — the question would not be easily fdetermi'ned. ^ Certainly, he replied, that would be difficult to determine. , Then the power of each individual in the State to do his iown work appears to compete in the scale of political virtue with wisdom, temperance, and courage?
Yes, he said. < And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice ? Exactly. Look at this in another light. Ate not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining causes? Certainly. And they will decide on the principle that individuals are neither to take what is another's nor to be deprived of wRatJs their own; that will be the principle at which they will aim? Yes j that will be their principle.
And that is a Just principle ? Yes. fThen on this view also justice will be admitted to be the (having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him? - That is true. Think, now, and say whether you agree with me.
Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter ; and suppose them to exchange imple- ^^^ ments or prerogatives, or the same person to be doing the work of both ; do you think that any great harm would happen to the State ?
Not at all, he said. r But when the cobbler leav& his last, and he or any other whom nature designed to be a trader, and whose heart is lifted up by wealth or strength or numbers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all at once, then I think you will agree with me that this interchange of duties and implements and this meddling of one iwith another is the ruin of the State.
Most true. Then, said I, as there are three distinct classes, any meddling of them with one another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justl] termed evil-doing ? Precisely. And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city you i would characterize as injustice ? Certainly. This-th^n is 4«jtifltice ; and let us once more repeat the thesis ill .the opposite form.
When the trader, the auxiliary, and the j;uardian do their o\m^ business, th^^^^^ and will make the city just. Let us not^ I said, be over-positive as yet ; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State^jhCD there will be no longer any room for doubt ; but, i(^t, there must be another inquiry.
At present, however, letuTfihishthe old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could first examine justice on the larger scale, there wpuld be less difficulty in recognizing her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, iaiid we made the best that we could, knowing well that Tn the good State justice would be found to exist.
Let us now apply what we found. there to the individual, and if they agree, well and good ; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls. That is the right way, he said ; let us do as you say.
I proceeded to ask : When two things, a greater and less, I are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same ? Like, he replied. The just man then, in being just, and in reference to the | mere principle of justice, will be like the just State? He will. And a State was thought by us to be just when the three . classes in the State did their own business ; and also thought p. 270to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain ' other affections and qualities of these same classes ? True, he said. And so of the individual ; we shall be right in arguing that .\^ he has th^glsame principles in his own soul, and may fairly receive the same appellations as possessing the affections wlucE\ correspond lo thiem ^"' .>^^ Certainry7 he Said.
Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question — whether the soul has these three principles or not? An easy question ! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good. Very true, I said ; and I confess that the method which we are employing, in my judgment, seems to be altogether inadequate to the, accurate solution of this question ; for the true method is another and a longer one.
Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous inquiry. May we not be satisfied with that ? he said : under the circumstances, I am quite content. I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied. Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.
''^Can I be wrong, I said, in acknowledging that in the individual there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State ? for if they did not pass'^from one to the other, whence did they come ?
Take the quality of spirit or passion ; there would be something ridiculous in thinking that this quality, which is characteristic of the Thracians, Scythians, ^^ and in general of the northern nations, when found in States, does not originate in the individuals who compose them ; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or the love of money, which may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians. ^^ Exactly, he said. There is no difficulty in understanding this.
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