Phaedrus — Plato
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p. 96poem under discussion. His explanation of the poem is long and elaborate. When he had finished,] Hippias said : I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good explanation of this poem ; but I have also an excellent interpretation of my own which I will expound to you, if you will allow me. » Nay, Hippias, said Alcibiades ; not now, but another time.
At present we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, Socrates should answer ; or that if he would rather answer, then that Socrates should ask.
I said : I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined ; but I would rather have done with poems and odes, if you do not object, and come back to the question about which I was asking you at first, Protagoras, and by your help make an end of that.
The talk about the poet seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar company have recourse ; who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own voices and conversation by reason of their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the market, hiring for a great sum the voice of a flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among them : but where the company are real gentlemen and men of education, you will see no flute-girls, nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls ; and they have no nonsense or games, but are contented with one another's conversation, of which their own voices are the medium, and which they carry on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are very liberal in their potations.
And a company like this of ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they are saying ; people who cite them declaring, some that the poet has one meaning, and others that he has another ; and there arises a dispute which can never be put to the proof.
This sort of entertainment they decline, and pre- ^ fer to talk with one another, and try one another's ^ mettle in conversation. And these are the sort of models which I desire that you and I should imitate. Leaving the poetS; and keeping to ourselves^ let us try the mettle of one p. 97another and of the truth in conversation. And if you have a mind to ask I am ready to answer ; or if you would rather, do you answer, and give me the opportunity of taking up and completing our unfinished argument. I made these and some similar observations ; but Protagoras would not distinctly say which he would do.
Thereupon Alci blades turned to Callias, and said ; Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in refusing to say whether he will or will not answer ? for I certainly think that he is unfair ; he ought either to proceed with the argument, or distinctly to refuse to proceed, that we may know his intention ; and then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one else, and the rest of the company will be free to talk with one another.
I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask and he would answer. So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties.
For I think that Homer was very right in saying that **When two go together one sees before the other,*' for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; but if a man **sees a thing when he is alone,*' he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them.
And I would rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you ? — who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and yet have not the power of making others good. Whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others.
Moreover such confidence have you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in return. How then ^^Xj can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and take advice of you ? Indeed, I must.
p. 98[Socrates now returns to the original question — whether the virtues are one or many — and wishes Protagoras to state his opinion again. Protagoras answers that the virtues are not one but many, and that while four of the virtues, justice, temperance, holiness, and wisdom, are to some extent similar, the fifth, courage, is very different from the rest.
For, he claims, a man may be remarkable for his courage, but utterly lacking in justice, temperance, wisdom, and holiness. Socrates proceeds in the following way to prove that courage is one with the other virtues. First, the courageous man is the confident man, as Protagoras himself allows. What gives confidence to a- man, for example, to a horseman or a soldier?
Clearly in every case, the confidence of a man comes from his knowledge of his profession. When a man is confident about matters of which he is ignorant, we call him mad. His is not true courage. When Protagoras concedes that confidence or courage is always derived fi'om knowledge, he contradicts his previous assertion that a man may be ignorant and still courageous. To be consistent he must admit that courage and wisdom are one.
He evades the point by complaining that Socrates has unfairly attributed to his words meanings that he did not intend, and he tries to show how he would make a distinction between courage and confidence. Socrates abruptly changes his point of attack. Some men, he says, live well, and others ill. Those who live pleasantly, live well, and those who live in pain, live ill. Protagoras agrees.
Now Socrates wishes to know whether pleasure is the only good and pain the only evil. Protagoras hesitates to make such an assumption without qualification. He would rather say with most men, that some pleasant things are good and some painful things evil.
He wishes, however, to inquire into the truth of the matter, and Socrates, who is to lead the discussion, begins by asking the nature of knowledge (This seems to be a digressjpn, but only for the moment) :] Now the rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of rule, or of command ; their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge w^hich is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps fear, — just as if knowledge were a slave^ and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is
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