Phaedrus — Plato

PROTA GOR AS 93 making an oration is quite another, according to my way of thinking. But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to speak in his own way, just as you claim to speak in yours. Here Alcibiades interposed, and said : That, Callias, is not a fair statement of the case.

For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make a speech — in this he yields the palm to Protagoras ; but I should be greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of holding and apprehending an argument.

Now if Protagoras will make a similar admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates ; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer — not, when a question is asked, having recourse to shifts and evasions, and instead of answering, making a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget — I will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory).

And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than Protagoras ; that is my opinion, and every man ought to say what he thinks. When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one — Critias, I believe — went on to say : O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras. And this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side.

But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or Protagoras ; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up the discussion.

Prodicus added : That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those who are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of both the speakers ; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as equality, ' for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed should not be assigned to both of them ; but to the wiser a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise.

And I as well as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win 2p. 94esteem, and not praise only, among us who are your audience ; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers* souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering words contrary to their conviction.

And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased ; for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight. Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his words. Hippias the sage spoke next.

He said : All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellowcitizens, by nature and not by law ; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature.

How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature of things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with one another like the meanest of mankind.

I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peacemakers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, but ^38- loosen and let go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and become you better.

Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also suggest and suppose further, that you choose an arbiter or overseer or president ; he will keep watch over your words and reduce them to their proper length.

This proposal was received by the company with universal approval ; and Callias said that he would not let me off, and that I was to choose an arbiter.

But I .said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be unseemly; for if the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better ; or if he was equal, neither would that be well ; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him? And if you say *vLet us have a better then,** to that I answer that you cannot have 3p. 95any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him ; not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire.

If Protagoras is not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer ; and I will endeavor to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer : and when I have answered as many questions as he likes to ask, let him in like manner answer ; and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the exact questions, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion.

And this will require no special arbiter : you shall all of you be arbiters. This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions ; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies. [Protagoras proposes to base his questions on a certain passage from the poet Simonides, relating to virtue.

The ensuing discussion which forms a long digression, some scholars claim to be a satire on the hypercritical methods of in- ^^?Z terpretation employed by the Sophists. In the course of the discussion however, Socrates gives expression to his doctrine that knowledge is virtue, as follows :] Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there were some who did evil voluntarily.

For no wise man, as I believe, will allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and dishonorable actions ; but they are very well aware that all who do evil and dishonorable things do them against their will. [The doctrine that a man cannot knowingly do wrong is fundamental with Socrates and is brought out more fully later in the dialogue. At present he employs it to interpret the