Phaedrus — Plato

p. 288admit that. Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every respect agree wdth the description of the ideal : if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly in the way that we propose, you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand ; and that will content you. I am sure that I should be contented with that — will not you? Yes, I will.

Then let me next endeavor to show what is that fault in States which is the cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change which will enable a State to pass into the truer form ; and let the change, if possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two ; at any rate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible. Certainly, he replied.

I think then, 1 said, that there might be a revolution if there were just one change, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one. What is that ? he said. Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of waves, yet shall the word be spoken, even though the running over of the laughter of the wave shall just sink me beneath the waters of laughter and dishonor ; and do you attend to me. Proceed, he said.

I said : Until, then, philosophers are kings, or the kings , and princes of this world have^the spirit and power of philoso- / phy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those/ commoner natures who follow either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never cease from ill — ^no, nor the human race, as I believe — and then only will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day; this was what I wanted but was afraid to say, my dear' Glaucon ; for to see that there is no other way either of private or public happiness is indeed a hard thing.

Socrates, he said, what a speech is this? I would have you consider that the word which you have uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable persons too, will in a moment pull off their coats, as I may in a figure say, and in light array, taking up any weapon that comes to hand, they 2p. 289will run at you might and main, intending to do heaven knows what ; and if you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be ** pared by their fine wits," and no mistake.

474" You got me into the scrape, I said. ^' And I was quite right, he said ; however, I will do all I can to get you out ; but I can only give you wishes and exhortations, and also, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers into your questions better than another — that is all. And now having such an auxiliary, you must do yoiu: best to show the unbelievers that you are right. I ought to try, I said, as I have an offer of such valuable assistance.

And I-4Jiiak._that>Jf there is to be a chance of our escaping^ we must define who these philosophers are who, as we say, are to rule in the State ; then we shall be able to defend ourselves : there will be discovered to be some natures who ought to rule and to study philosophy ; and-otheis who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers rather than leaders. Then now for a definition, he said.

Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may somehow or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation. Proceed, he replied. [The true philosopher is one who lo^ys all wisdom. HeP algne distinguishes -between, the changing'wbiiIjQ£the_sen§esri and tSe-^tejcnal .world of ,absp_lut^ Jruth.

In contrast withw hijn^the many.h^ve nq true knowledge but QnJyJthe_appearance |45 of knowledge which may be^called opinion.] V Those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see, . nor can be taught to see, absolute beauty ; who see the many I just, and not absolute justice, and the like, — ^such persons may | be said to have opinion but not knowledge ? That is certain.

But those who see the al)solute and eternal and immutable may be said to know, and not to have opinion only ? Neither can that be denied. « The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and 19 3p. 290gazed upon fair colors, but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty ? Yes, I remember. Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them ? I shall tell them that they ought not to be angry at a description of themselves which is true. But those who embrace the absolute are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion ? .^Assuredly.