Phaedrus — Plato

p. 239just because, by their lives of indolence and luxury, men fill themselvp like pools with waters and winds, compelling the ingenioii sons of Asclepius ^ to give diseases the names of flatulence and catarrh ; is not this, too, a disgrace ? [In the days of Asclepius and Homer, and before the time of Herodicus, most of the diseases which we now have did not exist and the practice of medicine was very simple.

But the present system of medicine may be said to educate diseases.] Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly consti tution, by a happy combination of training and doctoring, found out a way of torturing first and principally himself, and secondly the rest of the world. How was that ? he said.

By the invention of lingering death ; for he had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian ; he could do nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on to old age. What a noble reward of the physician's skill !

Yes, I said ; such a reward as a man might fairly expect . who knew not the wisdom of Asclepius, and did not consider that, if he failed to instruct his descendants in these arts, this arose not from ignorance or inexperience of such a department of medicine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered States every individual had an occupation to which he must attend, and therefore had no leisure to spend in continually being ill.

This we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, fail to apply the same rule to people of the richer sort. How is that ? he said. I replied ; when a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and ready remedy ; an emetic or a purge or cautery or the knife, — these are his remedies.

And if any one tells him that he must go throygh a course of dietetics, and swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life * Physicians. See Protagoras, note 8.

p. 240which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his ordinary calling ; and therefore saying good-by to this sort of physician, he resumes his customary diet, and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution fails, he dies and has done with it. Yes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use this summary art of medicine.

Has he not, I said, an occupation ; and what profit ^ g would there be in his life if he were deprived of his occupation ? Very true, he said. But the rich man, as we say, is a gentleman who has no work which he ought to do or die ? He is generally supposed to have nothing to do. Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides,^ that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practice virtue ?

Nay, he said, I think that he need not wait for that. I don't want to raise that question, I replied ; 1 want rather to know whether the practice of virtue is obligatory on the rich, and ought to be a necessity of life to him ; and if so, whether their dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the apphcation of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of the maxim of Phocylides ?

Of that, he replied, there can be no doubt ; such excessive care of the body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic," is most inimical to the practice of virtue, and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army, or an office of State. Yes, and even more incompatible, I replied, with any kind of study or thought or self-reflection. [Asclepius shows himself to have been a good statesman.

He conserved the interests of the State in healing only those of healthy constitution and habits of life. He did not attempt to cure diseased constitutions because they were of no use to the State.] All that, Socrates, he said, is excellent ; but I should like to put a question to you. Ought there not to be good physi- » Phocylides (fS-c^l'f-dez, 560 B.C.) : a Greek poet

p. 241 cians in a State, and are not the best those who have the greatest experience of constitutions good and bad, just as good judges are those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral natures ? Yes, I said, I quite agree about the necessity of having good judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think good? Will you inform me ? Yes, if I can.

Let me however note that in the same question you join two things which are not the same. How is that ? he said. Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now skillful physicians are those who, besides knowing their art, have from their youth upwards had the greatest experience of disease ; they had better not be in robust health, and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons.

For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they cure the body ; in that case we would not allow them ever to be sickly ; j ^ but they cure the body with the mind, and the mind which is or has become sick can cure nothing. That is very true.

Tie sai3^ But with the judge the case is different ; he governs mind by mind, and he cannot be allowed therefore to have been reared among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from youth upwards, in order that, having gone ^^ through the whole calendar of crime, he may infer the crimes of others like their diseases from the knowledge of himself; but the honorable mind which is to form a healthy judgment ought rather to have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when young.

And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily practiced upon by the evil, because they have no samples of evil in their own souls. Yes, he said, that very often happens with them.

Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young ; he should have learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of the nature of evil in others : knowledge, and not his own experience, should be his guide. Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge. Yes, I replied, and he will be good too (and this answers your question) ; for he is good whose soul is good ; now your i6