Phaedrus — Plato

p. 273Yes, he said, there must be a third. Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to | be different from desire, turn out also to be different from; reason. But that is obvious, he said, and is proved in the case of young children, who are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and a good many only late in Hfe.

Excellent, I said, and the same thing is seen in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying.

And Homer, whose words we have already quoted, may be again summoned as a witness, where he says, — *' He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul ; " for in those lines Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning principle which is the subject of the rebuke. That is true, he said.

And now, after much tossing in the argument, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the principles which ^ exist in the State, like those in the individual, are three in" number, and the same with them. Exactly. And must we not infer that the individual is wise in the t same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the * State wise ? Certainly.

And the same quality which constitutes bravery in the State i constitutes bravery in the individual, and the same is true of * all the other virtues ? Assuredly. And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way that the State was just ? That will also follow of course. And the justice of the State consisted, as we very well re- i member, in each of the three classes doing the work of that class?

We are not very likely to forget that, he said. And we must also remember that the individual whose sev- i eral principles do their own work will be just, and will do his own work ? i8

p. 274Yes, he said, we must remember that. I And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has Ithe care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spir- |ited principle to be the subject and ally ? Certainly.

And, as you were saying, the harmonizing influence of •music and gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and educating the reason with noble words and lessons, and ^^ softening and consoling and civilizing the wildness of I passion with harmony and rhythm ? Quite true, he said.

And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will set a rule over the concupiscent part of every man, which is the largest and most insatiable ; over this they will set a guard, lest, waxing great with the fullness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, and no longer confined to her own sphere, the concupiscent soul should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man ?

Very true, he said. iThe two will be the defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without ; the one counseling, and the other fighting under the command of their leader, and courageously executing his counsels. True. And he is to be deemed courageous who, having the element I of passion working in him, preserves, in the midst of pain and pleasure, the notion of danger which reason prescribes ? Right, he replied.

And he is wise who has in him that little part which rules J and gives orders ; that part being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each and all of the three parts? Assuredly. And would you not say that he is temperate who has these |Same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling Iprinciple of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel ? Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual.

And surely, I said, a man will be just in the manner of which we have several times already spoken and no other ? That is very certain. And is the edge of justice blunted in the individual, or is there any reason why our definition of justice should not apply equally to the individual and to the State? None in my judgment, he said.

Because, I said, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of this. What sort of instances do you mean ? Why, for example, I said, who would imagine that the jus? State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, would be more likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver ?j No one, as I should suppose, he replied.

Will such an one, I said, ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country ? That will be far from him. Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements ? Impossible. No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonor his father and mother, or to fail in his rehgious duties ?

'Nb one. / And the reason of this is that each part of him is doing his / own business, whether in ruling or being ruled ? ^^--%at is the truth. Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such! men and such States is justice, or do you hope to discover somej other ? Not I, indeed.

Then our dream has been realized ; and as we were saying at the beginning of our work of construction, some divine power must have conducted us to a sort of first principle or form of justice — that suspicion of ours has been now verified ? Yes, certainly.

And the division of labor which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a kind of shadow of justice, and therefore of use ?