Phaedrus — Plato

p. 262founded State among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in the State, but about the whole State, and considers what may be. regarded as the best policy, both internal and external ? There certainly is. And what is this knowledge, and among whom found ? I asked. This is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those whom we were just how describing as perfect guardians.

And is there any name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge ? The name of good in counsel and truly wise. And do you suppose that there will be as many of these true guardians as there are blacksmiths in a city ? No, he replied ; the blacksmiths will be far more numerous. Will they not be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge ?

Much the smallest. f\nd by reason of this smallest part or class of a State, which is the governing and presiding class, and of the knowledge which resides in them, the whole State, being in the order of nature, will be called wise ; and nature appears to have ordained that this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called knowledge, should be the smallest of all I classes. Most true, he said.

Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four virtues has somehow been discovered. I am sure, he said, that the discovery is to my mind quite satisfactory. Agairir T said^ there is no diflf^riilty in seeing the^atiirr* nf courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.

How do you mean ? i Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of that part which fights and goes to battle on the State's behalf. No one, he replied, would ever think of any other. The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be 2p. 263cowardly, but that, as I conceive, will not have the effect of making the city either one or the other. Certainly not. / The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of the city w in which there resides a never-failing quality preservative of the opinion which the legislator inculcated about the right sort of fear ; and this is what you term courage.

I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you. I mean, I said, that ^^"ffigfi 1^ ^ ^'^^^ nf pr^>g#*^vi^tinn What kind of preservation ?

The preservation, I said, of the opinion about the nature and manner of dangers which the law implants through education;! and I mean by the word ** never-failing,'* to intimate that in' pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration of my meaning ? If you will.

You know, I said, that the dyejs, when they want to dye wool for making the true sea- purple, begin by selecting their white color first ; this they prepare and dress with no slight circumstance, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds ; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast color, and no washing with lyes or without lyes can take away the bloom of the color.

I dare say that you know how these, or indeed any colors, look when the ground has not been duly prepared ? Yes, he said ; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.

Then now, I said, you will understand what our object wasinl selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic ; we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection, and the color of their opinions about dangers and every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, and not to be washed away by any such potent lyes as pleasure,— mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye ; and sorrow, fear, and desire mightier solvents than any others. And this sort of universal preserving power of tiue opiaion in conformity with law about real and false dan3p. 264gers, I call and maintain to be courage, unless you can suggest (another view. But I have no other to suggest, and I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave, — this, in your judgment, is not courage in conformity with law, and ought to have another name. That is as you say. ^ Then I may infer that this is courage ?

Why, yes, said I, that you may infer, and if you add the word ** political,*' you will not be far wrong: hereafter we may pursue that inquiry further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice, and with a view to this there is nothing more wanted. You are right, he replied.

T\^^ virfriips remain jto be discovered in the State, — first, temperance, and then ju^ice. which is the great object of our se^cR. *" ■* Very true. .^ Now, can we find ^justice without troubling ourselves about {temperance ? I do not know how' that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light, and temperance lost sight of ; and therefore I wish you would do me the favor of considering temperance first.

Certainly, I replied, I cannot be wrong in granting you a favor. Then do as I ask, he said. Yes, I repHed, I will do as you ask, and next consider temperance ; this, as far as I can see at present, has more of the nature of symphony and hari^ony than the preceding. How is that ? he asked.

Temperance, I replied, is, as I conceive, a sort of order and control of certain pleasures and desires ; this is implied in the saying of a man being his own master ; and there are other traces of the same notion. No doubt, he said. There is something ridiculous in the expression " master of himself; *' for the master is also the slave and the slave the master ; and in all these modes of speaking the same ^^' person is predicated. Certainly.