Phaedrus — Plato

p. 265But the real meaning of the expression, I believe, is that the human soul has a better principle, and has also a worse principle ; and when the better principle controls the worse, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is certainly a , term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is less, is overcome by the worse principle, which is greater, this is censured ; and he who is in this case is called the slave of self and unprincipled.

Yes, he said, there is reason in that. And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized ; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of self, if the words temperance and self-mastery truly express the rule of the better over the worse. Yes, he said, I have looked, and perceive the truth of what you say.

Moreover, I said, the pleasures and desires and pains, which are many and various, are found in children and women and servants, and in the lower classes of the free citizens. Certainly, he said. Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are confined to a few, being those who are the best born and the best educated. Very true, he said.

And these also, I said, as you may perceive, have a place in our State, but the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few. That I perceive, he said. Then if there be any city which may be described as master* of pleasures and desires, and master of self, ours may claim* that designation? Certainly, he replied. And also that of temperate, and for the same reasons ? Yes, he said.

And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will 1 be agreed about the question who are to rule, that again will be our State ? No doubt at all of that. And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in

p. 266^ which class will temperance be found, — in the rulers or in the ^. subjects ? ^ In both, as I should imagine, he replied. ( Do you observe, I said, that we were pretty right in our anticipation that temperance was a sort of harmony?

Why do you say that ? ( Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a portion of the State only, which the one makes wise and the other valiant ; but that is not the way ^ with temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or strength or numbers or wealth, or whatever else may be the measure of them.

Most truly ^ then, do we d^ribe temperance as the natural harmony of master and slaves, bothlrTStates and_-individuals, in^which_the_subfects are as w i Hi n^to obey jsjbe L governors are to rule. - I entirely agree with you. And so, I said, three of the virtues have been discovered in our State, and this is the form in which they appear.

There remains the last element of virtue in a State, which must be justice,' if we only knew what that was. *That, he said, is obvious.

The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not slip away, and pass out of sight, and get lost ; for there can be no doubt that we are in the right direction ; only try and get a sight of her, and if you come within view first, let me know.

I wish that there were any chance of that, he said ; but I believe that you will find in me a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him ; that is as much as I am good for. Offer up a prayer, I said, and follow. I will follow, he said, but you must show me the way. Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing, still we must push on. Let us push on then. Halloo ! I said, I begin to perceive indications of a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.

• ■ ^-\ THE REPUBLIC 26/, That is good news, he said. Truly, I said, we are very stupid. Why so ? Why, my good sir, I said, when we first began, ages ago, there lav justice roUing at our feet, and we, fools that we were, failed to see her, like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands : And that was the way with us ; we looked away into the far distance, and I suspect this to have been the reason why we missed her.

What do you mean ? I mean to say that we have already had her on our lips and in our ears, and failed to recognize her. I get impatient at the length of your exordium.

Well, then, say whether I am right or not ; you will re^ member the original principle of which we spoke at the foundation of the State, that every man, as we often insisted, should pra^tifif n^^ fV»ing ^^nly, that bein^ the thing ^^^ to which his nature was most perfectly adapted ; now justice is^either tnis or a part ot tE523 ' "" ' Yes,"~tliat was often repeated by us.

Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own busi-1 ness, and not being a busybody ; that was often said by us^ and many others have said the same. Yes, that was said by us. Thfry yhis Hninjy one's own business in a certain way may be a$sumea to be justice. Do you know why I say this ? I do not, and should like to be told.

Because I think that this alone remains in the State when \ the other virtues of temperance and courageand wisdom are abstracted ; and this is me uiiimaie cause and conditioiToTIRe existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative ; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one. ^ That follows of necessity. ^ Still, I said, if a question should arise as to which of these [ four qualities contributed most by their presence to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers would claim the palm, or whether this which I am about to mention, and which is found