Phaedrus — Plato
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p. 47wealth and health and beauty, — is not knowledge that which directs us to the right use of them, and guides our practice about them ? Knowledge, he replied. Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good fortune but success ? He assented. And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither sense nor wisdom ?
Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? Look at the matter thus: if he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes ? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable? Certainly, he said. And who would do least — a poor man or a rich man ? A poor man. A weak man or a strong man ? A weak man.
A noble man or a mean man ? A mean man. And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man ? Yes. And an indolent man less than an active man ? He assented. And a slow man less than a quick ; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones? All this was mutually allowed by us.
Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge : under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them ; and when under the guidance of wisdom and virtue, they are greater goods : but in themselves they are nothing ?
p. 48That, he said, appears to be certain. What then, I said, is the result of all this ? Is not this the result — that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil ? He assented.
Let us consider this further point, I said : Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is ^ gained by a use, and a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and good fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge, the inference is that every man ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as he can ? Yes, he said.
And the desire to obtain this treasure, which is far more precious than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether citizen or stranger — the eager desire and prayer to them that they would impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonorable, Cleinias ; nor is any one to be blamed for doing any honorable service or ministration to any man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is wisdom. Do you agree to that, I said.
Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right. Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to man spontaneously; for that is a point which has still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me. But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said.
Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say that ; and I am also grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome speculation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love Wisdom, and that you in particular should be of this mind and try to love her ?
Certainly, Socrates, he said ; and I will do my best. I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and said : That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of the sort of exhortations which I desire you to offer ; and I hope that one of you will set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style ; at any rate take up p. 49the inquiry where I left off, and next show the youth whether he should have all knowledge ; or whether there is one sort of knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what that is. For, as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart. Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was coming.
I wanted to see how they would approach the question, and where they would start in their exhortation to « the young man that he should practice wisdom and ^ virtue. Dionysodorus the elder spoke first. Everybody's eyes were directed toward him, perceiving that something wonderful might shortly be expected.
And certainly they were not far wrong ; for the man, Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully persuasive as an exhortation to virtue.
Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest ? (I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting when we asked them to converse with the youth, and that this made them jest and play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided in saying that we were in profound earnest.) Dionysodorus said .
Reflect, Socrates ; you may have to deny your words. I have reflected, I said ; and I shall never deny my words. Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise ? Undoubtedly. And he is not wise yet ? At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is. You wish him, he said, to become wise and not to be ignorant ? That we do. You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is.
I was thrown into consternation at this. Taking advantage of my consternation he added : You wish him no longer to be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty lovers and friends they must be who want their favorite not to be^ or to perish I
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