Phaedrus — Plato

436- 439

" The names Thracia (thra'shf-a) and Scythia (Sy'thf-aJ were applied to various regions at different periods. Here the reference is probably to regions on the west and north coasts of the Black Sea, whose inhabitants were semi-civilized, fierce, and war-like. " The Phoenicians and Egyptians were the principal commercial peoples of antiquity with whom the Greeks were acquainted.

p. 271 None whatever. But the difficulty begins as soon as we raise the question whether these principles are three or one ; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites ; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action — to determine that is the difficulty. Yes, he said, that is the difficulty.

Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different. [The same thing cannot at the same time, with the same part, act in contrary ways, about the same. If therefore we find in ourselves a principle which impels us to eat and drink and indulge in other passions, and another principle which at the same time restrains us from these indulgences, these two principles, the impelling and the restraining, must be distinct.

The principle which impels us we may call the irrational ol appetitive^ and the principle which restrains we may calT'the rational. Socrates continues :] Then let these be marked out as the two principles which there are existing in the soul. And what shall we say of passion, or spirit ? I<s that a thlT^ t or akin to one of the preceding ? I should be inclined to say — ^akin to desire.

Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and on which I rely. The story is that Leqn^tius, the son of Aglaion,^^ was coming up from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, and observed some dead bodies lying on the ground by the executioner.

He felt a longing desire to see them, and also a disgust and abhorrence of them ; for a time he turned away and averted his eyes, and then, suddenly overcome by the impulse, forced them open, ^^ and ran up, saying (to his eyes). Take your fill, ye wretches, of the fair sight. I have heard the story myself, he said. Now this seems to imply that anger differs from the desires, and is sometimes at war with them. That is implied, he said. ^> Leontius (le-dn'shf-us). Aglaion (Sg-lfyon).

272 PLATO THE TEACHER PAnd are there not many other cases in which we observe that, when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of actions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reasoA.

But that the passionate or spirited element should side with the desires when reason decides that she is not to be opposed, this sort of thing, I believe, you will say that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I think, in any one else? Certainly not, he said.

Suppose, I said, that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another : the nobler he is the less able he is to get into a state j of righteous indignation ; his anger refuses to be excited at the hunger or cold or other suffering, which he deems that the injured person may justly inflict upon him ? True, he said.

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then 1 he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to , be justice ; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer ; he must do or die, and will not desist, until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more.

That is a very good illustration, he replied; and in our State as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be d,ogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds. I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me ; there is, however, a further point which I would wish you to consider. What may that be ?

You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a sort of desire, but now we should say the contrary ; ' I for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle. Most assuredly. fBut a further question arises.

Is spirit different from reason also, or only a sort of reason ; in which case, instead of three principles in the soul, there will be only two, the rational and the concupiscent ; or rather, as the State was composed ^^ of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so may there not be in the individual $oul a third element which is passion or spirit, and which is the auxiliary of reason when inot corrupted by education ?