Phaedrus — Plato

p. 395but the imperfect copy made by the carpenter. Moreover a bed may be looked at from many points of view and appears different from each. The painter represents it as it appears from one point only. To take another instance, a painter may paint a cobbler or a carpenter, though he knows nothing of their arts.

Therefore we see the art of painting is an imitation of appearances and the creations of the painter are far removed from reality or truth. In this sense any one may be a creator who catches in a mirror the reflection of the sun, or earth or anything else. The poets are likewise imitators. They write charmingly about all the arts and virtues, but it is impossible from the very nature of knowledge for one person to know all these things.

Moreover, any one who is able to make the original surely would not devote himself to making copies. The poet who had true knowledge of the arts and virtues, would leave many fair works as memorials of himself, instead of singing the praises of others who do accomplish these works. Homer, in his poems, deals with politics, education, military tactics, and the like.

If he had had a knowledge of his subjects, if, for example, he had been a legislator or general, he would have made laws for the better government of some State or given his counsel in war. In reality, he did no public service nor did he act as guide and teacher to his friends.

If Homer or Hesiod had been able to educate and improve mankind, they would have had many loving disciples who would not have allowed them to go about begging, or else would have followed them about in order to get an education. Now since none of these good works or good counsels may be ascribed to the poets, we may infer that they all, beginning with Homer, have been imitators.

As a painter who understands nothing of cobbling may make the likeness of a cobbler, so the poets, in the color of language, present images of virtue and many arts whose nature they understand only enough to imitate them ; and by the beauty of their melody they deceive the ignorant.

It may indeed be shown that " imitation is concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth" as follows: The excellence or beauty of anything depends upon the use for which it is intended. The user of the flute alone knows what are the good and bad qualities of a flute, and must in2p. 396struct the artificer how to make the flute. The imitator who paints or describes the flute, has neither the more perfect knowledge which the user possesses nor the less perfect knowledge which the artificer has gained firom the user. He is, therefore, as said, thrice removed firom true knowledge. ** Imitation is a kind of sport or play, and the epic and tragic writers are imitators in the highest degree.

Now that the nature of imitation has been discovered, the next inquiry is — to what faculty in man does imitation appeal ? Take first the case of painting. Objects in the world about us look diff'erent at different times. For example, the same object appears straight when out of water and crooked in water. Thus do our senses deceive us by various kinds of illusion.

We should be greatly confused by this variety of appearance, were it not that by measuring, weighing, and numbering, we can determine the fact. That part of the soul which trusts to measuring and calculation is the highest and best part, or the rational principle of the soul. That part of the soul which is deceived by appearance and does not rely on measuring, is one of the inferior principles of the soul.

Now the imitations of painting, which, as we have seen, are far removed from the truth, address themselves not to reason, but to an inferior part of the soul which is capable of being imposed upon. We shall find that poetry is analogous to painting in that it appeals to another inferior principle in man's soul. When a man meets with misfortune, his first impulse is to moan and lament.

This impulse is prompted by an irrational or cowardly part of his soul. The highest or rational principle bids him resist the desire to bewail his sufferings. It bids him find a cure or endure with patience. Now the calm wise temperament in which the rational principle prevails is not easy to imitate ; nor would it be appreciated by the mixed multitude which form the audience of the poets.

The multitude understand best the fitful and passionate temper of man. Therefore in order to be popular, the imitative poet does not try to please or affect the rational principle in the soul of his hearers. Instead, he appeals to their feelings and represents men in trouble, weeping and wailing over misfortunes. We are right then in refusing to admit the poet to the State, for he awakens and nourishes the feelings, but he impairs the reason. The most serious charge against poetry is its power of hann3p. 397ing even the good. Even those of us who with pride restrain ourselves from outcry over suffering, delight in giving way to sympathy with the weeping and waihng heroes of tragedy . Can it be right for us to admire in another what we would be ashamed of in ourselves ? If we indulge in pity for others, we become weak ourselves and will end by weeping over our own sorrows. The same is true of comedy.

We laugh at jests on the stage, which we should be ashamed to utter ourselves. If we continue to be amused by coarse merriment we shall ourselves become buffoons. In like manner anger and all the other passions are fed and watered by poetry. But since law and reason are to be rulers in our State, not pain and pleasure, we must expel all poetry except hymns to the Gods and praises of famous men.

We are conscious of the charm of poetry and we should gladly admit her to the State could she make a defense of herself and prove that she is not only delightful but '* useful to States and to human life.''] But so long as she is unable to make good her defense, even though our ears may listen, our soul will ^ 5,][ charmed against her by repeating this discourse of ours, and into the childish love which the many have of her we shall take care not to fall again, for we see that poetry being such as she is, is not to be pursued in earnest or regarded seriously as attaining to the truth ; and he who listens to her will be on his guard against her seductions, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, and he will attend to our words.

Yes, he said, I quite agree with you. Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. Neither under the influence of honor or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, ought he to fail in the observance of justice and virtue. I agree, he said ; and I think that any one would agree who heard the argument.

And yet, I said, no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards of virtue. If, he said, there are others greater than these they must be of an inconceivable greatness.