Phaedrus — Plato
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PH^DO 433 are born again into this world. This generation of the living from the dead is analogous to other processes in nature. Just as sleeping passes into waking and waking into sleeping, as the greater becomes the less and the less grows into 7^" the greater, as all opposites pass, the one into the other, so life passes into death and death again becomes life.
To complete the circle of nature it is necessary that death should generate life.] My dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, \^ and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive — how could this be otherwise ?
For * if the living spring from any othere who are not the dead, and they die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death? There is no escape from that, Socrates, said Cebes ; and I think that what you say is entirely true.
Yes, he said, Cebes, I entirely think so too ; and we are not walking in a vain imagination : but I am confident in the belief that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil.
Cebes added : Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply Recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul was in some place before existing in the human form ^\ here then is another argument of the soul's immortality. But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias interposing, what proofs are given of this doctrine of recollection ?
I am not very sure at this moment that I remember them. One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give •' '• Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting ; The soul that rises with us, our life's star, Hath had elsewhere its setting, And Cometh from afar.
Not in entire forgetfulness, And not in utter nakedness, But trailing clouds of glory, do we come From God, who is our home." — Wordsworth's " Intimations of Immortality. 28 p. 434a true answer of himself, but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him ? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram ^ or to anything of that sort.
But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way; I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection ?
Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias ; but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced : but I should still like to hear what more you have to say. [Socrates gives a proof of the doctrine as follows : What we recollect we must have known at some previous time. This recollection is due to a power of mind called association.
73- For example, a lyre or a garment may remind us of the person who has used the one or worn the other. Simmias may make us think of Cebes because they are frequently in one another's company. Likewise, the imperfect equality of two pieces of wood or stone suggests the idea of perfect equality. Indeed we must have the standard of perfect equality before we can compare two things. Now where did we get our idea of perfect equality.
Surely not through our experience with material objects in this life, for no two material objects are absolutely alike. Their appearance is changing and they serve only to recall the idea of absolute likeness which is ever the same. Moreover the knowledge of perfect equality is not given to us at birth, for all men do not possess it. It comes to none save by a process of remembering, and what we call learning is only recollection.
Clearly then, our knowledge of perfect equality and likewise of perfect beauty, perfect goodness, perfect justice, and the like must have been acquired by us before we came into this world.
Therefore our souls must have existed and had intelligence before birth.] 3^ In a passage from Plato's Meno, which is often quoted in educational journals to illustrate the Socratic method of questioning, a slave boy who cannot read, answers "of himself," a series of simple questions about a geometrical diagram. The boy is led in this way to see for himself the truth of a certain geometrical proposition.
Socrates argues that since the boy has not learned these things m this life, he must be remembering them from a former life.
PH^DO 435 y we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always here is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and esaeral, and to this, which is now discovered to be condition of our being, we refer all our sensations, his compare them — assuming this to have a prior cx.iaicuv.%., when our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument.
There can be no doubt that if these absolute ideas existed before we were born, then our souls must have existed before we were born, and if not the ideas, then not the souls. Yes, Socrates ; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the existence of the soul before birth, and of the essence of which you are speaking : and the argument arrives at a result which happily agrees with my '' own notion.
For there is nothing which to my mind is so evident as that beauty, good, and other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence ; and I am satisfied with the proof. Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied ? for I must convince him too. I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied : although he is the most incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is convinced of the existence of the soul before birth.
But that after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring — the feeling that when the man dies the soul may be scattered, and that this may be the end of her.
For admitting that she may be generated and created in some other place, and may have existed before entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end ?
Very true, Simmias, said Cebes ; that our soul existed before we were born was the first half of the argument, and this appears to have been proven ; that the soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied.
But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said Socrates, if you put the two arguments together — I mean this and the former one, in which we admitted that everything living is born of the dead. For if the soul existed be-
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