Phaedrus — Plato

;euthydemus S3 But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing ? Then we must surely be speaking the same thing ? He admitted that. Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing ? For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all ? He granted that also. Bnt when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say something and you say nothing, is there any contradiction ?

How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not ? Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said : What do you mean, Dionysodorus?

I have often heard, and have been amazed, to hear this thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples of Protagoras,^® and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite wonderful and suicidal, as well as destructive, and I think that I am most likely to hear the truth of this from you. The dictum is that there is no such thing as falsehood ; a man must either say what is true or say nothing.

Is not that your position ? He assented. But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely ? No, he cannot, he said. Then there is no such thing as false opinion ? No, he said. Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant ; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of facts ? Certainly, he said. And that is impossible? Impossible, he replied.

Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus ; or do you seriously maintain that no man is ignorant ? Do you refute me ? he said. But how can I refute you, if, as you say, falsehood is impossible ? Very true, said Euthydemus. Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus ; for how can I tell you to do that which is not ? I" Protagoras (pro-ti(g'o-ras) : a celebrated Sophist See the dialogue Protagoras.

p. 540 Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties and excellent devices of wisdom ; I am afraid that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me therefore if g I ask a very stupid question : if there be no falsehood or ' false opinion or ignorance, there caii be no such thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting — that is what you mean ? Yes, he replied.

And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question : If there is no such thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach ? And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who could learn ?

And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you bring up now what I said at first — and if I had said anything last year, I suppose that you would bring that up — but are nonplussed at the words I have just uttered ?

Why, I said, they are not easy to answer ; for they are the words of wise men : and indeed I have a great difficulty in knowing what you mean in that last expression of yours, ** That I am nonplussed at them.** What do you mean by that, Dionysodorus ? You must mean that I have no refutation of them. Tell me if the words have any other sense.

No, he said ; the sense or meaning of them is that there is a difficulty in answering them ; and I wish that you would answer. What, before you, Dionysodorus ? I said. Answer, said he. And is that fair ? Yes, quite fair, he said. Upon what principle ? I said.

I can only suppose that you are a very wise man, who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows when to answer and when not to answer — and now you won't open your mouth at all, because you know that you ought not. You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you. 1 suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question. Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless ? They are alive. And do you know of any word which is alive ?

p. 55I cannot say that I do. Then why did you ask me what sense my words had ? Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense ; what do you say, wise man ?

If I was not in error, and you do not refute me, all your wisdom will be nonplussed; but if I did fall into error, then again you are wrong in saying that there is no error, — and this remark was made by you not quite a year ago.

I am inclined to think, how- ^^ * ever, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument is not very likely to advance : even your skill in the subtleties of logic, which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another and not falling yourself. Ctesippus said : Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you call yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to talking nonsense.

Fearing that there would be high words, I endeavored to soothe Ctesippus, and said to him : To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said before to Cleinias — that you don't understand the peculiarity of these philosophers. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian wizard, Proteus,^* they take different forms and deceive us by their enchantments ; and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they show us their real form and character.

When they are in earnest their full beauty will appear : let us then beg and entreat and beseech them to shine forth. And I think that I had better show them once more the form in which I pray to behold them. [Socrates gives another example of his method, but the conversation again returns to the level of the two sophists. Several pages of this quibbling are omitted.

Their last masterpiece was a proof that all things which have life are animals, that the gods have life and so are animals, that the gods are your gods, and so you may sell them as you do other animals.] >* Proteus (pr5'teys) : a minor sea divinity who lived on an island off the coast of Egypt. He possessed prophetic power but was reluctant to exercise the gift and. to avoid doing so, would assume all kinds of shapes.

If the one consulting him caught and held him fast through all these changes he returned to his own form and told the truth. Menelaus, the legendary king of Sparta, in this way once forced Proteus to prophesy.