Phaedrus — Plato
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THE REPUBLIC I97 away. But the company would not allow this, and they compelled him to remain and defend his position ; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasyniachus, I said tb him, excellent man, how suggestive are your words ! And are you going away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not ?
Is the attempt to determine the way of man's life such a small matter in your eyes — the attempt to determine the way in which life may be passed by one of us to the greatest advantage ? My reason is that I do not agree with you, he replied. I should rather think, Thrasymachus, that you have no feeling about us, I said ; you don't seem to care whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know.
Prithee, friend, be obliging and impart your wisdom to us; any benefit which is conferred on a large party such as this is will not be unrewarded. For my own part I frankly admit that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe ^«T injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play.
For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament as myself.
Perhaps we may be wrong ; if so, you should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice. [In the discussion which follows, Thrasymachus again finds himself caught in the net of Socrates' questions and his argument refuted. But they arrive at no conclusion satisfactory to Socrates for they have not yet defined justice.
At the close of the discussion Thrasymachus says :] l^t this, Socrates, \ye your entertainment at the Bendidea. And for this I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle toward me, and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained ; but that was my own fault and not yours.
I may liken mjrself to an epicure who snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table before he has fairly enjoyed the one before ; and this has been the case with me. For before I discovered the nature of justice, I left that and proceeded to inquire p. 198whether justice was virtue and wisdom or evil and folly ; and then arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and. injustice, and I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of all is that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I an^ not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the-Just is happy or unhappy.
THE REPUBLIC I99
BOOK II I I With these words I was thinking that I had madeyan end of the discussion ; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is at all times the boidest of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' retirement ; he ^^' wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me : Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?
I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could. Then you certainly have not succeeded. And will you tell me, he said, how you would arrange goods ; is there not one class of goods which are desirable in themselves, and independ- ^ntly of their results, as, for example, mere innocent pleasures and enjoyments, upon which nothing follows? TlhinK that there is such a class, I replied.
What would you say to a second class of goods which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results, such as knowledge, sight, health ?
To that likewise I assent. _ Thirdly, would you recognize ,a class of goods troublesome ^n themselves, yet pr^table to us ; sucK, Tor "example", as gym" nasHc-excrcises, or the Sealing and treatment of disease, and the business of money-making, which fHo opg would choose for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or PKuIt oT them ? There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?
Because I want to know in which of the three classes you ^ would place justice? .• — ■ y^ In the highest and noblest class, I replied, of goods, ^^ f which he who is to be happy desires for their own sakes y^ (^ a^ well as for their r^ults. .--*-- — (^' ^ .
1, » Then the many are of another mind ; they think that justice is of the troublesome class of goods, which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and reputation, but in themselves are rather to be avoided. I know, I said, that this is their doctrine, and this was also
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