Phaedrus — Plato
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p. 383Moreover, as we were saying, he grows worse from having power : he becomes of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more friendless, more impious ; he entertains and nurtures every evil sentiment, and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and thus he makes everybody else equally miserable. No man of any sense will dispute that.
Come then, I said, and as the umpire gives sentence in the games, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in the scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others follow : there are five of them in all — they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical.
The judgment will be easily given, he replied ; they shall be choruses entering on the stage, and I will decide the place of each of them by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.
Need we hire a herald, or shall I proclaim the result — that the son of the best (Ariston)^ is of opinion that the best and justest man is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal master of himself; and that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he who is the greatest tyrant of himself and of his State ? Make the proclamation, he said.
And shall I proclaim further, ** whether seen or imseen by gods and men?*' Yes, he said, you had better add that. Then this, I said, will be the first proof; and there is another, which may also have some weight. What is that ? The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul, seeing that the individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles,^ the division may furnish a new demonstration. Of what nature ?
There are three pleasures which correspond to the three principles, and also three desires and governing powers. How do you mean ? he said. There is one principle with which a man learns, another * Glaucon. to whom Socrates was talking, was the boh of Ariston. Ariston means literally best. a See Book IV., 435-442.
p. 384with which he is angry ; the third, having many forms^ has no single name, but is termed appetitive, from the extraordinary strength and vehemence of the pleasures of eating and drinking g and the other sensual appetites ; also money loving, be- * cause this sort of desires can only be gratified by the help of money. That is true, he said.
If we were to say that the loveg and pleasures of this third part of the soul were concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single class ; and might truly describe this part of the soul as loving gain or money. Yes, I should say that. Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and getting fame? True. Suppose we call that contentious or ambitious — ^would the term be suitable ? Extremely suitable.
On the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than any of the others for gain or fame ? Far less. ** True lover of wisdom," *' lover of knowledge,** are titles which are rightly applicable to that part of the soul ? Certainly. One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others, just as may happen ? Yes.
Then we may assume that there are three classes of men — lovers of wisdom, lovers of ambition, lovers of gain? Exactly. And there are three kinds of pleasures, which are their several objects ? Very true.
Now, if you examine the three classes, and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, each of them will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others : the money-maker will contrast the vanity of honor or of learning with the solid advantages of gold and silver? True, he said. And the lover of honor — what will be his opinion ? Will p. 385he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, which has no meed of honor, he regards as all smoke and nonsense ? True, he said. But may we not suppose, I said, that philosophy estimates other pleasures as nothing in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that abiding, ever learning, in the pursuit of truth, not far indeed from the heaven of pleasure ?
The other pleasures the philosopher disparages by calling them necessary, meaning that if there were no necessity for them, he would not have them. There ought to be no doubt about that, he replied. Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honorable, or better or worse, but which is the more ^ pleasant or painless — how shall we know ? I cannot tell, he said.
Well, but what ought to be the criterion ? Is any better . ' "^> than experience and wisdom and reason ? There cannot be a better, he said. Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated ? Has the lover of gain greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge derived from learning the nature of the truth than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain ?
The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage ; for he has always known the taste of the other pleasures from his youth upwards : but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity tasted — or, I should rather say, could hardly have tasted by any process of learning the nature of things — the sweetness of intellectual pleasures.
Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience ? Very great indeed. Again, has the philosopher greater experience of the pleasures of honor, or the lover of honor of the pleasures of knowledge?
Nay, he said, they are all honored in proportion as they attain their object ; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of worshippers, and as they all receive honor they all have experience of the pleases
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