Charaka-Samhita — trans. Kaviraj Avinash Chandra Kaviratna

question and suggested an answer about the existence of some cause behind the five which is capable of combining them, Bharadwaja proceeds to say that if the union is the result of something about which one may not care, why is it that the foetus, which is stated to be the result of all the causes united together, takes the form of a human being in the case of a human concep¬ tion ? Why also is it said that man has man for his progenitor ? Indeed, if the answer be that because man has man for his progenitor, even as a horse has a horse and a cow has a cow for its progenitor, then the original proposition, viz., that conception is the result of a union of the five causes, becomes no longer justifiable. If, again, Bharadwaja asks, the common saying, viz., man is born. of man, be accepted as true, then why is it that men born of progenitors that are blind, deaf, or dumb, or totally bereft of intelligence, do not resemble their progenitors in respect of those defects ? If the answer to this be that the Self or Soul sees with his own eye, hears with his own ear, etc., i.e., with eye or ear derived by him from the eye or ear he had in a previous state of existence, and not with eye or ear, etc., derived from the progenitor, it can scarcely be tenable. For, if such an answer be accepted as correct, the conclusion becomes inevit able that the Self be¬ comes knower only when he happens to have the senses, and he does not become knower when he does not happen to have the senses. Such aconclusion is diametically opposed to what is universally accepted regarding the Self, and what has been asserted by Punarvasu himself, viz., that the Self in its natural or unmodified condition, is knower. Indeed, it is only the attribute of knowledge that distinguishes Self from Not-Self. Such knowledge is independent of the senses, the mind, and the understanding, for Self exists, when emancipated, freed from these. He is ‘ Sarvendriyavivarjjitah.’ Even then he is knower, for, as has been said in several Upanishads, {vide., Cwetacwatara, 19,) “ though without hands and feet, he is endued with great speed and capable of seizing all things ; though without eyes, he sees everything ; though without ears, he hears everything, etc., etc.” Relying upon the widely accepted nature of the Self, viz., the possession of knowledge inde¬ pendent of the senses, Bharadwaja shows the untenable character of the hypo¬ thesis that the Self becomes knower only when he has the senses and does not become knower when he does not happen to have them. Besides this, another objection is capable of being preferred against that hypothesis. It is this : if both conditions can be posited of the Self, viz., knowledge and absence of knowledge, depending on the presence and absence of the senses, the Self then ceases to be immutable. In fact, it becomes mutable and, therefore, ‘ Prakritika,’ i.e., of the nature of Prakriti which is always mutable or subject to modifications. The Self, however, is universally regarded as

CHARAKA SAMHITA.

73* sently explain why the foetus, which results from all the causes united together, takes birth in a human shape, and why man is said to have man for his progenitor.27

Living creatures have four kinds of origin, viz., uterus, eggs, filth, and germination (upwards through the soil).*

Each of these four orders has innumerable interdistinctions, in consequence of the infinity of distinctions between creature and creature as regards form.

Amongst them, as regards viviparous and oviparous creatures, the entities that create conception take the form of that particular species into whose womb they enter, even as gold and silver and copper and tin and lead, when cast (in a liquified form) into a waxrmould, take the form of the mould itself.

After this manner, when the causal entities already mentioned enter into a human mould, they take birth in a human shape.

Hence, the foetus, though it has all the entities (mentioned) for its constituent causes, takes birth in a human shape.

immutable and as knower. Punarvasu has assented to it. The hypothesis, therefore, of the Selfs being knower when the senses are present, and notknower when the senses are absent, is untenable. Then, again, if the Self ceases to be knower when he does not happen to have senses, it follows from his condition of ignorance that he cannot be the cause of all things. The accepted theory is that the universe consists of two things, viz.. Self and Not-Self. The latter is otherwise called ‘Prakriti.’ Divested, of ‘ chetana ’ or consciousness, Prakriti, which is highly plastic, is moulded or modified by Self who is endued with ‘ chetana.’ The result of the action of Self on ‘ Prakriti ’ is the universe in all its infinity of forms or things falling under the class called Not-Self. If, therefore, Self ceases, however temporarily, to be knower, he becomes incapable of acting upon 1 Prakriti ’ and moulding and modifying it into those infinite forms which constitute the universe of Not-Self

If Self ceases to be the Cause (of the universe) the distinction between Self and Not-Self vanishes, and Self, therefore, becomes Not-Self. — T.

* The word 1 yoni 7 implies species as also the womb in which a creature is born. Here, following the usual Hindu classification, the Rishi names four orders of creatures, viz., viviparous, oviparous, filth-born, aud vegetables. The classification is defective ; for all that, it was accepted by the Rishis generally. They did not know that insects and worms born in filthy places are really egg-born or oviparous. — T,

CHARAKA SAMHITA.

Again, man, it is aaid, has man for his progenitor, because man takes birth in the human species.*28