Charaka-Samhita — trans. Kaviraj Avinash Chandra Kaviratna

Gautama, Nyaya (or reasoning) is ‘ Panchanga ’ or five-limbed ; the five limbs are, as here noted, Pratijna, Hetu, Drishtanta, Upanaya, and Nigamanai. Later logicians of India (such as the famous Raghunath Shiromani, the founder of the Nadiya School of Nyaya, in his ‘P'adartha-khandam,’) have re- construct¬ ed Nyaya by taking it as consisting of only three limbs, viz., Pratijna, Hetu, and Nigamana. The Mimansakas, particularly in their ‘ Bhatta-Chintamani, appear to be of the same opinion. The fact is, to those familiar with the Greek system, the five-limbed Nyaya of Gautama would' certainly appear to be very crude. The presence, again, of Drishtanta and Upanaya among those five limbs would seem to add absurdity to crudity. The fact, however, is that Gautama did not distinguish between Inductive and Deductive reasoning. In the latter, Drishtanta and Upanaya ate not needed. In the former, they areof great service. Then, again, according to the Greek system, Logic is a formal Science, i. e., Science of only the form of thought. Hindu Logic, instead, is concerned not only with form but also with substance or meaning. Hence, the latter is actually conterminous with every branch of knowledgeThe proposition ‘ a horse has wings ’’ is quite logical according to the Greek system. The Hindu system rejects it as absurd. The end of logic, with theHindus, is to acquire true knowledge whereby to achieve Emancipation. No branch of knowledge has any value in the eyes of the Hindu Rishis unless it furthers, by at least a step, man’s efforts to conquer woe and -attain to thaimmutable felicity which Emancipation offers. Drishtanta is a mere example. Upanaya is indicating the relation of similarity between the proposition and the example. Hence, it is an expression, in terms, of the resemblance existing be¬ tween the proposition and the example. — T.

* As printed in some Bengal editions, the text of this aphorism is given! very viciously. Gangadhara’s text is much better. — T.

CHA RA KA-SAMHITA.

p. 568

As regards Hetu : Hetu, verily, is cause of apprehension. That is Pratyaksha (Direct perception), Anumana (Ratiocination), Aitihya (Testimony), and Upamana (Analogy).

Since through these Hetus things are apprehended, therefore is their condition as such (that is, of being the cause of apprenhension)*3a

Upanaya and Nigamana have both been spoken of while explaining Sthapana and Pratishapana {vide aphorisms 30 and 31 ante of this Lesson).

As to Uttara (Answer) : Uttara, verily, is the ascription of dissimilarity of attributes when a Hetu (cause or reason), setting forth similarity of attributes, has been assigned, or the ascription of similarity of attributes when a Hetu, setting forth dissimila¬ rity of attributes, has been assigned.

For instance : one says, — Diseases have attributes similar to those of their Hetus (causes) j (hence) all afflictions caused by cold have similarity of attributes with their Hetus (or causes); hence contact with cold, night dew, and wind, enhances their severity.

Unto such a person, the disputant on the other side should answer that diseases have attributes dissimilar to those of their Hetus (causes) ; since in developing (the sensation of) burning and heat, and inflammation, of the diverse limbs of the body, there is dissimilarity in respect of Hetus, those Hetus being contact with cold, night-dew, and wind.

This contradictory statement would be an answer.83

As to Drishtanta (Example) : Drishtanta, verily, is that which effects an equality of apprehension among both the ignorant and

* The word ‘ tattwa,’ literally, means ‘thatness,’ if such a word, which is convenient, could be used. Here, it refers to the condition of being the cause of apprehension. The Rishi first defines Hetu as ' upalabhdhi-karanam then distributes Hetu into four varieties ; then concludes by adding that since it is through Hetu that things are apprehended, Hetu properly comes under the definition at the outset. — T.

:ha ra kasa miiitA.

p. 569

the learned, and which illustrates the proposition to be established ; such as fire (is example) of heat; water, of liquid; Earth, of stability ; the Sun, of the light which discovers objects.

Another instance of example would be, — As the sun is a discoverer of objects so is an aphorism of Sankhya*3*

As to Siddhanta (determination) : Siddhanta, verily, is that determination which is established, after being proved by means of Hetus (or reasons) by observant people after an examination made in various ways.f

This Siddhanta is of four kinds, viz., Sarvatantra-siddhanta, Pratitantra-siddhanta, Adhikarna-siddhanta, and Abhyupagamasiddhanta.J3*

Amongst these, that, verily, is Sarvatantra-siddhanta which occurs in all treatises bearing on the subject.

For instance : There are causes of diseases ; there are diseases ; there are means for (the alleviation of) curable diseases.§36

Pratitantra-sidahanta, verily, is that which occurs in particular treatises.

For instance : In some treatises it is said that there are eight tastes, in others that there are six tastes.

In some treatises it is said that there are five senses ; in others that there are six senses.