Charaka-Samhita — trans. Kaviraj Avinash Chandra Kaviratna
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The translator’s English as printed (Avinash Chandra Kaviratna). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
* I. e., which the assembly is sure to discountenance. Chakrapani cites such examples as “ there is no future world,” or “ there is nothing like the effects of action in determining one’s course of existence.” It is well-known that the belief in a next world, or in karmaphala, is universal. The negative, as regards both these, is sure to be discountenanced by every one. — T.
p. 565
These (technical) terms should be understood by physicians with a view to learn the course of (medical) disputation. The are i» Vada, 2. Dravya, 3. Guha, 4. Karma, 5. Samanya, 6 Vigesha, 7. Samavaya, 8. Pratijna, 9 Sthapana, 10. Pratisihapana, 11. Hetu, 12. Upanaya, 13. Nigamana, 14. Uttara, 15. Drishtanta, 16. Siddhanta, 17. £avda, 18. Pratyaksha, 19. Anumana, 20. Aupamya, 21. Aitihya, 22. Samgaya, 23. Prayojana, 24. Vyabhichara, 25. Jijnasa, 26. Vyavasaya, 27. Arthaprapti, 28. Sambkava, 29. Anuyojya, 30. Ananuyojya, 31. Anuyoga, 32. Pratyanuyoga, 33. Vakyadosha, 34. Vakyapragamsa, 35. Cchala, 36. Ahetu, 37. Atiiakala, 38. Upalambha, 39. Parihara, 40. Pratijnahani, 41. Abhyanujna, 42. Hetvantara, 43, Arthantara, and 44. Nigrahasthana. ?*zs
Of these, the following on Vada: Vada (disputation) is discus¬ sion with each other, agreeably to the scriptures, and in a spirit of contradiction.
In brief, this disputation is of two kinds : Jalpa and Vitanda.
Of these, the discussion between two persons that have adopted opposite sides (of a question), is Jalpa. Vitanda is Jalpa conduct¬ ed perversely.
In illustration : the proposition of one of the parties is — There is re-birth ; the proposition of the other is — There is no re-birth. Each seeks to establish his own proposition and demolish his antagonist’s by adducing reasons. This is Jalpa.
A perversion of Jalpa is called Vitanda. Verily, Vitanda is merely the imputation of faults to the proposition taken up by the other side.27
* Instead of endeavouring to give the English renderings of these techni¬ cal words, it is more convenient to present them in their original forms. The Rishi, in the succeeding portion of this Lesson, carefully explains every word and the Commentators add illustrations in' a great many cases. Many of these terms belong to the Nyaya school of philosophy', and are well-known to readers conversant with the methods of Hindu dialecticians.
As each of these words, therefore, has been fully explained in the subsequent aphorisms, it is not necessary to render them into English, even if accurate renderings were possible. — T.
p. 566
CHARAK-SAMHITA
Dravya (substance), Guna (attribute), Samanya (similarity), Vigesha (dissimilarity), and Samavaya (combination), — these have been explained, by means of their respective indications, in the Place of flokas Sutrasthana before.*23
Pratijna is, verily, the proposition that is to be established : as, — The soul is ever-existent.f29
Then as to Sthapana : Sthapana is of what has been called Pratijna (or proposition).
This Sthapana (or establishment) is to be made by Hetu (rea¬ son), Drishtanta (example), Upanaya (similarity), and Nigamana (inference or conclusion).
The proposition comes first.
After this comes the establishment. For what is to be estab¬ lished if there be no proposiiion ?
Thus in illustration of the above: ‘The Soul is ever-existent ’ — is a proposition. The Hetu (or reason) is — In consequence of its being uncreated.
Drishtanta (example) : as — Space (which also is increate and ever-existent).
Upanaya (application) : as — Space is increate, so is the Soul.
Nigamana (Inference or conclusion) as, — Hence, the Soul is ev r-existent.J30
* Vide p. — Sutrasthana, ante. Sutrasthana, or place of aphorisms, is sometimes referred to as flokasthanam, or the place of flokas, i. e., verses, be¬ cause the whole of that division is written in verse. — T.
f ‘ Purusha ’ is, literally, ‘ that which lies in pura or the body;' hence, the Soul, which though not of the body resides within it. The Hindu idea is that the Soul is ever-existent, that it is as ancient as ‘ Iswara ’ or the Supreme Being ; that its being invested with a body or material case is the result of acts in a previous state of existence, i*that re-birth, i. e., re-investment in a material case, is going on for ever ; that Emancipation consists in its being freed from the obligation of such re-investment. — T.
% From the language employed above, it is evident that it is borrowed from the Gautama-Sutras, with very slight alterations. In the Gautama-Sutras, the words are ‘Sadhya-nirdefa’ for ‘Sadhya-vachanam’ of Charaka. According to
CHA RA KA-SA M II IT A.
p. 567
As to Pratistliapana : Pratisthapana is the establishment of a proposition that is contradictory in sense to the proposition first mooted. For instance : The soul is not ever-existent. (This is a proposition contradictory in sense to the proposition first mooted, vis., The soul is ever-existent).
The Hetu or reason (of this) is the fact of its being apprehend¬ ed by the senses.
Drishtanta (or example) : as — a Jar. It is apprehended by the senses and is not ever-existent.
Upanaya (or application) : as — As is a jar so is the soul.
Nigamana (inference or conclusion) : as — Hence it (the soul) is not ever-existent.*31
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