Charaka-Samhita — trans. Kaviraj Avinash Chandra Kaviratna

ence together of the soul, the senses, and their objects. When, for example, the soul, the eye, an object of vision, and the mind are present together, knowledge of the visual object arises in the mind. At that time, however, all ■other kinds of knowledge, such as those relating to the other senses, must necessarily be absent. Yet when the mind ceases to act with the eye and begins to act with the organ of hearing, knowledge arises of audible things, such as sound or speech. The presence in the mind of one particular kind of knowlege implies the absence therefrom of other kinds of knowledge at the same unit of time. Hence, in defining mind, the attributes to be particularly referred to are both the presence and the absence of knowledge. If the exis¬ tence or presence only of knowledge be regarded as an indication of the mind, the mind would be non-existent as regards other kinds of knowledge. It would, indeed, be a bold assertion to make that while the mind exists as regards visual knowledge, it does not exist as regards other kinds of knowledge. The capacity of the mind to seize those other kinds of knowledge cannot be denied. Hence, mind is known by the existence and non-existence of knowledge. — T.

* It should be noted that the word ‘ Manas,’ as used in Hindu philosophy, has not for its equivalent 1 Mind,’ for 1 Manas ’ excludes ' Buddhi.’ Vi ith ‘ Buddhi,’ 1 Manas ’ is ‘ Mind.’ Adopting the Kantian distribution of mental phenomena, ‘ Manas,’ it would appear, would include all the cognitive' faculties except ‘ Reason ’ or the faculty of Comparison ; in other words, only the faculties of Acquisition, Conservation, Reproduction, and Representation. Besides these,

‘ Manas ’ includes the feelings of Pleasure and Pain, as also Desire and Will.

‘ Manas ’ is ‘ Anu 1 or subtile, that is, not gross. If it were gross, it would then (as Hindu philosophers argue) have contact with all the senses at the same instant of time, the result of which would be a simultaneous perception of all sensual objects at all times. Such simultaneous perception, however, existing again for all time, does not happen ; when ‘ Manas ’ operates with the organ of scent, it does not operate with that of hearing or sight. Smelling and hearing may sometimes seem to be simultaneous. In point of fact, however, as argued by Gautama, there is no actual simultaniety but succession so rapid that one can hardly be conscious of it The illustration is given of a continuous circle of light produced by the rapid whirling of a burning brand. Some thinkers maintain the opposite and cite an illustration from the act of eating.' a large piece of cake. They maintain that in such a case there is a simultaniety of perceptions, such as the tactual, due to the holding of the cake in the hand ; the visual, due to seeing it ; the auricular due to hearing the noise made by the teeth and tongue in mounching ; while those appertaining to scent and taste are equally apparent. In answer to this, the other side quote the case of piercing a century of lotus petals by the sudden stroke of a needle. There is succession, though

CHARAKA SAMHITA.

That which is remembered, that upon which reason (or com¬ parison) works, that upon which ratiocination is employed, that which after reproduction is held fast in consciousness, that which is re¬ solved upon, and that which is known, form what is called the objects of the mind.®7

Seizure of objects by means of the senses, subjecting them to control, comparison, and ratiocination, are the functions of the mind.

After this the understanding begins to work.*2®

By the organs of sense, with the mind working with them, are all sensuous objects apprehended.

The mind' then works upon those objects, rightly or wrongly.25

The Intellect then, having certitude for its essence, becomes manifested in connection thereto. Aided (thus) by the Intellect, one then sets about to speak or act.f 25'

it is not perceptible. As regards the oneness of the mind, what is held by the orthodox philosophers (by which I mean those who were opposed to the Buddhistic doctrines) is that it is the same mind which sees and hears and smells and touches and tastes. With respect, again, to the operations of the same senses in successive moments of time, it is the same mind that acts in conjunction with it. The mind that sees at one moment of time is identical with the mind that sees at successive moments.

* The principal functions of the mind are i. the seizure of objects through the senses (meaning apprehension), 2. subjecting them to control (probably im¬ plying working upon the objects seized for its own purposes, such as conserving or retaining them, reproducing them, when needed, and representing or holding them before it for the higher purposes of Buddhi or the Intellect), 3. comparison, and 4 ; Ratiocination. The last two functions properly appertain to Buddhi. It is, therefore, the preliminary arrangements of these two processes and not the actual processes that are implied.