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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Thus in the Védanta the highest Brahman is not possessed of pure existence, intellect, and joy as qualities of his nature, but Brahman is existence, intellect, and [45] c XXXIV GAINA SOTRAS. joy itself. In the Sankhya the nature of purusha or soul is similarly defined as being intelligence or light; and the three guzas are described as goodness, energy, and delusion, or light, colour, and darkness; yet these guzas are not qualities in our sense of the word, but, as Professor Garbe adequately calls them, constituents of primitive matter. It is quite in accordance with this way of thinking that the ancient Gaina texts usually speak only of substances, dravyas, and their development or modifications, parydyas; and when they mention guzas, qualities, besides, which however is done but rarely in the Sdtras and regularly in comparatively modern books only, this seems to be a later innovation due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of Ny4ya-Vaiséshika gradually gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus. For at the side of pary4ya, development or modification, there seems to be no room for an independent category ‘quality,’ since pary4ya is the state in which a thing, dravya, is at any moment of its existence, and this must, therefore, include qualities, as seems to be actually the view embodied in the oldest text. Another instance of the Gainas applying the category ‘substance’ to things which are beyond its sphere, and come rather under that of ‘quality,’ is seen in their treating merit and demerit, dharma and adharma, as kinds of substances with which the soul comes into contact}; for they are regarded as coextensive with the world, not unlike space, which even the Vaiséshikas count as a substance. If the categories of substance and quality had already been clearly distinguished from one another, and had been recognised as correlative terms, as they are in Vaiséshika philosophy (which defines substance as the substratum of qualities, and quality as that which is inherent in substance), Gainism would almost certainly not have adopted such confused ideas as those just expounded. ‘ That this was the primitive conception of the Vedic Hindus has been noted by Oldenberg, Die Religion des Veda, p. 317 f. INTRODUCTION. XXXV
2‘ That this was the primitive conception of the Vedic Hindus has been noted by Oldenberg, Die Religion des Veda, p. 317 f. INTRODUCTION. XXXV From the preceding remarks it will be evident that I do not agree with Bhandarkar ', who claims a late origin for Gainism, because, on some points, it entertains the same views as the Vaiséshika. The Vaiséshika philosophy may be briefly described as a philosophical treatment and systematical arrangement of those general concepts and ideas which were incorporated in the language, and formed therefore the mental property common to all who spoke or knew Sanskrit. The first attempts to arrive at such a natural philosophy may have been made at an early epoch; but the perfection of the system, as taught in the aphorisms of Kazada, could not be reached till after many centuries of patient mental labour and continuous philosophical discussion. In the interval between the origin and the final establishment of the system those borrowings may have taken place of which, rightly or wrongly, the Gainas may be accused. I must, however, remark that Bhandarkar believes the Gainas to hold, on the points presently to be discussed, a view ‘which is of the nature of a compromise between the Saénkhyas and the Védantins on the one hand and the Vaiséshika on the other.’ But for our discussion it makes no difference whether direct borrowing or a compromise between two conflicting views be assumed. The points in question are the following: (1) both Gainism and Vaiséshika embrace the Kriy4v4da, i.e. they maintain that the soul is directly affected by actions, passions, &c.; (2) both advocate the doctrine of asatk4rya, i.e. that the product is different from its material cause, while the Véd4nta and Sankhya hold that they are the same (satkArya); (3) that . they distinguish qualities from their substratum (dravya). The latter item has been discussed above; we have to deal, therefore, with the first two only. It will be seen that the opinions under (1) and (2) are the common-sense views ; for that we are directly affected by passions, and that the product is different from its cause, e.g. the tree from the seed, will always and everywhere be the prim4 facié con- » See his Report for 1883-84, p. 101 f. c2 XXXVI GAINA SOTRAS.
3the tree from the seed, will always and everywhere be the prim4 facié con- » See his Report for 1883-84, p. 101 f. c2 XXXVI GAINA SOTRAS. clusion of an unbiassed mind, or rather will appear as the simple statement of what common experience teaches. Such opinions cannot be regarded as characteristic marks of a certain philosophy, and their occurrence in another system need not be explained by the assumption of borrowing. The case would be different if a paradoxical opinion were found in two different schools; for a paradoxical opinion is most likely the product of but one school, and, when once established, it may be adopted by another. But such opinions of the Vaiséshika, as are the result of a peculiar train of reasoning, e.g. that space (dis) and air (4k4sa) are two separate substances, do not recur in Gainism. For in it, as well as in the older Brahmanical systems, Védanta and Sankhya, space and air are not yet distinguished from one another, but 4k4sa is made to serve for both. Some other instances of difference in fundamental doctrines between Vaiséshikas and Gainas are, that according to the former the souls are infinite and all-pervading, while to the latter they are of limited dimensions, and that the Vaiséshikas make dharma and adharma qualities of the soul, while, as has been said above, the Gainas look on them as a sort of substances. In one point, however, there is some resemblance between a paradoxical Vaiséshika opinion and a distinct Gaina doctrine. According to the Vaiséshika there are four kinds of bodies: bodies of earth, as those of men, animals, &c.; bodies of water in the world of Varuza; bodies of fire in the world of Agni; and bodies of wind in the world of Vayu. This curious opinion has its counterpart in Gainism ; for the Gainas, too, assume Earthbodies, Water-bodies, Fire-bodies, and Wind-bodies. However, these elementary bodies are the elements or the most minute particles of them, inhabited by particular souls. This hylozoistic doctrine is, as I have said above, the outcome of primitive animism, while the Vaiséshika opinion, though probably derived from the same current of thought, is an adaptation of it to popular mythology. I make no doubt that the Gaina opinion is much more primitive and INTRODUCTION. XXXVIi belongs to an older stage in the development of philosophical thought than the Vaiséshika assumption of four kinds of bodies.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1Thus in the Védanta the highest Brahman is not possessed of pure existence, intellect, and joy as qualities of his nature, but Brahman is existence, intellect, and [45] c XXXIV GAINA SOTRAS. joy itself. In the Sankhya the nature of purusha or soul is similarly defined as being intelligence or light; and the three guzas are described as goodness, energy, and delusion, or light, colour, and darkness; yet these guzas are not qualities in our sense of the word, but, as Professor Garbe adequately calls them, constituents of primitive matter. It is quite in accordance with this way of thinking that the ancient Gaina texts usually speak only of substances, dravyas, and their development or modifications, parydyas; and when they mention guzas, qualities, besides, which however is done but rarely in the Sdtras and regularly in comparatively modern books only, this seems to be a later innovation due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of Ny4ya-Vaiséshika gradually gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus. For at the side of pary4ya, development or modification, there seems to be no room for an independent category ‘quality,’ since pary4ya is the state in which a thing, dravya, is at any moment of its existence, and this must, therefore, include qualities, as seems to be actually the view embodied in the oldest text. Another instance of the Gainas applying the category ‘substance’ to things which are beyond its sphere, and come rather under that of ‘quality,’ is seen in their treating merit and demerit, dharma and adharma, as kinds of substances with which the soul comes into contact}; for they are regarded as coextensive with the world, not unlike space, which even the Vaiséshikas count as a substance. If the categories of substance and quality had already been clearly distinguished from one another, and had been recognised as correlative terms, as they are in Vaiséshika philosophy (which defines substance as the substratum of qualities, and quality as that which is inherent in substance), Gainism would almost certainly not have adopted such confused ideas as those just expounded. ‘ That this was the primitive conception of the Vedic Hindus has been noted by Oldenberg, Die Religion des Veda, p. 317 f. INTRODUCTION. XXXV
2‘ That this was the primitive conception of the Vedic Hindus has been noted by Oldenberg, Die Religion des Veda, p. 317 f. INTRODUCTION. XXXV From the preceding remarks it will be evident that I do not agree with Bhandarkar ', who claims a late origin for Gainism, because, on some points, it entertains the same views as the Vaiséshika. The Vaiséshika philosophy may be briefly described as a philosophical treatment and systematical arrangement of those general concepts and ideas which were incorporated in the language, and formed therefore the mental property common to all who spoke or knew Sanskrit. The first attempts to arrive at such a natural philosophy may have been made at an early epoch; but the perfection of the system, as taught in the aphorisms of Kazada, could not be reached till after many centuries of patient mental labour and continuous philosophical discussion. In the interval between the origin and the final establishment of the system those borrowings may have taken place of which, rightly or wrongly, the Gainas may be accused. I must, however, remark that Bhandarkar believes the Gainas to hold, on the points presently to be discussed, a view ‘which is of the nature of a compromise between the Saénkhyas and the Védantins on the one hand and the Vaiséshika on the other.’ But for our discussion it makes no difference whether direct borrowing or a compromise between two conflicting views be assumed. The points in question are the following: (1) both Gainism and Vaiséshika embrace the Kriy4v4da, i.e. they maintain that the soul is directly affected by actions, passions, &c.; (2) both advocate the doctrine of asatk4rya, i.e. that the product is different from its material cause, while the Véd4nta and Sankhya hold that they are the same (satkArya); (3) that . they distinguish qualities from their substratum (dravya). The latter item has been discussed above; we have to deal, therefore, with the first two only. It will be seen that the opinions under (1) and (2) are the common-sense views ; for that we are directly affected by passions, and that the product is different from its cause, e.g. the tree from the seed, will always and everywhere be the prim4 facié con- » See his Report for 1883-84, p. 101 f. c2 XXXVI GAINA SOTRAS.
3the tree from the seed, will always and everywhere be the prim4 facié con- » See his Report for 1883-84, p. 101 f. c2 XXXVI GAINA SOTRAS. clusion of an unbiassed mind, or rather will appear as the simple statement of what common experience teaches. Such opinions cannot be regarded as characteristic marks of a certain philosophy, and their occurrence in another system need not be explained by the assumption of borrowing. The case would be different if a paradoxical opinion were found in two different schools; for a paradoxical opinion is most likely the product of but one school, and, when once established, it may be adopted by another. But such opinions of the Vaiséshika, as are the result of a peculiar train of reasoning, e.g. that space (dis) and air (4k4sa) are two separate substances, do not recur in Gainism. For in it, as well as in the older Brahmanical systems, Védanta and Sankhya, space and air are not yet distinguished from one another, but 4k4sa is made to serve for both. Some other instances of difference in fundamental doctrines between Vaiséshikas and Gainas are, that according to the former the souls are infinite and all-pervading, while to the latter they are of limited dimensions, and that the Vaiséshikas make dharma and adharma qualities of the soul, while, as has been said above, the Gainas look on them as a sort of substances. In one point, however, there is some resemblance between a paradoxical Vaiséshika opinion and a distinct Gaina doctrine. According to the Vaiséshika there are four kinds of bodies: bodies of earth, as those of men, animals, &c.; bodies of water in the world of Varuza; bodies of fire in the world of Agni; and bodies of wind in the world of Vayu. This curious opinion has its counterpart in Gainism ; for the Gainas, too, assume Earthbodies, Water-bodies, Fire-bodies, and Wind-bodies. However, these elementary bodies are the elements or the most minute particles of them, inhabited by particular souls. This hylozoistic doctrine is, as I have said above, the outcome of primitive animism, while the Vaiséshika opinion, though probably derived from the same current of thought, is an adaptation of it to popular mythology. I make no doubt that the Gaina opinion is much more primitive and INTRODUCTION. XXXVIi belongs to an older stage in the development of philosophical thought than the Vaiséshika assumption of four kinds of bodies.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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