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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1g&amam pakkgakkhanti. 3 Loe. cit., p. 56. INTRODUCTION. XXV come under the denomination of Akriyavada; and in this they differ from the Vaiséshika proper, which is a Kriy4vada system. As these two terms are frequently used both by Buddhists and Gainas, it will not be amiss to define them more accurately. Kriy4vada is the doctrine which teaches that the soul acts or is affected by acts. Under this head comes Gainism, and of Brahmanica! philosophies Vaiséshika and Ny4ya (which, however, are not expressly quoted in the canonical books of either Buddhists or Gainas), and apparently a great many systems of which the names have not been preserved, but the existence of which is implied in our texts. Akriyavada is the doctrine which teaches either that a soul does not exist, or that it does not act or is not affected by acts. Under this subdivision fall the different schools of materialists; of Brahmanical philosophies the Védanta, Sankhya, and Yéga; and the Buddhists. Of the latter the doctrines of the Kshazikavadins and the Sfinyavadins are alluded to in Sitrakrtanga I, 14, verses 4 and 7. It may be mentioned here that the Véd4ntists or their opinions are frequently mentioned in the Siddhanta; in the Satrakritanga the Védanta is the third heresy described in the First Lecture of the Second Book, p. 344; it is also adverted to in the Sixth Lecture, p. 417. But as no professor of it was among the six heretical teachers (titthiya) of the Buddhists, we may pass them over here !. The fourth heresy discussed in the First Lecture of the Second Book of the Sitrakv#ténga? is Fatalism. In the Sama##aphala Sutta this system is expounded by Makkhali Gésala in the following words *: ‘Great king, there is no cause, nor any previously existing principle productive of the pollution of sentient beings; their defilement is uncaused and unproduced by anything previously existing. There is no cause nor any previously existing principle ‘ It is worthy of remark that the Védantists play no conspicuous part, if any, among Buddha’s opponents. As they were, however, the foremost of Brahmanical philosophers, we must conclude that Brahmans of learning held aloof from the classes of society to which the new religion appealed. 3 Page 345 f., see also p. 239. 3 Grimblot, Sept Suttas P&lis, p. 170. XXvi GAINA SOTRAS.
2As they were, however, the foremost of Brahmanical philosophers, we must conclude that Brahmans of learning held aloof from the classes of society to which the new religion appealed. 3 Page 345 f., see also p. 239. 3 Grimblot, Sept Suttas P&lis, p. 170. XXvi GAINA SOTRAS. productive of the purity of sentient beings: their purity is uncaused and unproduced by anything previously existing. For their production there is nothing that results from the conduct of the individuals, nothing from the actions of others, nothing from human effort: they result neither from power nor effort, neither from manly fortitude nor manly energy. Every sentient being, every insect, every living thing, whether animal or vegetable}, is destitute of intrinsic force, power, or energy, but, being held by the necessity of its nature, experiences happiness or misery in the six forms of existence, &c.’ The explanation of these doctrines in the Sdtrakrztanga (l.c.), though less wordy, comes to the same; it does not, however, expressly ascribe them to Gésdla, the son of Makkhali. The Gainas enumerate four principal schools of philosophy?: Kriyavada, Akriyavada, Ag#anavada, and Vainayikavada. The views of the Ag#Anikas, or Agnostics, are not clearly stated in the texts, and the explanation of the commentators of all these philosophies which I have given in note 2, p. 83, is vague and misleading. But from Buddhist writings we may form a pretty correct idea of what Agnosticism was like. It is, according to the Sama##aphala Sutta, the doctrine of Sa#gaya Béla¢¢kiputta, and is there stated in the following way®: ‘If you inquire of me whether there be a future state of being, I answer: If I experience a future state of existence, I will then explain the nature of that state. If they inquire, Is it after this manner? that is ‘In the original: sabbé satté sabbé p44, sabbé bhfita, sabbé giva. Thesame enumeration frequently occurs in Gaina Sitras, and has, in my translation, been abbreviated in ‘all classes of living beings.’ Buddhaghésa’s explanation has been thus rendered by Hoernle, Uvasaga Dasdo, Appendix II, p. 16: ‘In the term a// deings (sabbé satta) he comprises camels, oxen, asses, and other animals without exception. The term all sensive beings (sabbé p4m4) he uses to denote those with one sense, those with two senses, and so forth. The term al/ generated beings (sabbé bhiit&) he uses with Teference to those that are generated or produced from an egg or from the womb. The term ad! living beings (sabbé giva) he uses with reference to rice, barley, wheat, and so forth; in these he conceives that there is life, because it is their nature to grow.’ 2 See pp. 83, 291, 316, 385. 3 Grimblot, 1. c., p. 174. INTRODUCTION. XXVii
3The term ad! living beings (sabbé giva) he uses with reference to rice, barley, wheat, and so forth; in these he conceives that there is life, because it is their nature to grow.’ 2 See pp. 83, 291, 316, 385. 3 Grimblot, 1. c., p. 174. INTRODUCTION. XXVii not my concern. Is it after that fashion? that is not my concern. Is it different from these? that is not my concern, Is it not? that is not my concern. No, is it not? It is no concern of mine.’ In the same way he e.g. refuses a definite answer to the questions whether the Tathagata is after death, or is not; is and is not at the same time, is not nor isnot at thesametime. It is evident that the Agnostics examined all modes of expression of the existence or nonexistence of a thing, and if it were anything transcendental or beyond human experience, they negatived all those modes of expression. The records of the Buddhists and Gainas about the philosophical ideas current at the time of the Buddha and Mahavira, meagre though they be, are of the greatest importance to the historian of that epoch. For they show us the ground on which, and the materials with which, a religious reformer had to build his system. The similarity between some of those ‘heretical’ doctrines on the one side, and Gaina or Buddhist ideas on the other, is very suggestive, and favours the assumption that the Buddha, as well as Mahavira, owed some of his conceptions to these very heretics, and formulated others under the influence of the controversies which were continually going on with them. Thus, I think, that in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sa%gaya, Mahavira has established the SyAdv4da. For as the Ag#dnavada declares that of a thing beyond our experience the existence, or non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence, can neither be affirmed nor denied, so in a similar way, but one leading to contrary results, the Syadv4da declares that ‘you can affirm the existence of a thing from one point of view (sy4d asti), deny it from another (sy4d n4sti) ; and affirm both existence and non-existence with reference to it at different times (sy4d asti nAsti). If you should think of affirming existence and non-existence at the same time from the same point of view, you must say that the thing cannot be spoken of (sy4d avaktavyaz). Similarly, under certain circumstances, the affirmation of existence is not possible XXviil GAINA SOTRAS. (syad asti avaktavya); of non-existence (sy4n nAsti avaktavyah); and also of both (sy4d asti nAsti avaktavyah)}.’
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1g&amam pakkgakkhanti. 3 Loe. cit., p. 56. INTRODUCTION. XXV come under the denomination of Akriyavada; and in this they differ from the Vaiséshika proper, which is a Kriy4vada system. As these two terms are frequently used both by Buddhists and Gainas, it will not be amiss to define them more accurately. Kriy4vada is the doctrine which teaches that the soul acts or is affected by acts. Under this head comes Gainism, and of Brahmanica! philosophies Vaiséshika and Ny4ya (which, however, are not expressly quoted in the canonical books of either Buddhists or Gainas), and apparently a great many systems of which the names have not been preserved, but the existence of which is implied in our texts. Akriyavada is the doctrine which teaches either that a soul does not exist, or that it does not act or is not affected by acts. Under this subdivision fall the different schools of materialists; of Brahmanical philosophies the Védanta, Sankhya, and Yéga; and the Buddhists. Of the latter the doctrines of the Kshazikavadins and the Sfinyavadins are alluded to in Sitrakrtanga I, 14, verses 4 and 7. It may be mentioned here that the Véd4ntists or their opinions are frequently mentioned in the Siddhanta; in the Satrakritanga the Védanta is the third heresy described in the First Lecture of the Second Book, p. 344; it is also adverted to in the Sixth Lecture, p. 417. But as no professor of it was among the six heretical teachers (titthiya) of the Buddhists, we may pass them over here !. The fourth heresy discussed in the First Lecture of the Second Book of the Sitrakv#ténga? is Fatalism. In the Sama##aphala Sutta this system is expounded by Makkhali Gésala in the following words *: ‘Great king, there is no cause, nor any previously existing principle productive of the pollution of sentient beings; their defilement is uncaused and unproduced by anything previously existing. There is no cause nor any previously existing principle ‘ It is worthy of remark that the Védantists play no conspicuous part, if any, among Buddha’s opponents. As they were, however, the foremost of Brahmanical philosophers, we must conclude that Brahmans of learning held aloof from the classes of society to which the new religion appealed. 3 Page 345 f., see also p. 239. 3 Grimblot, Sept Suttas P&lis, p. 170. XXvi GAINA SOTRAS.
2As they were, however, the foremost of Brahmanical philosophers, we must conclude that Brahmans of learning held aloof from the classes of society to which the new religion appealed. 3 Page 345 f., see also p. 239. 3 Grimblot, Sept Suttas P&lis, p. 170. XXvi GAINA SOTRAS. productive of the purity of sentient beings: their purity is uncaused and unproduced by anything previously existing. For their production there is nothing that results from the conduct of the individuals, nothing from the actions of others, nothing from human effort: they result neither from power nor effort, neither from manly fortitude nor manly energy. Every sentient being, every insect, every living thing, whether animal or vegetable}, is destitute of intrinsic force, power, or energy, but, being held by the necessity of its nature, experiences happiness or misery in the six forms of existence, &c.’ The explanation of these doctrines in the Sdtrakrztanga (l.c.), though less wordy, comes to the same; it does not, however, expressly ascribe them to Gésdla, the son of Makkhali. The Gainas enumerate four principal schools of philosophy?: Kriyavada, Akriyavada, Ag#anavada, and Vainayikavada. The views of the Ag#Anikas, or Agnostics, are not clearly stated in the texts, and the explanation of the commentators of all these philosophies which I have given in note 2, p. 83, is vague and misleading. But from Buddhist writings we may form a pretty correct idea of what Agnosticism was like. It is, according to the Sama##aphala Sutta, the doctrine of Sa#gaya Béla¢¢kiputta, and is there stated in the following way®: ‘If you inquire of me whether there be a future state of being, I answer: If I experience a future state of existence, I will then explain the nature of that state. If they inquire, Is it after this manner? that is ‘In the original: sabbé satté sabbé p44, sabbé bhfita, sabbé giva. Thesame enumeration frequently occurs in Gaina Sitras, and has, in my translation, been abbreviated in ‘all classes of living beings.’ Buddhaghésa’s explanation has been thus rendered by Hoernle, Uvasaga Dasdo, Appendix II, p. 16: ‘In the term a// deings (sabbé satta) he comprises camels, oxen, asses, and other animals without exception. The term all sensive beings (sabbé p4m4) he uses to denote those with one sense, those with two senses, and so forth. The term al/ generated beings (sabbé bhiit&) he uses with Teference to those that are generated or produced from an egg or from the womb. The term ad! living beings (sabbé giva) he uses with reference to rice, barley, wheat, and so forth; in these he conceives that there is life, because it is their nature to grow.’ 2 See pp. 83, 291, 316, 385. 3 Grimblot, 1. c., p. 174. INTRODUCTION. XXVii
3The term ad! living beings (sabbé giva) he uses with reference to rice, barley, wheat, and so forth; in these he conceives that there is life, because it is their nature to grow.’ 2 See pp. 83, 291, 316, 385. 3 Grimblot, 1. c., p. 174. INTRODUCTION. XXVii not my concern. Is it after that fashion? that is not my concern. Is it different from these? that is not my concern, Is it not? that is not my concern. No, is it not? It is no concern of mine.’ In the same way he e.g. refuses a definite answer to the questions whether the Tathagata is after death, or is not; is and is not at the same time, is not nor isnot at thesametime. It is evident that the Agnostics examined all modes of expression of the existence or nonexistence of a thing, and if it were anything transcendental or beyond human experience, they negatived all those modes of expression. The records of the Buddhists and Gainas about the philosophical ideas current at the time of the Buddha and Mahavira, meagre though they be, are of the greatest importance to the historian of that epoch. For they show us the ground on which, and the materials with which, a religious reformer had to build his system. The similarity between some of those ‘heretical’ doctrines on the one side, and Gaina or Buddhist ideas on the other, is very suggestive, and favours the assumption that the Buddha, as well as Mahavira, owed some of his conceptions to these very heretics, and formulated others under the influence of the controversies which were continually going on with them. Thus, I think, that in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sa%gaya, Mahavira has established the SyAdv4da. For as the Ag#dnavada declares that of a thing beyond our experience the existence, or non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence, can neither be affirmed nor denied, so in a similar way, but one leading to contrary results, the Syadv4da declares that ‘you can affirm the existence of a thing from one point of view (sy4d asti), deny it from another (sy4d n4sti) ; and affirm both existence and non-existence with reference to it at different times (sy4d asti nAsti). If you should think of affirming existence and non-existence at the same time from the same point of view, you must say that the thing cannot be spoken of (sy4d avaktavyaz). Similarly, under certain circumstances, the affirmation of existence is not possible XXviil GAINA SOTRAS. (syad asti avaktavya); of non-existence (sy4n nAsti avaktavyah); and also of both (sy4d asti nAsti avaktavyah)}.’
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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