Fetching
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One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1smallness ends and length begins. This applies to all things which we are supposed to know, that is, which we are able to name. And hence the Buddhist metaphysician tells us that all things are but names, saw^/zas^, and that being names they are neither what they seem to be nor what they do not seem to be. This extreme Pyrrhonism is afterwards applied to everything. Dust is not dust, because we cannot draw a line between the smallest molecules, the smallest granules, the smallest dust, and the smallest gravel. There are no signs (no re/c/xj/pta or o/pteta) by which we can know or distinguish these objects. There are in fact no objects, independent of us ; hence whoever speaks of things, of beings, of living beings, of persons, &c., uses names only, and the fact that they are names implies that the normal things are not what they seem to be. This, I believe, is the meaning of the constantly recurring phrase : What is spoken of as ' beings, beings indeed ' that was preached or called by Buddha as no-beings ; that is, every name and every concept is only a makeshift, if it is not altogether a failure ; it is certainly not true. We may speak of a dog, but there is no such thing as a dog. It is always either a greyhound or a spaniel, this or that dog, but dog is only an abstraction, a name, a concept of our mind. The same applies to quadruped, animal, living being, and being ; they are all names with nothing corresponding to them. This is what is meant by the highest perfect knowledge, in which nothing, not even the smallest thing, is known, or known to be known (par. 22). In that knowledge there is no difference, it is always the same and therefore perfect (par. 23). He who has attained this knowledge believes neither in the idea, i. e, the name of a thing, nor in the idea of a no-thing, and Buddha by using the expression, the idea, or name (sa;//^;7a) of a thing, implies thereby that it is not the idea of a thing (par. 31). This metaphysical Agnosticism is represented as perfectly familiar even to children and ignorant persons (par. 30),
2XVI THE VAGRAA'A'WEDIKA. and if it was meant to be so, the endless repetition of the same process of reasonini^ may find its explanation. That this extreme scepticism or Pyrrhonism is really the popular view of the present followers of the Mahayana Buddhism, was clearly stated at the Congress of Religions, held in Chicago, in September, 1893. A Deputy sent by the leading sects in Japan, submitted to the Congress an outline of the doctrines of the Mahayana Buddhists drawn up by Mr. S. Kuroda. This outline had been carefully examined and approved by scholars belonging to six of the Buddhist sects in Japan, and was published with authority at Tokyo in 1 893. This is what he writes of the Mahaj-ana metaphysics : ' The distinction between pure and impure is made by the mind ; so are also all the changes in all things around us. All things that are produced by causes and conditions, are inevitably destined to extinction. There is nothing that has any reality ; when conditions come things begin to appear, when conditions cease these things likewise cease to exist. Like the foam of the water, like the lightning flash, and like the floating, swiftly vanishing clouds they are only of momentary duration ^ As all things have no constant nature of their own, so there is no actuality in pure and impure, rough and fine, large and small, far and near, knowablc and unknowable, &c. On this account it is sometimes said that all things arc nothing. The apparent phenomena around us are, however, produced by mental operations within us, and thus distinctions are established. ' These distinctions produced by mental operations are, however, caused by fallacious reasoning nurtured by the habits of making distinctions between ego and non-ego, good and bad, and by ignorance of the fact that things have no constant nature of their own and are without distinctions (when things thought of have no corresponding reality, such thinking is called fallacious. It may be compared to the action of the ignorant monkey that tries to catch the image of the moon upon water). Owing to this fallacious reasoning, a variety of phenomena constantly ' Cf. Vn^ra*AAcdika, par. 32.
3appear and disappear, good and bad actions are done, and the wanderings through the six ways or states of Hfe are thus caused and maintained. 'All things are included under subject and object. The subject is an entity in which mental operations are awakened whenever there are objects, while the object consists of all things, visible and invisible, knowable and unknowable, &c. The subject is not something that occupies some space in the body alone, nor does the object exist outside of the subject. The innumerable phenomena of subject and object, of ego and non-ego, are originated by the influence of fallacious thinking, and consequently various principles, sciences, and theories are produced. ' To set forth the principle of " Vidyamatra " (all things are nothing but phenomena in mind), phenomena of mind are divided into two kinds : — " Gosshiki " (unknowable) and " Fumbetsujishiki " (knowable). They are also divided into eight kinds: — i. i^akshur-vi^;7ana (mental operations depending on the eye), 2. 6"rotra-vi^77ana (those depending on the ear), 3. Ghra;/a-vi^;7ana (those depending on the olfactory organs), 4. 6^ihva-vi^;?ana (those depending on the taste), 5. Kaya-vi^«ana (those depending on the organs of touch), 6. Manovi^;7ana (thinking operations), 7. Klish/a-mano-vi^/zana (subtile and ceaseless operations), 8. Alaya-vi^«ana (all things come from and are contained in this operation ; hence its name, meaning receptacle). ' According to the former division, the various phenomena which appear as subjects and objects are divided into two kinds : — the perceptible and knowable, the imperceptible and unknowable. The imperceptible and unknowable phenomena are called " Gosshiki," while the perceptible and knowable phenomena are called "Fumbetsujishiki. Now what are the imperceptible and unknowable phenomena? Through the influence of habitual delusions, boundless worlds, innumerable varieties of things spring up in the mind. This boundless universe and these subtile ideas are not perceptible and knowable ; only Bodhisattvas believe, understand, and become perfectly convinced of these [49] '"'b
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1smallness ends and length begins. This applies to all things which we are supposed to know, that is, which we are able to name. And hence the Buddhist metaphysician tells us that all things are but names, saw^/zas^, and that being names they are neither what they seem to be nor what they do not seem to be. This extreme Pyrrhonism is afterwards applied to everything. Dust is not dust, because we cannot draw a line between the smallest molecules, the smallest granules, the smallest dust, and the smallest gravel. There are no signs (no re/c/xj/pta or o/pteta) by which we can know or distinguish these objects. There are in fact no objects, independent of us ; hence whoever speaks of things, of beings, of living beings, of persons, &c., uses names only, and the fact that they are names implies that the normal things are not what they seem to be. This, I believe, is the meaning of the constantly recurring phrase : What is spoken of as ' beings, beings indeed ' that was preached or called by Buddha as no-beings ; that is, every name and every concept is only a makeshift, if it is not altogether a failure ; it is certainly not true. We may speak of a dog, but there is no such thing as a dog. It is always either a greyhound or a spaniel, this or that dog, but dog is only an abstraction, a name, a concept of our mind. The same applies to quadruped, animal, living being, and being ; they are all names with nothing corresponding to them. This is what is meant by the highest perfect knowledge, in which nothing, not even the smallest thing, is known, or known to be known (par. 22). In that knowledge there is no difference, it is always the same and therefore perfect (par. 23). He who has attained this knowledge believes neither in the idea, i. e, the name of a thing, nor in the idea of a no-thing, and Buddha by using the expression, the idea, or name (sa;//^;7a) of a thing, implies thereby that it is not the idea of a thing (par. 31). This metaphysical Agnosticism is represented as perfectly familiar even to children and ignorant persons (par. 30),
2XVI THE VAGRAA'A'WEDIKA. and if it was meant to be so, the endless repetition of the same process of reasonini^ may find its explanation. That this extreme scepticism or Pyrrhonism is really the popular view of the present followers of the Mahayana Buddhism, was clearly stated at the Congress of Religions, held in Chicago, in September, 1893. A Deputy sent by the leading sects in Japan, submitted to the Congress an outline of the doctrines of the Mahayana Buddhists drawn up by Mr. S. Kuroda. This outline had been carefully examined and approved by scholars belonging to six of the Buddhist sects in Japan, and was published with authority at Tokyo in 1 893. This is what he writes of the Mahaj-ana metaphysics : ' The distinction between pure and impure is made by the mind ; so are also all the changes in all things around us. All things that are produced by causes and conditions, are inevitably destined to extinction. There is nothing that has any reality ; when conditions come things begin to appear, when conditions cease these things likewise cease to exist. Like the foam of the water, like the lightning flash, and like the floating, swiftly vanishing clouds they are only of momentary duration ^ As all things have no constant nature of their own, so there is no actuality in pure and impure, rough and fine, large and small, far and near, knowablc and unknowable, &c. On this account it is sometimes said that all things arc nothing. The apparent phenomena around us are, however, produced by mental operations within us, and thus distinctions are established. ' These distinctions produced by mental operations are, however, caused by fallacious reasoning nurtured by the habits of making distinctions between ego and non-ego, good and bad, and by ignorance of the fact that things have no constant nature of their own and are without distinctions (when things thought of have no corresponding reality, such thinking is called fallacious. It may be compared to the action of the ignorant monkey that tries to catch the image of the moon upon water). Owing to this fallacious reasoning, a variety of phenomena constantly ' Cf. Vn^ra*AAcdika, par. 32.
3appear and disappear, good and bad actions are done, and the wanderings through the six ways or states of Hfe are thus caused and maintained. 'All things are included under subject and object. The subject is an entity in which mental operations are awakened whenever there are objects, while the object consists of all things, visible and invisible, knowable and unknowable, &c. The subject is not something that occupies some space in the body alone, nor does the object exist outside of the subject. The innumerable phenomena of subject and object, of ego and non-ego, are originated by the influence of fallacious thinking, and consequently various principles, sciences, and theories are produced. ' To set forth the principle of " Vidyamatra " (all things are nothing but phenomena in mind), phenomena of mind are divided into two kinds : — " Gosshiki " (unknowable) and " Fumbetsujishiki " (knowable). They are also divided into eight kinds: — i. i^akshur-vi^;7ana (mental operations depending on the eye), 2. 6"rotra-vi^77ana (those depending on the ear), 3. Ghra;/a-vi^;7ana (those depending on the olfactory organs), 4. 6^ihva-vi^;?ana (those depending on the taste), 5. Kaya-vi^«ana (those depending on the organs of touch), 6. Manovi^;7ana (thinking operations), 7. Klish/a-mano-vi^/zana (subtile and ceaseless operations), 8. Alaya-vi^«ana (all things come from and are contained in this operation ; hence its name, meaning receptacle). ' According to the former division, the various phenomena which appear as subjects and objects are divided into two kinds : — the perceptible and knowable, the imperceptible and unknowable. The imperceptible and unknowable phenomena are called " Gosshiki," while the perceptible and knowable phenomena are called "Fumbetsujishiki. Now what are the imperceptible and unknowable phenomena? Through the influence of habitual delusions, boundless worlds, innumerable varieties of things spring up in the mind. This boundless universe and these subtile ideas are not perceptible and knowable ; only Bodhisattvas believe, understand, and become perfectly convinced of these [49] '"'b
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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